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Abstract: 
 
This thesis covers the situation of the Iraqi press landscape after the toppling of 
Saddam’s regime on the 9th of April 2003. In particular, it attempts to disclose 
American interventions in the work of the Iraqi press in the period 2003-2006. It 
examines three main aspects of these interventions, as briefly summarized below: 
press legislation; planning and construction of new press entities; and attempts to 
influence pro-American press coverage following the invasion.  
 
Within a few weeks of the fall of Saddam’s regime, Iraq witnessed the launch of 
many newspapers, after many decades of government oppression and censorship. 
The phenomenal mushrooming of Iraqi local newspapers was used by the U.S 
government as an indication of success in democratizing a country in which the local 
press had suffered from the oppression of different military governments, and finally 
of Saddam Hussein and his notorious son Uday. However, this thesis shows that the 
flood of newspapers caused anarchy in the press market. As a result there was 
confusion among many readers about the credibility of the new press, because of the 
lack of professionalism in its coverage.  
 
- The existing, laws active in Iraq restricted the freedom of the press, and there 
was a need to establish a new legal framework for the media. The U.S Army’s 
first reforms abolished several articles of the press laws. This study shows, 
however, that these reforms had questionable practical effect.  The reforms 
abolished laws relating to the Ba’ath regime and Saddam Hussein, which were in 
fact already redundant, given the collapse of the regime. Meanwhile other 
articles in the Iraqi penal code, prescribing measures to punish newspapers, 
journalists or editors, were left intact when they should have been changed or 
cancelled. In addition, the Coalition Provisional Authority added an article that 
gave the head of the CPA the right to close or to punish any media entity if they 
violated certain conditions.  
 
- The thesis shows that the Americans’ early plans to shape the Iraqi press were 
mostly motivated by the need to create a press friendly to the American 
occupation, and to confront anti American messages or campaigns. The 
Department of Defense handled the early plans to “build” such media entities, 
but the Pentagon was not successful, as the main contractor was oriented more 
towards information control, and lacked experience in building media 
 x 
organizations. As a result of this the U.S plans for the Iraqi media in general 
stumbled, and did not make the expected progress.  
 
- American intervention in the Iraqi press was not limited to attempts to create an 
official “friendly” press, but extended into persistent efforts to influence the local 
“independent” press. This thesis uses evidence based on original interviews with 
leading figures from the Iraqi press to build up a detailed picture of these 
attempts. Different American military units or institutions used different 
procedures to pass messages that were directed to helping polish the image of 
the American soldiers, and at the same time demonize their “enemies”.  One of 
these procedures was to create friendly “independent” newspapers, covering 
certain events that would show the U.S Army as helping to establish new public 
services. The other favoured procedure was to bribe local journalists to cover 
such events and publish them in existing newspapers, or to pay newspapers to 
publish articles written by American soldiers and then translated into Arabic.   
 
 
 1 
Introduction: 
The dramatic change in Iraq after the 2003 invasion affected almost every aspect of 
daily life in Iraqi society, including the print media.  This study will highlight changes 
in the national, regional and specialist Iraqi press. Its primary objective is to trace 
how, and to what extent, a form of free press - press produced by independent 
national journalists for national consumption - has been able to develop in Iraq. 
Giving a background account of the situation of the print media during Ba’ath Party 
rule and Saddam Hussein’s national regimes, it discusses the developments that 
took place after the 2003 American invasion. It explores the factors that affected the 
expansion of the Iraqi press after the invasion, and presents evidence of attempts to 
influence, manipulate or directly control the Iraqi print media. This thesis investigates 
the American-sponsored Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and the cluster of 
associated companies and organisations, that were heavily involved in Iraqi press 
development after 2003. 
 
The thesis starts with a brief historical survey of Ba’ath Party rule in Iraq, from after 
the 1968 coup up to 2003, in order to provide a background picture of the Iraqi press 
at the time of the invasion. The study then examines in depth the state of the press 
under the regime of Saddam Hussein, from his ascent to the presidency in 1979 up 
to his dispossession of power in 2003.  It also covers the phenomenal rise of Uday 
Saddam Hussein’s interests in the media, and his role in shaping the Iraqi print 
press, and the Iraqi media more generally.  
 
The central part of the thesis explores the press explosion after 2003, and analyses 
its phenomenal expansion thereafter in depth. The main chapters are particularly 
concerned with examining the role of the American occupying powers - military and 
civilian - in relation to the establishment of a post-Saddam press that would combine 
freedom of expression with the promotion of positive accounts and reports of the 
intervention in Iraq by external powers. The tensions inherent in this agenda for Iraqi 
press development have already seen several phases of experiments in the short 
history of the post-Saddam media in the period covered by the research (2003-2006). 
To establish a broader historical perspective for the Iraqi case, the thesis suggests 
two previous twentieth century experiences that can be related to the situation in 
Iraq. The first of these is the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989, and its effect on the 
press, especially in the smaller countries of Eastern Europe where local dictatorships 
had a tight control over national press – which could be related to Iraq’s experience 
during the Saddam era. The second example is found in the late 1940s, when 
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international conflict produced situations of occupation, and of political restructuring 
and re-education, probably more directly comparable to the case of Iraq in 2003. The 
American Occupation of Japan, and of part of Germany, after the Second World War 
have clear parallels with the American situation in Iraq after 2003. Both sets of 
experience, from the 1940s and the 1990s, have been proposed as points of 
comparison for the still-evolving situation in Iraq. In my introductory survey of this 
scholarship, I will discuss to what extent such comparisons cast a helpful light on the 
interpretation of American interventions in, and attitudes towards, the national media 
following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime.  
 
Chapter analysis: 
The first chapter establishes the background of modern Iraqi press history, drawing a 
picture of the press and the media during the Ba’ath Party era. It discusses the 
circumstances Iraqi journalists were confronted with after the Ba’ath Party coup in 
1968. The chapter gives an account of Ba’ath Party newspapers, representing the 
government, and investigates those of other political parties, such as the Communist 
Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party. The conflict of interests between these main 
parties affected the development of the Iraqi press in the first decade of Ba’ath 
government. The chapter draws a picture of how several important political events in 
this period affected the freedom of Iraqi newspapers and their journalists.  
 
The second chapter presents the situation of Iraqi newspapers during Saddam’s era. 
The chapter highlights Saddam’s concerns about the media, and his monopoly over 
the press. The chapter discusses the effects of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and the 
rise of a new generation of journalists who served in a newspaper which represented 
the Iraqi army. More importantly, the chapter investigates the rise of Uday Saddam 
Hussein, and his domination over the Iraqi press, and the media in general. This part 
of the thesis documents Uday’s behaviour, and his abusive actions towards many 
Iraqi journalists when he became the head of the journalists’ syndicate.  This section 
draws on eyewitness accounts from many journalists. The chapter also covers what 
was called at the time the “weekly newspaper-magazine phenomena”, and the daring 
style of such papers in criticising the Iraqi government, while preserving certain 
taboos. Overall, the chapter offers a detailed and holistic picture of the situation and 
of some of the principal characteristics of the print media during Saddam’s ruling 
years.    
 
The third chapter covers the early preparations for the United States’ campaign 
against Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion. This campaign aimed to demonise the Ba’ath 
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Party regime and to present it as a rogue state, which threatened international peace. 
The chapter highlights the United States’ efforts to finance exiled newspapers and to 
unify the work of different Iraqi opposition movements.  Next, the chapter discusses 
the early stages of the war, through presenting the rival propaganda campaigns of 
the Iraqi government, and of the United States and its allies. The chapter explores 
both sides’ propaganda techniques, and the people that led such campaigns. It 
covers the last few days of the official Iraqi newspapers until the fall of Saddam’s 
regime on 9 April 2003. The chapter discusses the hopes of Iraqi journalists for 
freedom and a healthy journalistic environment, and also covers the early launch of 
the first “official” national newspaper in Iraq under the American occupation.  
 
The fourth chapter covers the new press, launched after the fall of Saddam’s regime. 
It draws a picture of how new publications, established by different individuals, 
political parties and others, flooded the market to the extent that many journalists 
called it “press anarchy”. It also covers technical challenges that the new publications 
had to confront, such as the issue of distribution, the newspapers’ financial 
resources, and the importance of advertisements for these publications. The chapter 
discusses the characteristics of the new press, discussing both their common bases, 
and the differences between them. This chapter differentiates between the various 
types of print media, in line with the motivation of those launching the publications, 
the language of the newspapers, their ownership, and other issues.  
 
The fifth chapter, “Publishing Legislation”, discusses the legal framework of the Iraqi 
press, and the Iraqi Media Network. It starts with the preparations for a new press 
framework drawn up by the Americans and their allies and advisers before the launch 
of the invasion, and traces how these were later formalised by the American authority 
in Iraq or by Iraqi government orders. The chapter sets these measures in context by 
discussing the previous press legislation of the Saddam era, and explores what parts 
of this framework the new authorities left intact, without any reform. It goes on to 
discuss extensively the introduction of new “prohibited actions” for the press, through 
order 14, which was introduced by order number 2 in June 2003. The chapter 
examines the Iraqi penal code, which the Americans did not alter, and which 
contained a large number of articles punishing publishing crimes. These punishments 
could range from fines imposed either on writers or on publications, to long-term 
sentences of imprisonment. The chapter presents cases where the American 
authority used order number 14 to close down several newspapers. Besides these 
instances of formal legislation and direct political control of the press, the chapter 
discusses the security situation and how it affected press freedom indirectly but 
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significantly during this period.  
 
The sixth chapter covers the United States’ plans for how they would handle the Iraqi 
media after removing Saddam’s regime. It discusses how initial American plans for 
the Iraqi media differed, covering in succession the plans proposed by the State 
Department, the Pentagon, and finally the recommendations of the United States’ 
Institute of Peace. The chapter discusses the launch of the Iraqi Media Network by 
the Pentagon, through a sole contract handed to the company “Science Application 
Information Corporation” (SAIC). This company had no previous experience in 
building a media organisation, but had previously specialised in the “control” of 
information released via the media. The criticisms directed towards the network are 
covered, in addition to the interventions of the CPA - the American authority in Iraq. 
 
The seventh chapter investigates the propaganda campaigns practised by the 
different American stakeholders in Iraq. The chapter covers US army psychological 
operations, using evidence collected through numerous interviews conducted with 
Iraqi journalists. The research presents an example of a US financed newspaper, 
Wassit Al Aan, through an interview with the editor-in-chief, and analysis of the 
majority of the publication’s back copies.  This chapter also discusses the Baghdad 
Press Club, formed under the supervision of the American army in Iraq, where 
journalists were “rewarded” for positive coverage of certain events related to 
American army activities. This chapter includes exclusive interviews with the head of 
the club and a journalist who was an active member. It covers a newspaper bribery 
scandal, showing how the Pentagon had commissioned a company to plant certain 
kinds of stories in the Iraqi press, and presents the company’s techniques and the 
mechanisms of this process. The final phase of this chapter covers the reaction of 
the United States’ government towards the scandal, and the way it was dealt with 
officially. 
 
In the last chapters (eight and nine) of the thesis, the chronological and institutional 
survey of the main sequence of chapters is complemented by a set of “case studies” 
that illustrate the situation of the press in Iraq after 2003 in closer detail. Chapter 
eight offers a detailed analysis of the development of individual newspaper titles in 
the months and years after the invasion. The two highest distributed newspapers in 
Iraq have been chosen for discussion: Al Sabah; and Azzaman. The analysis covers 
in detail the formation, contents, and framework of both newspapers, and provides an 
overview of each newspaper’s credibility. Following this chapter’s tightly focused 
discussion of specific newspaper titles, chapter nine turns to the realities of the 
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journalistic experience as regards the “new” Iraq. In a personal reflection, I comment 
on my own experience, working as a journalist and news media gatherer in Iraq. I 
provide individual examples of the many problematic situations I have had to deal 
with. While these are in many ways representative of typical journalistic challenges in 
reporting from this sensitive region, in this chapter I offer analysis of my experience 
from my own point of view. 
 
Finally, chapter ten presents the Conclusion to this thesis. It provides a summary of 
the questions posed by the research, the findings that have been established in the 
course of the investigation, and points towards areas which will benefit from future 
research in directions indicated by the results of the present study. 
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Methodology: 
This study aims to give an in-depth picture of the Iraqi press after the collapse of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime on 9 April 2003, and of its transition from a state-
controlled to a “free” press. The research closely interrogates the American role in 
the rise of Iraqi newspapers in particular, and the Iraqi media in general. In many 
cases, its findings demonstrate that the role practised by the occupiers could be 
described as part of the psychological warfare that would be practised by any 
occupying power. The thesis aims to answer many questions related to the Iraqi 
press under the American occupation from 2003-2006, but mainly: 
- What was the situation of the Iraqi press under Ba’ath Party rule and under 
Saddam’s regime? 
- How did that regime use the Iraqi press? 
- How did the press change and expand after the 2003 invasion? 
- Why did so many new newspapers appear in Iraq after the 2003 invasion?  
- Why did many of these newspapers not last for long?  
- How can we classify the post-2003 Iraqi press? 
- What kind of laws and regulations did the American-sponsored CPA introduce 
in order to deal with the new press?  
- How did the CPA use these legal tools to deal with the Iraqi press?  
- What role did US institutions and individuals play in determining the collapse 
or survival of Iraqi newspapers and magazines after the invasion of 2003?  
- What plans did the Americans have to shape the Iraqi state media? 
- What kind of psychological operations did American institutions employ in Iraq 
to achieve full domination of the press, so as to win the hearts and the minds 
of the Iraqi public?  
 
Methodological Approach 
This thesis adopts a qualitative approach to answer the research questions outlined 
above. The qualitative approach has been chosen as a method to obtain a useful 
perspective on social realities or phenomena that are not easily observable - 
especially needed when analysing a situation that has been characterised by such 
extreme changes as those experienced in Iraq since 2003, which have included, but 
are not limited to: invasion and violent regime change; extreme civil unrest, including 
some phases of effective civil war; and the complete restructuring of political, military 
and governmental institutions.  
 
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000), “Qualitative research involves the studied 
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use and collection of variety of empirical materials - case study; personal experience; 
introspection; life story; interview; cultural texts and productions; and observational, 
historical, interactional, and visual text - that describe routine and problematic 
moments and meanings in individuals’ lives. Accordingly, qualitative researchers 
deploy a wide range of interconnected interpretive practices, hoping always to get a 
better understanding of the subject matter at hand.” In this study, a range of 
qualitative data has been gathered, to build a complex, holistic picture of the field of 
Iraqi newspaper and press development, by:   
 
1. Studying certain academic theses, books, papers, articles and special reports 
related to the Iraqi media before and after the 2003 invasion. These included 
academic, governmental, press and other materials published both in print 
and electronic forms, and in both languages, Arabic and English.  
2. Examining certain categories of Iraqi prints and newspapers, and collecting 
different kinds of materials related to these publications. 
3. Analysing specific events that had an impact on the Iraqi press.  
4. Conducting 40 qualitative interviews, to gain information about publications 
and on relevant journalistic, political and institutional practices. 
5. Analysing over 100 editions of individual newspapers, including both the 
different official newspapers published under Saddam’s regime and newly 
published titles from after the 2003 invasion. 
 
As this list indicates, data collection was a prerequisite for examination of the press in 
Iraq under the rule of the CPA. The research questions then demanded two key 
elements of data collection and analysis: the examination of many newspapers; and 
interviews with key respondents. Using this qualitative approach, the study sampled 
certain kinds of publications, practices and parties, to reach a realistic conclusion 
about the American role in the Iraqi press. 
 
In beginning the work of accumulating and studying appropriate data for the 
research, the first stage of enquiry began with analysis of the newspapers that were 
launched after the 2003 invasion. It proceeded to an investigation of the factors that 
helped many of the selected newspapers to survive, and to analyse why, in 
comparison, several others folded. In this analysis, a focus on the content of certain 
newspapers led to the identification of the permissible statements and specific terms 
used within them: e.g. the use of the terms “Iraqi resistance”, “terrorists”, or “militant 
groups” by different newspapers to describe the same group of people. These terms 
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could give an indication of the degree of adherence to press guidelines, and the 
strategies with which editors and journalists were able to circumvent restrictions for 
the purpose of freedom of speech. Secondly, besides the work on actual titles and on 
individual copies of the selected newspapers, the study also proceeded by 
conducting a large number of interviews with the following groups of respondents: 
editors and other members of the Iraqi media organisations; journalists; officials of 
the Iraqi government and of the CPA in Iraq. Using these primary resources, different 
aspects of the Iraqi press, and of the factors shaping its development, could be 
investigated, using the first-person interviews to sketch the landscape of the Iraqi 
press after the 2003 invasion.  
 
In many cases, the two methods of interview, and the collection of printed materials 
were pursued in tandem, to provide complementary insights into the phases of Iraqi 
press development. For instance, close analysis of individual publications was 
required to build up a picture of American intervention in the Iraqi media in general, 
and particularly in the press. The bimonthly newspaper Baghdad Al Aan (Baghdad 
Now) was selected as an example of the American army’s attempts to influence the 
opinion of the Iraqi public. Despite the huge number of copies produced, several of 
which are discussed individually, this newspaper had little impact and low readership. 
To understand better why this was the case, this newspaper, which had the largest 
print-run in Iraq’s history, was also covered for this study through an exclusive 
interview with its former editor. Similarly, American methods for paying journalists to 
cover certain stories for the American army were revealed by exploring the formation 
of the Baghdad Club for Journalism, notionally an association for local Iraqi 
journalists “sponsored” by the occupying forces. Interviews with the head of the club 
and with one of the active members revealed a clearer image of the club’s activities, 
and the degree of attempted manipulation of information by its military sponsors. To 
complement the testimony of how individual reporters were supported by US funding, 
the study also analysed a sample publication fully funded by the Americans in Iraq, 
Wassit Al Aan newspaper. As the findings demonstrated, the newspaper flourished 
as long as American funding continued, but did not maintain any subsequent 
sustainability.   
 
Besides these examples of direct intervention in the Iraqi press scene by the 
occupying authorities, the research also required analysis of home-grown titles from 
after 2003. The study chose to focus on the two Iraqi newspapers which had, and 
continue to have, the highest readership in the country - Al Sabah and Azzaman. 
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Once again, the data used to understand the development of these titles over time 
was collected both by examination of the publications themselves, and through 
conducting interviews with their editors and journalists. Using such evidence, the 
study was able to establish classifications for these newspapers, and the Iraqi print 
media more generally, according to the motivation behind each publication (political, 
regional, financial, and so on). Through interviews with the editors of both 
newspapers, this study was also able to develop a clear understanding of each 
newspaper, the context it was published in, and the purpose it served during the 
period of time covered by the research.    
 
 
Difficulties  
This study is reflexive, drawing on first-hand knowledge and experience observing 
and analysing the Iraqi press. Although I am an Iraqi national, who until 2005 was 
working as a journalist in Baghdad, I have faced many difficulties in undertaking this 
project. In many cases, potential Iraqi informants refused to be interviewed, because 
many did not want to reveal their former relationship with the United States. In other 
cases, interviewees would refuse to answer certain questions about their association 
with the Americans or, previously, with Saddam’s regime. Most of the informants who 
agreed to be interviewed were concerned about the way the information would be 
used, and wished that it should not be published in any newspaper or website in 
Arabic. Others tried to use the interview to defend their cooperation with the 
Americans, claiming that the main aim was to build a “free” Iraqi press. One of the 
key players who refused to be interviewed or to answer my questions (sent via an 
associate we had in common) was Saad Al Bazaz, the owner of the Azzaman 
newspaper. The probable reason, I have come to understand, was that Mr Al Bazaz 
was reluctant to reveal any damaging information about his relationship with the 
British Ministry of Defence. Like Mr Al Bazaz, many potential interviewees declined 
my invitation to discuss their part in the “new” Iraq, as nowadays it is considered a 
stigma to have been part of any American project, and Iraqis may consider that 
individual a “traitor”.  
 
There were also problems in gaining access to the American army’s media unit. I 
contacted the American Embassy in Baghdad both officially and non-officially to 
request information from this unit. Through official means, I received an email from 
the embassy requesting that I submit the questions to them for a written response. 
Although I provided the embassy with my questionnaires in January 2011, I have 
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received no answers in the twelve-month period since. Through non-official 
approaches, I established contact with different media officers, but they too could not 
provide any answers to the questions raised, giving a range of reasons, one being 
that the member of staff concerned had left service in Iraq, another that the related 
papers were currently classified information. I received similar answers, or simply no 
response at all to my e-mails, from most of the companies and individuals who had 
worked with the Americans in Iraq, whom I attempted to contact. These included the 
Al Fawares group, Harris Corporation, and The Lincoln Group, and the office of the 
current US chief of staff, General Martin Dempsey.  
 
Despite the ongoing violence in Iraq and the danger of visiting some places in the 
country - particularly those of interest to a journalist - I have continued my regular 
visits, roughly every six months since 2007. These visits have not been easy, as Iraq 
had no air service between Baghdad and any other European country until 2009.   It 
was a requirement to fly to another country in the Middle East to enter Iraq.  
 
Another significant factor which should be considered as having affected my ability to 
conduct research, was the continuing violence towards journalists in Iraq. Many 
journalists were either too scared to talk; had left the country to live in exile; or were 
killed, such as Dr Abdul Rahman Al Issawi, who launched many newspapers, but 
was assassinated along with his family by militants in 2007. 
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Literature Review: 
The transition the Iraqi press went through, from being a propaganda tool under 
Saddam Hussein to a “free” media after the 2003 war, is the question which this 
research aims to address. The press plays an essential role in any society, including 
in Iraq, and is considered a crucial index of the degree of freedom or democracy in a 
given country or region. Newspapers have grown up as a powerful institution in what 
could be called "western civilization". Criticisms of the role of any national or local 
press generally focus on the challenges of working as independent organisations, 
free from the interests of the political or business groups (Hardt, 1979). The Iraqi 
press has repeatedly tried to achieve independence, but it has always fallen under 
the influence of ruling regimes. Even after 2003, it appears difficult to consider it a 
“free” press, given the importance of the various bodies that directly influence its 
output.  These include the American military and civilian authorities; religious, ethnic 
and political influences; and financial organisations. 
 
The most readily available English language study of the history of the Iraqi media 
that covers the whole period of this thesis is Noor Al Deen’s 2005 article, “Changes 
and Challenges of the Iraqi Media”. In this short journal article, she offers an 
informative overview of some of the key factors that have influenced the development 
of the modern Iraqi press, both before and after 2003. However, this short work does 
not explore how and why certain newspapers were censored after the 2003 invasion. 
Additionally, it does not provide a clear picture of the Iraqi press after the 2003 
invasion. 
 
LR1: Iraqi Press History: From the Ottomans to the Fall of Saddam 
Much has been written on the formation of Iraq, and on the turbulent history and 
politics of the country from the nineteenth century Ottoman occupation through to the 
formation of Iraq as a modern state (Tripp, 2002). Some of these studies explore how 
the British as an occupying power fabricated Iraq (Dodge, 2003). The role of this 
typical occupying power bears much similarity to the role of the American occupation 
of Iraq, both politically and also in their plan for the press. The press existed in Iraq, 
as in any part of the Middle East, from the nineteenth century (Ayalon, 1995). The 
year 1869 witnessed the launch of the first Iraqi newspaper, Al Zawra (one of the 
names for Baghdad). The restrictions imposed on the press were declining at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, as there were many changes in the Ottoman 
Empire, such as the constitutional revolution in 1908. In a few years, approximately 
61 newspapers were launched in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Najaf, and other Iraqi 
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cities.  These newspapers “were variously published in Arabic, in both Arabic and 
Turkish, and in both Arabic and French. Among such publications were dozens of 
dailies, weeklies, and literary magazines, including a satirical newspaper, Habez 
Bouz, that was very popular ” (Noor Al Deen, 2005, p.3.). 
 
After World War I, Iraq fell under British occupation. The occupiers supported the 
establishment of many daily newspapers in Arabic (Ayalon, 1995). Some 
newspapers were financed by the mandatory power and voiced a pro-British position, 
supporting the various versions of treaties proposed by Britain to the antagonistic 
nationalists (Ayalon, 1995).  But the expansion of the press also reflected the growth 
of nationalism during the 1920s and 1930s. “The founding of As-Sahifah (“The 
Journal”) by Husayn Rahhal, Mohammed Ahmed Al Sayyid and a group of leftist 
thinkers in 1924, Al Ahali (“The Public”) in 1932, Sawt Al Ahali (“Voice of the Public”) 
in 1934, and the Iraqi Communist Party’s Kifah Al Sha’ab (“The People’s Struggle”) in 
1935 created a core of nationalist newspapers” (Davis, 2005, p.75). Newspapers like 
these attacked the British role in Iraq and some of them called for the immediate 
evacuation of British troops (Davis, 2005). But they were also the means to introduce 
new ideologies, and played an essential role in forming revolutionary movements. 
Batatu demonstrates the importance of the press in Iraqi political development in his 
comments on the Communist newspaper, As-Sahifah, launched on 28 December 
1924: "This was a paper of a new type, the first of its kind in the Iraq of the Twenties. 
Unlike the other Iraqi papers, it sought not a livelihood, but the conversation of men. 
Its preoccupation was not with news or belles-lettres, but with ideas. It focused on 
social problems and dealt only marginally with political issues. In a period when the 
free expression of opinions was fraught with risks, it did not hesitate to attack the 
deeply ingrained beliefs and prejudices of the people. These things gave As-Sahifah 
a character all its own, and marked the opening of new perspectives in the mental life 
of Iraq" (Batatu, 1978, p.394). The newspaper folded in 1927. 
 
Following the fall of the monarchy in July 1958, the Iraqi media continued to suffer 
from state censorship, under the control of military regimes. Their professional 
prejudice led the military governments to view journalists as “irresponsible and 
almost traitorous, since they are continually criticising" (Janowits, 1977, p.164). 
Journalists and military regimes hold different attitudes about freedom. The military in 
general tends to have “specific and firm” thinking about the right order of society. It 
offers no room for discussions, criticism or debate, and everything is dealt with by a 
“firm hand” (Shils, 1962). The military dictatorships of the Ba’ath regime, and 
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specifically of Saddam Hussein (1979-2003), imposed their control over the Iraqi 
media and public communication (Isakhan, 2008).  Saddam Hussein, like other 
dictators, knew well that if the press was deprived of freedom of expression this 
would give him a free hand to take other freedoms from society. So the message of 
such leaders was clear: "If the press is to be tolerated, it must obey, otherwise it must 
pay the usual price which military officers demand from recalcitrant subordinates" 
(Shils, 1962, p.42). 
 
The Iraqi press forms part of the mass media in the Arab world, which William Rugh, 
in a 2004 study, classified into four types: Mobilisation, Loyalist, Transitional, and 
Diverse. Kim and Mariwan Hama-Saeed (2008) consider that the Iraqi media under 
the Ba’ath regime were types of the “Mobilisation” press and “Loyalist” press, based 
on Rugh’s classification. A “Mobilisation” press is the kind that mobilises government 
ideology and is one of the government’s instruments used to promote its own 
ideologies among the population (Rugh, 2004). A “Loyalist” press is that which 
supports all authority viewpoints without discussing them, and may be privately or 
government owned or run.  Rugh’s “Transitional” and “Diverse” types of press, being 
more “free” than the other two, would not have been permissible under the Saddam 
regime. The Iraqi press was a state-controlled propaganda machine that was 
intended to achieve certain political goals (Kim, and Hama-Saeed, 2008). During 
Saddam Hussein’s reign, the state ran and controlled most media outlets. The press 
was used to serve and promote public support for the government’s policies. Kim and 
Hama-Saeed (2008) claim that the propaganda press in Iraq was run on a model 
similar to the Marxist-Leninist press system of the Soviet bloc countries, with which 
Saddam Hussein was, in fact, closely allied (Kim, and Hama-Saeed, 2008).  
 
LR 2: A Collapse of Dictatorship Means More Free Press 
The situation of Saddam’s regime was similar to the autocratic regimes of Eastern 
Europe and elsewhere. The collapse of the communist regimes in east European 
countries in the 1990s is thus an experience that may be related to Iraq’s own 
experience following the events of 2003.  
 
The overthrow of the communist governments has not resulted in creating a viable 
Fourth Estate in much of the former Soviet bloc (Lawson, 2005). Their experience 
has proved that the end of dictatorship, and the absence of the censorship of the 
totalitarian regime, does not necessarily lead to a free, pluralist or independent press 
(Lawson, 2005). As Mondak argues, “the crux of the problem in many post-
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communist states is that media lack independence and professionalism … such 
media must be counted as part of the problem, not part of the solution” (Lawson, 
2005, p.2).  
 
The successful revolutions of 1989 were considered to be a “victory of liberal values 
over authoritarianism”, while the years after proved that the absence of communism 
did not mean that the people would get democracy, of which a free press is an 
essential part (O’Neil, 1996). O’Neil (1996) raises the need for societies to be built (or 
re-built), demolishing the old state structures that served to centralise political power. 
The challenge is to find what to replace it with, and to agree in advance about the 
form and shape of such replacement (O’Neil, 1996).  
 
Both the Iraqi press, and the press in Eastern Europe, are parts of a media system 
emerging from a long period of authoritarianism (O’Neil, 1996).  In both cases, the 
monopoly of information access suddenly collapsed, to be replaced with a diverse 
expansion of the press, in which different kinds of publications, newspapers, and 
magazines appeared overnight. In Eastern Europe, some of these publications 
emerged after years of publishing in exile, revealing the crimes of the past and the 
history before communism. These new emerging publications also discussed their 
expectations about their countries’ futures. These discussions appeared suddenly 
and loudly in the public domain, after years in which such debates could only be 
conducted as private talk in small circles, or among the ruling party’s top 
commanders. The vast quantities of information presented after the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe could be considered to constitute an overload: “The 
expansion of press freedom took place in a period of real transition, where old rules 
had lost their legitimacy and new ones had not yet been promulgated to take their 
place” (O’Neil, 1996, p.2).  
 
Although the Eastern European case provides some useful comparisons for the Iraqi 
situation, it is also important to note several significant differences between the two 
experiences.  The political changes in Eastern Europe came from inside the 
countries concerned, while the situation in Iraq came as the result of a foreign 
invasion. The emerging pictures from Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries, show 
that democracy is not an item which can be shipped over in tanks, but is the choice 
of the people, and they must genuinely want it. The media role here can be an 
assisting factor by supporting and promoting it (Merrill, 2009). 
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The collapse of Saddam's dictatorship promised Iraqi journalists freedom from the 
heavy government censorship they had endured for decades. They were hoping to 
create a free press that could tackle different issues without fear of intervention from 
any authority. Benjamin Isakhan (2008) observed that post-invasion Iraq witnessed a 
large range of media projects, representing different political, religious and ethnic 
groups, all attempting to be free from any government influence. There were, 
however, numerous internal and external obstacles to face. For instance, Isakhan 
has cited interventions in the Iraqi media outlets attributed to regional powers such as 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. He asserted that, both before and after the invasion, these 
neighbouring countries have funded and supported, perhaps hosted, many media 
outlets aiming to send specific messages to the Iraqi public, to drive them towards 
specific political agendas (Isakhan, 2008). In addition, many Iraqi politicians, mainly 
those who came from exile, tried to find a foothold in the crowded political scene after 
the 2003 invasion. There were numerous different attempts among many parties to 
control the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people under the occupation: “The actors on 
the new media scene include returning Iraqi exiles, British and American officials, 
Iraqi former political parties, and various indigenous Iraqi religious and secular 
groups” (Najjar, 2009, p.256). In the view of Al Mljawi (2009), in such an atmosphere, 
sectarian, religious and ethnic media outlets should flourish in Iraq or any similar 
mixed society, if there is an absence of regulating national bodies or institutions. The 
differences between communities will always appear as prominent topics in such 
publications, as a means of seeking popularity within their own community 
readerships. On the other hand, such commentary will also become a means of 
increasing political and sectarian divisions, and can harm national unity. Al Mljawi 
believes that “unified” media can be helpful in a situation like Iraq’s, through 
preaching unity and loyalty to the country instead of emphasising sectarian or ethnic 
differences (Al Mljawi, 2009).  
 
Ibrahim Al Marashi (2007) returns to the Eastern European paradigm as a potential 
model for the Iraqi case. He refers to Izabella Karlowicz’s work on media 
development in the post-conflict Balkans, where she recommends a development 
plan in three phases: “set up, implementation and capacity building”. Al Marashi 
suggests that this Balkan framework could be applied in Iraq: “While the post-war 
Iraqi media have passed the “set up” phase, there are still some important 
recommendations that can be made that were ignored in the first phase” (Al Marashi, 
2007, p.129). In Iraq, as in the post-conflict Balkan states, a great deal of the printed 
press emerged from, or established close ties with, political parties. These partisan 
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newspapers published material serving the political agenda of the different factions, 
while simultaneously accusing independent editors and journalists of being Serb 
collaborators (Berman, 2006). 
 
In order to create liberal media, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in 
Bosnia felt compelled to take the media out of the control of the hard-line, sectarian 
political parties. This process was necessary to democratise the media, which played 
an essential role in democratising the country, and promoting co-existence and 
reconciliation among different ethnic communities. In order to achieve what the OHR 
had commissioned, a team was formed to introduce a regulatory framework that 
would help to introduce Western democratic press standards, forming an 
Independent Media Commission, IMC (Haselock, 2010). The process required 
immediate action, but unfortunately the hesitancy of the OHR to implement serious 
restrictions in the early stages of the post-conflict era allowed the Bosnian media to 
undermine the implementation of the Dayton Agreement (Berman, 2006). 
 
By contrast, the initial reformers were much more effective in Kosovo in 2000. The 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) introduced a 
comprehensive regulation framework plan, similar to the one established in Bosnia. 
The framework would be granted “the power to censor material judged dangerous or 
incendiary”. The regulations put in place a system for media penalties - from fines to 
closing down media outlets if they violated established reporting standards (Berman, 
2006). Much of the UN’s concern lay with tackling hate speech in the Kosovar media, 
fearing repetition of the Bosnian or the Rwandan experience. The Deputy for the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), in charge of 
democratisation, stated on 16 February 2000: “We cannot tolerate hate speech 
anywhere in society—whether it is on the radio, in the classroom, in a newspaper, or 
at a political rally” (Haselock, 2010). 
 
Media regulation expert, Simon Haselock, referred to an incident in which a Serb 
working for the UN was killed, after a newspaper published his picture and accused 
him of killing Albanians. The editor of the newspaper was considered to have 
behaved in an irresponsible way, and may have to face prosecution. Haselock 
referred to the complaints system on media violations that was introduced by the UN 
after this case, which helped to prevent any further incitement (Haselock, 2010). 
 
This incident shows the scale of damage that the media can cause in a fragile 
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society, but it also shows how important it is for regulators and media experts to react 
quickly to defuse any attempt to spread hate speech. In a 1995 report about the role 
of the media in the Balkan war, the United Nations envoy, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, said 
that media outlets should be considered guilty of involvement in inciting community 
hatred. However, the lack of a tradition of independence, together with low standards 
of journalism, made the media fall prey to political pressure (UN/UNESCO, 1997). 
 
The experience of Bosnia and Kosovo showed that in the future, media reforms 
would need to be implemented in any place where the preconditions of free liberal 
media norms did not exist: such reforms would have to concentrate on creating these 
norms and on preparing the basis for such norms to be respected (Berman, 2006). In 
comparison to the situation in Bosnia and Kosovo, the post-war Iraqi media should 
have had a better chance of being democratised, because the ethno-sectarian media 
had not established any monopoly or base in the country. The whole breakdown of 
the previous system was more complete in Iraq.  There would have been justification 
for introducing regulatory measures in Iraq immediately after the war, as Iraqi society 
did not have the required liberal norms. This could have been justified during the 
stage of democratisation of the society. Such regulation could have been changed or 
cancelled when traditions of an independent and professional press began to 
become established among journalists, and when threats posed by hate speech had 
been dramatically reduced or eradicated.  Such strict measures would have helped to 
create an environment that accepted the necessary preconditions for independent, 
professional journalism (Berman, 2006). 
 
Media experts are always hesitant to approve any media regulation and they prefer 
no regulation, as is the case for many democratic societies around the world. But the 
principle of non-regulation in a non-democratic country, formed of many 
communities, can make media a weapon of struggle among the different factions, 
even deepening the division among communities. 
 
In Iraq, the Bush administration did not follow the Clinton administration in the way it 
had dealt with media projects in the post-conflict Balkans through using the State 
Departments. Instead, the Defence Department was in charge of post-war Iraq, 
which led many experienced media development groups and experts to lose interest 
in taking part in the US media project (Rohde, 2005). The majority of NGOs that had 
been engaged in both Bosnia and Kosovo did not offer their services in Iraq. Such 
absences could be related to safety concerns as many of these NGOs did not want 
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to deal with the DoD, reluctant to be considered as part of their military operations 
(Berman, 2006). The US followed the model they had used following World War II in 
Germany and Japan in their approach to stabilising post-war Iraq. It was the first time 
in 50 years the US Defence Department had tackled such a mission (Rohde, 2005). 
But for a long time the coalition provisional authority did not impose any licensing or 
monitoring on media in Iraq, unlike the strict licensing and monitoring system that had 
been used in Germany by OMGUS (Office of Military Government, US)  (RAND, 
2003). 
 
In Iraq neither the CPA nor any previous authority provided sufficient training to 
journalists to learn to do their job responsibly. In addition, political parties with their 
large funds were allowed to control the media market – different to what the Alliance 
had established in post-war Germany, when the political parties were not allowed to 
have their own media outlets. The situation in Iraq declined into chaos, and in the 
final analyses, the US media project was considered by many a complete failure. 
 
The former navy officer and UN official Simon Haselock (2010), who was appointed 
as the head of the advisory media team in Iraq after the invasion, wanted to repeat 
his experience of the Balkans in Iraq. But he says this was not possible, nor was it 
the intention of the occupying power. “At no time was this more apparent than when 
this author visited the Pentagon to discuss the framework with Secretary of Defence 
Donald Rumsfeld’s aide, Larry Di Rita, who said, “Forget how you did it in the 
Balkans, the Pentagon is in charge, and they intend to do things their own way”” 
(Haselock, 2010, p.9). 
 
Another issue that affected the freedoms of the newly launched Iraqi press, is the 
largely Muslim, conservative society in Iraq. This created another kind of censorship, 
sometimes explicit, but also sometimes tacit, or even unconscious. Trevor Mostyn’s 
“Censorship in Islamic Societies” (2002), offers a history of various aspects of 
censorship in Islamic societies, culminating in an analysis of the current political 
direction of censorship and the control of freedom of expression. Included in his 
analysis is a discussion of censorship in the media. However, as his main interest is 
in fundamentalist Muslim societies, his focus leans towards censorship in the Iranian 
media and in Saudi Arabia. However, this is still relevant to my work, as I will 
highlight how the growth of various indigenous Islamic factions have also played an 
essential role in shaping the new spectrum of newspapers and their content in Iraq.  
 
 19 
LR 3: Building the Media Post-Dictatorship: International Precedents and 
Comparisons 
As an occupation power, the United States has been the main player on the Iraqi 
media scene. The American administration in Iraq demolished the previous 
propaganda machine - the Ministry of Information - after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime on 9 April 2003, but the Pentagon subsequently established a new network of 
media outlets. In The Index on Censorship, Rohan Jayasekera (2003) stated that the 
US army’s objectives in Iraq were similar to those it held in Germany after the World 
War. Jayasekera argued that, at the end of the Second World War, the 
“Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) provided ‘consolidation propaganda’, 
designed ‘to gain the cooperation of the German population in restoring essential 
services, and to create a public opinion favourable to post-war Allied aims’”. There 
was a similar target for the US army in Iraq (Jayasekera, 2003). Simon Haselock 
(2010), commented that the only previous experiences, which could be considered 
similar to Iraq, were those of post-war Germany and Japan.  The media policy in both 
occupied Germany and Japan was designed to support political aims, starting by 
dismantling the previous state propaganda systems, then creating new public media 
services, and introducing new training for the journalists of both countries to gain 
sufficient experience to follow the model of “liberal journalism” (Haselock, 2010). This 
included freedom of speech and the firm separation between covering the news and 
commenting on it.  Haselock commented that this “was essentially a policy of 
imposition underpinned by the power of an occupying army and designed to achieve 
political outcomes” (Haselock, 2010, p.3).  According to Haselock the US authorities 
in Iraq had no clear template or framework to follow in developing media outlets in 
occupied territories, other than the experience in post-war Germany and Japan. It 
should be noted that in this discussion, Haselock, despite his experience in putting 
together the framework of the media plan for the Balkans, discounted the media 
approach of organisations which had more recent experience in drawing up plans for 
media development, such as the UN, and other NGOs such as IREX and Internews.  
 
3-1 America Designs the Rebirth of the German Press 
Throughout modern history, governments in major conflicts, such as World War II, 
have used mass communication as an offensive weapon in the field of psychological 
warfare (Hardt, 1979). The Second World War provided clear examples regarding the 
use of the media in general as part of psychological warfare. All parties in the conflict 
used the media as a tool in this major international struggle.  
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In post-war Germany, the United States concentrated on dealing with the heritage of 
the Nazi regime. The administration of the American occupied areas of Germany 
intervened both in the education system, and the media (RAND, 2003). In occupied 
Germany, the Americans used the press as a tool to promote their ideologies and 
perspectives in the country by controlling press output. In a report on the German 
press in the US occupied area, published in 1948 by the Military Governor’s office, 
the US military admitted that the press they handled was not free, but claimed that it 
was a "nearly" free press. The report tried to emphasise that the ultimate goal that 
the Americans wanted to achieve was to create a free press (Germany. The US 
army, Office of Military Government for Germany (US) 1948). After the Germans’ 
surrender, the Americans and the allied forces initially decided to wipe out all "Nazi 
propaganda" press, because the Nazis had already crushed all the opposition press. 
More than 1,500 different publications, which had been published right up to Victory 
in Europe day, were suspended or abolished. This was done through law number 
191, of May 1945, which closed all existing German information services (Germany. 
The US Army, Office of Military Government for Germany (US) 1948). 
 
Law 191 was introduced by the Allied Control Council - the joint allied body, 
responsible for the administration of the occupied territories. Peter J. Humphreys 
(1994) notes that the law deprived the defeated Germans from having any public 
communication (Humphreys, 1994). In the beginning, the only available press was 
military publications, which formed the only means of communication between the 
military government and the German people. The allied forces had started a group of 
weekly or bi-weekly newspapers which were called the “Army-Group Newspapers” 
(“Heeresgruppenzeitungen”). Each of the occupying allied forces launched their own 
publication in the zone they occupied. So in the four occupied zones of Germany, 
there were different publications: The Neue Zeitung for the American zone; Die Welt 
for the British zone; the Nouvelles de France for the French zone; and the Tagliche 
Rundschau for the Soviet zone (Humphreys, 1994). The common concept for these 
newspapers was to persuade the Germans of their war guilt in general, but they did 
not discuss the future of Germany (Humphreys, 1994). The Office of Military 
Government, United States (OMGUS), was in charge of licensing and monitoring the 
new press and other media outlets. The Americans also intervened in appointing the 
staff of these outlets, as the journalists were required to have anti-Nazi backgrounds 
(RAND, 2003). 
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Jessica Gienow–Hecht (1999), demonstrates that the Americans and the Russians 
used the same policies to control the German press, by issuing laws preventing it 
from directing any criticism against occupation troops: "The Information Control 
Division (ICD) enforced the Directives No.4 and No.40 of the Allied Control Council, 
which forbade any criticism of the occupying powers"  (Gienow–Hecht, 1999, p.96). 
To guarantee full control of the press, the US started to look for people who could 
help to impose the occupation policy. The US military began to employ editors and 
publishers on the basis of their opposition to the Nazi regime and Nazi ideology 
(Germany. The US Army, Office of Military Government for Germany (US), 1948). 
The military government finished their procedures for taking over the German press 
by imposing a licensing system. The military government used this system to control 
the press by giving licences to the "right" publications. The writer of the 1948 report 
on German newspapers also referred to more than 54 German publications that had 
been licensed by the US military by that time. The report emphasised that the military 
government had put in place strict laws for these publications, threatening them with 
prosecution if these were violated.  
 
The main points that might cause the revocation of publication licences, and 
prosecution of editors and writers if they published anything referring to or potentially 
encouraging the following actions, were as follows: 
 
a. Incites riots or resistance to military government, jeopardises the occupying 
troops, or otherwise endangers military security. 
b. Propagates former national socialist or related "voelkisch" ideas, such as 
racism and race hatred or propagates any fascist or anti-democratic ideas, or 
any militarist ideas, or pan-Germanism or German imperialism.  
c. Constitutes a malicious attack upon policies or personnel of military 
government, aims to disrupt unity among the allies, or seeks to evoke the 
distrust and hostility of the German people against any occupying power. 
d. Appeals to Germans to take action against democratic measures undertaken 
by military government.  
 
(Quoted in Germany. The US Army, Office of Military Government for Germany (US). 
1948, p.17). 
 
The report also shows that the new political parties in Germany were not permitted to 
have their own press. The military government justified this ban by saying that the 
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German print media did not yet constitute "a solid nucleus of independent press", and 
also that the German economy was still too weak to tolerate any expansion in 
printing equipment (Germany. The US Army, Office of Military Government for 
Germany (US), 1948). 
 
The starting conditions for the rebirth of the German press were very poor in general, 
despite the great need for news, as both Humphreys and H. Meyn have argued 
(Humphreys, 1994). By 1948 the American army had closed all of its other 
publications, and "Die Neue Zeitung" was the only military publication left, with two 
editions, one in Munich and one in Berlin  (Germany. The US Army, Office of Military 
Government for Germany (US), 1948). Humphreys considers the role of the 
Americans’ Neue Zeitung to be significant, setting out a principal example of a new 
democratic press system. In the first edition of Neue Zeitung, on 18 October 1945, 
General Dwight Eisenhower wrote an article saying that this newspaper would be a 
"symbol" for the German press, for its "objectivity, respect for the truth and the high 
journalistic standard" (Humphreys, 1994, p.27). Neue Zeitung represented an Anglo-
Saxon press style of democratic reporting. It added a new tradition to the German 
press by starting a political section, and more importantly, a separate section called 
“Das Freie Wort” (Free Speech), which reflected readers' opinions through the letters 
they sent to the section. Neue Zeitung and other licensed newspapers received 
generous financial support from the Americans. The main reason for this support was 
to protect these newspapers from market competition (Humphreys, 1994).  
 
Rohan Jayasekera (2003) comments that the post-World War II German media were 
indeed heavily controlled by one of the US army generals, Major-General Alexis 
McClure, who had been responsible for psychological operations during the war. 
Jayasekera quotes McClure telling vice-president CD Jackson in July 1946: “We now 
control 37 newspapers, six radio stations, 314 theatres, 642 (cinemas), 101 
magazines, 237 book publishers, 7,384 book dealers and printers, and conduct about 
15 public opinion surveys a month, as well as publishing one newspaper with 
1,500,000 circulation … [we] run the Associated Press of Germany and operate 20 
library centres .. This job is tremendous”. Although a truly free press did gradually 
emerge as part of the post-war reconstruction of institutions in what would become 
the German Federal Republic, McClure’s comment reveals the heavy extent of 
American control of press and public information resources of all kinds in the years 
immediately following the war. 
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Jayasekera (2003), finally asks, whether it was the US aim to repeat McClure’s 
strategy in post-war Iraq (Jayasekera, 2003). The preceding outline of American 
policy towards the German press outlines a number of strategies employed by the 
American occupation of Germany in the late 1940s, to control and shape the 
emerging post-war media. As the findings of this thesis will suggest, the literature on 
efforts to rebuild the German press post-World War II may indeed be usefully related 
to the American efforts in rebuilding the Iraqi media. 
 
3-2 Japanese Press and the Control of the American Censors 
Japan was another country occupied by the United States following the Second 
World War, and which offers relevant examples of how the victorious Americans, who 
had a far freer hand in Japan than in occupied Germany, handled the 
“democratisation” of the press, in a Far Eastern country with a culture and traditions 
very different to those of Western Europe and the US. 
 
The Japanese press had well-established democratic institutions in the early 1930s. 
Susan J. Pharr and Ellis S. Krauss (1996), state that although restrictions on the 
press had never been lifted, the Japanese press enjoyed some space of freedom 
before the Pacific War in 1937. From the beginning of the war in 1937, all public 
communications were put under police control, which lasted till the end of the war in 
1945. During that time, the press was used as an instrument of state policy, 
especially where their views resonated the views of the military more strongly (Pharr, 
and Krauss, 1996). Anne Cooper-Chen and Miiko Kodama (1997), note that there 
were more than 1,200 newspapers by 1937, but because of the Japanese 
government's policy this number fell dramatically to 104 by 1940, and to 54 by 1942. 
American bombers destroyed many printing works, but remarkably a number of 
publications survived (Cooper-Chen, and Kodama, 1997). Despite the destruction of 
Japan during the war, and the shortage of printing paper, a good part of Japan's 
publication industry remained intact, more than enough to make a good start at the 
end of the war (Mayo, 1991).  
 
One of the first concerns for the Americans, after the surrender of Japan in World 
War II, was to take over control of the Japanese media, according to William De 
Lange (1998). On 10 August 1945, the subcommittee of the State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee issued a paper entitled “Control of Media of Public 
Information and Expression in Japan”. The paper suggested that during the first 
phase of occupation, Japanese media activities should be suspended, and its 
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facilities should be taken under the direct control of the Americans’ military 
government. The second phase would be to relax this control, and gradually hand 
over to the Japanese (De Lange, 1998). The Americans announced a campaign to 
“demilitarise” and “democratise” Japan. "Democratising" the press was one of the 
issues that the Japanese and the Americans prioritised.  
 
The first daily publication, which appeared under the American occupation, was the 
financial newspaper “Nikkan Kogyo Shinbun” (The Industrial Daily). This newspaper 
and other Japanese newspapers reappeared on the newsstands just one month after 
the end of the war (De Lange, 1998). In addition, within the first month, the Japanese 
Cabinet Information Bureau became officially associated with the occupation 
authorities in the implementation of their policies. One of the most important goals 
that the military government wanted to achieve was to use the Japanese press to 
play a supporting role in imposing its policies (De Lange, 1998). General Douglas 
MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, "embraced the broad 
categories of militarist propaganda, inaccurate statement, incitements to unrest or 
remarks disturbing to public tranquillity, and criticism of the United States, the allies, 
the occupation or General MacArthur. For internal guidance, there were detailed 
office manuals and elaborate key logs that extended and periodically updated the list 
of forbidden subjects" (Mayo, 1991, p.136-137). 
 
In late September of 1945, McArthur instituted rules banning any material that might 
cause “unrest” for the occupation troops. The responsibility for monitoring the 
Japanese press was tackled by the Press Publication and Broadcasting Division, 
which acted as watchdog over the Japanese press. The division’s main job was to 
prevent the media from publishing any materials considered harmful to the campaign 
of demilitarisation and democratisation in occupied Japan.  The division had 
headquarters in three Japanese cities: Tokyo, Osaka and Fukuoda. The censors and 
their support teams worked effectively to delete any "offensive" materials from 
newspapers and wire service copy. This also included censorship of films, plays, 
slides, lantern shows, paintings, cartoons, magazine and books (Mayo, 1991). 
Newspapers and other publications were all subjected to pre-publication censorship. 
The censors would mark the passages for deletion with red ink before giving the final 
proof to the editors. The Press Publication and Broadcasting Division also imposed 
restrictions to keep censorship secret from the Japanese public, and the editors were 
not allowed to mention anything about the censorship, which took place under their 
regulations (De Lange, 1998). However, Japanese editors and writers tried to protect 
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their articles from the censors' scissors by using euphemisms: "Euphemisms such as 
'blue eyed national' were coined to protect the articles that recounted rapes and other 
crimes committed by American soldiers from the censorious eyes of those who were 
ultimately responsible" (De Lange, 1998, p.169). During the pre-publication 
censorship period, Japanese authors, editors, publishers, and foreign 
correspondents, were obliged to provide two copies of their work to the censors who 
would take the final decision about which one of the two would be presented to the 
public (Mayo, 1991). "During the first two years of the Press Publication and 
Broadcasting Division (PPB) operations, the bulk of Japanese books and periodicals 
were pre-censored, with a shift in September 1947 to post-censorship of books 
followed by magazines by the end of the year" (Mayo, 1991, p.137). 
 
The censors were very keen to destroy the Japanese feeling of uniqueness, through 
raising questions about ancient works and poetry, which gave signs of ultra 
nationalism (Mayo, 1991). Certain topics were not allowed to be either mentioned, or 
discussed by the press. Literature concerning the atomic bomb represented one of 
these topics, for instance. This topic represented a lot of work for the Press 
Publication and Broadcasting Division's censors - they were generally deleting 
passages from articles and books if either happened to contain references to the 
atomic bomb attack. It was only in 1948 and 1949 that a few titles about the atom 
bomb appeared, and even after the "end" of the occupation, the bulk of publications 
continued to avoid the topic. "For Japan's literary world, censorship remained very 
much a fact of life, as did thought surveillance. It affected words and themes, the 
internal flow of ideas and emotions and overall conceptualisation" (Mayo, 1991, 
p.152).  
 
Pharr and Krauss (1996) analyse media operations’ role in politics, and the effect of 
such media policies on the political behaviour of ordinary people. The Japanese 
press suffered from double censorship, both in direct cuts made to their reports and 
in limits on journalistic coverage for news. The press law was very strict about 
standards of exact truth in all correspondence, but also followed enforcement 
guidelines which forbade "publishing any item that might disturb public order or 
cause distrust of and dissatisfaction towards the occupation forces" (De Lange, 1998, 
p.168-169). On different occasions many newspapers were suspended or fined by 
the Press Publication and Broadcasting Division or by the Japanese Cabinet 
Information Bureau. The first suspension of distribution was for three newspapers, 
the Asahi Shinbun, the Mainichi Shinbun and the Yomiuri Shinbun, after they 
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published a picture of the Japanese Emperor Hirohito, standing next to the much 
taller, General MacArthur. The suspension was justified by fears of hostile feelings 
that might occur towards the Americans as a result of the picture. In another case, 
Asahi Shinbun suffered a twenty-four hour suspension for publishing an official report 
comparing the occupation forces to the Japanese army in the Philippines (De Lange, 
1998). 
 
The Americans' attitude toward communism also had a great effect on the Japanese 
press and its freedom of expression. The Communist Party organ “Akahata” was 
banned for 30 days. The ban was reinforced and all newspapers related to the 
Communist Party were suspended (De Lange, 1998). After the deterioration of the 
international political situation between the "Eastern Camp" led by the Soviet Union 
and the "Western Camp" led by United States, the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers invented different roles for the Japanese press. More than 700 
suspected communists were purged from different public communications 
corporations and newspapers (Komatsubara, 1971). "The red purge added the 
darkest page to the post war history of the Japanese press" (Komatsubara 1971, 
p.81).  The Supreme Commander encouraged the establishment of new newspapers 
in order to discourage monopoly control of the press, but the true "renaissance" of 
the press started only after they lifted newsprint restrictions (Cooper-Chen, and 
Kodama, 1997, p.57). 
 
3-3 Reconstruction in Post-War Iraq in Comparison to Post-War Germany and 
Japan 
Following the fall of the Third Reich, despite Hitler’s attempts to create a feeling of 
superiority based on certain notions of German race, the country had a long tradition 
of constitutional government and civic society which formed a good base for 
rebuilding democracy and for overcoming Hitler’s attempts to stratify populations on 
racial lines. By contrast, the situation in Iraq was considerably different, and ethno-
sectarian tension in fact increased after the invasion of 2003 (Stafford, 2008). 
 
Although both Germany and Japan are larger than Iraq in size and population, both 
were developed countries prior to World War II, while Iraq was a developing nation. 
Moreover, violence in Iraq raised security costs, and there were many attacks on its 
infrastructure, whereas there were no comparable resistance movements in either 
Germany or Japan (Serafino, Tarnoff, and Nanto, 2006). 
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In planning for post-war national recovery, the US authority in Germany had a clear 
policy, and the US army clearly told the Germans: "We come as conquerors, but not 
as oppressors." Also, they decided not to deal with the anti-Nazi German exiles, who 
wanted to return and form a government. The US administration in Iraq labeled 
themselves as liberators, and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq created the 
Iraqi Governing Council, whose members included recently returned exiles. Despite 
the claims it was the Iraqi leading body, in reality it was the cover the US 
administration needed to have for direct occupation. However, such recognition of 
the members of this IGC gave them legitimacy to play a significant role in Iraqi 
politics thereafter. 
 
The Americans had made better plans for the future of Germany. For nearly two 
years before occupying Germany in 1945, the US army was distributing 
responsibilities among different departments to deal with the situations they were 
likely to find after crossing the German frontier. Training was provided to thousands 
of soldiers to run the military government in occupied Germany. In Iraq, things were 
opposite: plans were designed up to the very last moment, amid squabbling between 
the Pentagon and the State Department. Even after the occupation of Iraq, the US 
administration kept changing its plans, as for instance when they replaced Jay 
Garner after only a few weeks with Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, at the very top of 
the new administration. 
 
The CPA almost immediately decided to dissolve the Iraqi army and to ban the 
Ba’ath Party - the pre-war ruling party. The CPA soon dismissed all civil servants 
from different government offices, as part of a process called, at the time, De-
Ba’athification. Although De-Ba’athification was a term derived from the analogous 
De-Nazification policy in Germany, in 1945 pragmatic experience had quickly 
demonstrated that Germany could be rebuilt only with the help of people who had 
formerly been members of the Nazi Party. But none of this was clear enough to the 
CPA staff, nor to the subsequent Iraqi governments, in dealing with the catastrophic 
consequences of so-called De-Ba’athification in Iraq (Stafford, 2008). 
 
Restoration of national infrastructure was also an issue that presented very different 
problems in Iraq by comparison to Germany. The amount of support that the US 
allocated for Iraq may explain its very different recovery from wartime destruction. A 
report to the US Congress claims that US aid (all grant assistance) to Iraq for the 
time period 2003-2006 totalled USD 28.9 billion.  After considering inflation factors, 
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this amount is nearly the same as the total US assistance provided to Germany for 
the period 1946-1952. 
 
In regard to rebuilding, the CRS Report to Congress on US Occupation Assistance 
made a direct comparison: “The amount and proportion of assistance for roughly 
equivalent infrastructure reconstruction in Iraq appears higher, probably about USD 
11.5 billion. This would indicate that the actual (adjusted) dollar amounts of US aid 
for economic infrastructure reconstruction in Iraq thus far is roughly a third greater 
than that provided to Germany and perhaps more than double that provided to 
Japan. One explanation for the difference may be that aid for economic 
reconstruction in Germany and Japan consisted of financing through loans and 
grants in order to enable those countries to carry out their recoveries largely on their 
own. In Iraq, the United States is providing not only the material assistance, but also 
is paying for the necessary labor.” (Serafino, Tarnoff, and Nanto, 2006, p.7). 
 
The report claimed that considerable parts of Germany’s infrastructure were left 
“surprisingly intact”. According to the report, some industries survived the destruction, 
such as the coal, iron, and steel industries, as they were relatively lightly damaged, 
while the public utilities suffered severe damage. But post-war Iraq’s experience was 
different, as the report says: “In Iraq, while US military action did little damage, by 
design, to much of Iraq’s economic infrastructure, it did damage Iraq’s electrical grid, 
which had an effect on the availability of water. In addition, Iraq’s infrastructure had 
greatly deteriorated over the previous years, especially in the period of sanctions 
imposed after the First Gulf War of 1990-91. The existence of an insurgency in Iraq 
which deliberately sabotaged the economy and reconstruction efforts is an important 
consideration in comparing Iraq’s economic reconstruction requirements with those 
of post-war Germany and Japan, which had no resistance movements” (Serafino, 
Tarnoff, and Nanto, 2006, p.9). 
 
The report also referred to damage to the electrical grid caused by immediate post-
war looting, saying that such looting “had reduced Baghdad’s power supply to one 
fifth its pre-war level, according to an internal Pentagon study (Serafino, Tarnoff, and 
Nanto, 2006, p.9). 
 
Like Iraq, Germany had also suffered from looting, but in that case the US had 
enough soldiers to impose law and order in all major cities (Stafford, 2008). In Iraq, 
post-war looting spread on a vast scale because the US army did not have sufficient 
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forces on the ground. The looting did much to destroy whatever infrastructure had 
survived the war (Fallows, 2004). Looting also affected the capability to develop post-
conflict broadcasting. It had led to the destruction of most major facilities, destroying 
video libraries, studios, and the basis of a broadcasting system (Price, Griffin, and Al 
Marashi, 2007). 
 
3-4 Conclusion: From Germany and Japan to Iraq  
The two previous American occupation experiences reviewed show factual evidence 
that the situation in Germany and Japan was similar in some phases to the situation 
in post-Saddam Iraq, but different in others. The policies and actions around press 
and propaganda carried out by the Americans during their occupation of Germany 
and Japan can be compared to American policy towards the press in Iraq. The 
American authorities in both Japan and Germany designed the laws that gave them 
the right to close any newspaper that might cause any problem for them. The 
American administration in Iraq did the same by introducing order 14, which gave any 
authority the right to close any newspaper. The study will explain this order, and 
explore the effects of this law on the Iraqi press (see in particular chapter 5). Through 
specific examples, the thesis will demonstrate how the Americans used order 14 to 
punish political movements by closing their publications.  
 
LR 4: US Plans to Dominate the Iraqi Press: Discussing Developments Since 
2003 
The American Administrator of Iraq, Paul Bremer, signed a decree to abolish the Iraqi 
Ministry of Information, and dismiss all its employees, within a few weeks of capturing 
Iraq. Based on previous experience in Germany and Japan, the Americans planned 
to fill the gap left by the collapse of the official press through creating their own 
means of communication with the public. They did not, of course, use exactly the 
same approach as that of sixty years earlier. Unlike what happened in late 1940s 
Germany, they did not prevent political parties from running their own newspapers. 
Indeed, all political parties started to publish their own newspapers after the toppling 
of Saddam. The Americans likewise did not practise any form of pre-censorship in 
Iraq, as they had done in Japan, and they did not set up a licence system for Iraqi 
newspapers as had happened in Germany. The Americans wanted to show the world 
a tangible difference between themselves and Saddam's regime. Khalil (2006) 
observes that, at the end of any conflict, there will be an opportunity to lay the 
foundations for a free, democratic and diverse media landscape; but in the case of 
Iraq, the US planners were thinking of monopolising the information spectrum with 
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the help of a “friendly” Baghdad government, as Joyce Battle has documented 
(Battle, 2007). However, their plans lacked any consideration of the presence of any 
independent media, or of any other means for communicating information, such as 
the Internet (Battle, 2007). 
 
David Miller (2004), discussed how information policy became a  “weapon” of war 
that was considered as "full spectrum dominance" in the official US strategy. Miller 
refers to two US military experts’ indications about such strategy, those of Jim 
Winters and John Giffin. Miller quotes Winters and Giffin: “We think of dominance in 
terms of ‘having our way’ – ‘Overmatch’ over all operational possibilities. This 
connotation is ‘qualitative’ rather than ‘quantitative’. When dominance occurs, nothing 
done, makes any difference. We have sufficient knowledge to stop anything we don’t 
want to occur, or do anything we want to do” (Miller, 2004).  In Miller’s analysis of this 
strategy, he sees two elements that were new in the US information dominance, in 
comparison to traditional concepts of propaganda. Miller considers “the integration of 
propaganda and psychological operations into a much wider conception of 
information war”, to be the first element; while the integration of “information war into 
the core of military strategy”, is the second element (Miller, 2004). Miller, and many 
others, quote US army Colonel Kenneth Allard, a strategic expert, who observed that 
the 2003 attack on Iraq “will be remembered as a conflict in which information fully 
took its place as a weapon of war” (Miller, 2004). Miller however argues that even if 
the US and UK had massive resources with which to attempt “information 
dominance”, other parties successfully prevented their achievement of this goal: “if 
they are faced at every turn by resistance, and in the end, is the only thing which can 
stop the US achieving final information or full spectrum dominance” (Miller, 2004).  
 
Public diplomacy and propaganda have many common bases with the armed forces 
during peacetime. During a war, both governments and armies will mobilise 
campaigns to attempt to influence both supporters and enemies. For a long time, 
before the 9/11 attacks, many Western governments, including the US government, 
had neglected such warfare messages; but after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
these messages were sharpened through the Internet and satellite television, as well 
as more traditional media (Hachten, and Scotton, 2007). Such efforts could be 
considered part of American propaganda in occupied Iraq.  
 
In Iraq, the US army launched big “public diplomacy” campaigns to gain support of 
the locals, following the traditional concept of conquering armies. Ron Schleifer 
(2005), says that the US army's standard Psychological Operations Manual 
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concentrated its discussion on winning the battlefield victory. It failed to go beyond 
that to discuss points such as how to consolidate the new regime’s control after 
victory. But in Schleifer’s view, the situation was different in Iraq, as the US army took 
control of the country's communication systems to be used as a means to send 
specific information to the Iraqi people, and to counter anti-American rumours on the 
street (Schleifer, 2005). The theorist Jacques Ellul (1966) argued that propaganda 
can influence public political and social activities, so that propaganda can accordingly 
be divided into political propaganda and social propaganda. Either official or unofficial 
bodies may perform propaganda efforts, whether in political or social propaganda 
(Ellul, 1966). In Scot Macdonald’s classification, propaganda messages can be 
divided according to the propaganda source. Scot Macdonald (2007), calls it “White 
Propaganda” when the source is known, which is mainly the case with official 
sources. For such propaganda, it is clear who, and what, is communicating the 
message. In “Black Propaganda”, the source is deliberately concealed, or the 
recipient of the propaganda is lead to believe the source to be someone else. This 
kind of propaganda is used in undercover psychological operations.  Finally, “Grey 
Propaganda” stands in between these two, which means that the source may be 
ambiguous. Such propaganda is also designed to mislead. Macdonald (2007) says: 
“Black propaganda is more difficult to create than white propaganda, because white 
propaganda can contain mistakes and still be effective, since it is known to be from a 
foreign source, whereas black propaganda cannot contain certain types of errors” 
(Macdonald, 2007, p.33).  
 
The Americans set up and ran the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), and its publication al 
Sabah, as the medium to transfer such propaganda messages, and to be effectively 
the official newspaper of Iraq. Al Sabah could be considered similar to the German 
Neue Zeitung in the aftermath of the Second World War. The paper received 
American support in several forms (as later chapters in this thesis will show). It 
received financial backup from the Americans, and was run by an exiled Iraqi 
journalist, who was working for an American broadcast service. Psychological 
warfare in Germany and even Japan had been made more effective as the 
implementers of these plans shared a cultural background for Germany and Japan, 
but this was not the case for Iraq (Schleifer, 2005). The Iraqi Media Network failed to 
convey the message of the allied forces, although this did not stop attempts to 
influence the public through “the military and CIA media networks, mobile printing 
outfits, loudspeakers, and broadcasting units” (Schleifer, 2005, p.3). 
 
The role of the US military in the media project in Iraq is investigated by Peter Cary 
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(2010). Cary refers to the massive, USD 200 million budget, released between 2003 
and 2005, to build a national media in Iraq, which he believes cannot be considered a 
classic “media development” of a kind that would be undertaken by any known media 
development organisation. Rather, Cary (2010) describes the project as designed to 
influence public opinion, to improve security and to deal with anti-American 
messages. US army officers were involved directly in the process of shaping or 
directing this media project, and much of what has been done is still considered 
secret, classified information which cannot be made public at this stage. It is known, 
however, that private contractors, commissioned by the US army or the US 
government, played a major role in shaping the media environment in Iraq (Cary, 
2010). 
 
Orayb Aref Najjar (2009), described the American public diplomacy in the Iraqi press 
as a “failure” of the US media plans in Iraq. Najjar argues that many accumulated 
factors led to the “failure” of the American media project, and offers a list of seven 
key points:  
 
1. Pre-planning for Iraqi media reform in Washington rather than in the Arab 
world. 
2. The clash of multiple authorities over the question of Iraq’s media needs and 
who is  best suited to address them. 
3. Imperial arrogance that has led to the exclusion of well-known and seasoned 
Iraqi and Arab media professionals from much of the decision-making 
process. 
4. The privatisation of media development, along with a lack of oversight 
regarding the millions of dollars awarded to private, mostly United States, 
consulting firms, having very little media experience to begin with. 
5. A lack of knowledge regarding Iraqi and Arab media environments, leading to 
an underestimation of existing Arab media capacity and appeal. 
6. A failure - refusal - to differentiate between free media with content designed 
wholly by Iraqis, and PR media designed to place US actions in Iraq into a 
favourable light, not least by planting “good news” when deemed necessary.  
7. The positioning of the needs of the occupation over the needs of Iraqis, which 
has led to excessive legislation in the name of so-called security and the 
establishment of additional layers of media regulation that have hampered 
freedom of press.  
 
(Najar, 2009, p.30)  
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Furthermore, Najjar confirms that general mismanagement destroyed the reforming 
mission of the Iraqi media in general, and affected the future of the new media in post 
war Iraq (Najjar, 2009). These factors, together with other mistaken policies, 
handicapped the American efforts to develop the media sector in Iraq. The fatal 
mistake of the Pentagon was to contract a company “inexperienced” in media 
development to build media project, SAIC (Rohde, 2005). The first year of the project 
was nearly a “complete failure”, because of “the Pentagon’s focus on only reforming 
the state-run broadcaster and the CPA’s efforts to influence Iraqi media network 
coverage” (Rohde, 2005, p.29). The second year, however, was better, as the 
Americans contracted the Harris Corporation, which demonstrated more experience 
than the first company, SAIC.  
 
The “failure” of the Iraqi Media Project led by the Americans was not a result of bad 
management, but unspecific development plans, and associated corruption, 
contributed to its poor outcome.  
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Chapter 1: 
The Iraqi Media Under The Ba’ath Party 1968-1979 
 
1-1 Introduction: Media in Totalitarian Regimes 
Many totalitarian regimes have used the press to market revolutionary ideas. 
Ruling parties or individuals have jumped to power through undemocratic 
means - often through military coups. According to Rugh (2004) a ruling 
group, even if they have power, do not have the legitimacy and the stability 
which they need for their complete authority.  They therefore use newspapers 
as a way of communication to influence people, and will often gradually 
terminate all private media outlets, so that all communication falls under 
government control.  
 
1-2 Iraq in the Ba’ath Era 
On the morning of 17 July 1968 a military coup overthrew the regime of 
President Mohammed Abdel-Rahman Arif. The Ba’athists did not declare at 
first that they were partners in the coup because of their bloody reputation 
after the 1963 coup. When the situation stabilised, Ahmed Hassan Al Baker, 
the conservative Ba’ath Party leader, became the President of the Republic, 
while military officer, Abdul Razzak Al Naif was appointed prime minister and 
Ibrahim Al Dawood became defence minister.  
 
The Ba’ath leadership planned to get rid of Al Naif and Al Dawood as soon as 
possible. This was achieved before the end of July. Saddam Hussein, the 
young radical Ba’athist, led an internal coup against Al Dawood and Al Naif 
on 30 July 1968. After isolating the prime minister in his offices, he entered, 
pointed his gun and gave Al Naif a choice between death or exile.  He chose 
the later. The Ba’ath Party’s success on 30 July proclaimed that internal coup 
on their partners as the completion of their “revolution” on 17 July 1968 
(Saleh, 2008). 
 
1-3 The Ba’ath and the Iraqi Press 
After the summer coup in 1968, the Iraqi press entered the second Ba’ath 
era, carrying the legacy of little press independence from the previous regime, 
which had ruled modern Iraq since 1921 (Saleh, 2008). The ousted regime 
had nationalised the press a few months before the coup. Due to this 
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nationalisation, there were no independent newspapers, and the Ba’athist 
government effectively had the entire print media working for the benefit of 
the regime, as part of their propaganda machine. Newspapers stressed that 
the “revolution” was open to all political parties and that the new regime was 
looking forward to the participation of all effective powers in governing the 
country. In addition, other issues were raised like economic difficulties, and 
the importance of finding a solution to the long-term Kurdish “insurgency” 
peacefully and democratically as this problem was threatening national unity 
(Kadham, 1997). 
 
Despite these assurances, it was rare for the government to license any new 
newspapers. The well-known journalist and Ba’ath supporter, Qassim 
Hamoudi, got the privilege of establishing the Al Huriya newspaper, which 
was issued in early September 1968 (Hasson, 2008), although it was shut 
down after less than a year.  
 
1-4 Official Press 
The Ba’ath regime kept the same newspapers as were published earlier, with 
the addition of the Ba’ath Party’s press; this will be explained later. 
 
1-4-1 Al Jumhuriya Newspaper 
This was the official newspaper, which had started publishing at the beginning 
of the Republican era in 1958. It continued to be published under the authority 
of the Ba’ath, but under new management and presenting ideas consistent 
with the new regime’s ideology (Saleh, 2008). 
 
1-4-2 Al Thawra Newspaper 
On 18 August 1968, the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party published its first 
newspaper edition under the name Al Thawra. It was headed by Tariq Aziz 
and was published in a tabloid size despite the fact that rest of the country’s 
newspapers were broadsheets (Batti, 2010). A big budget was allocated to it, 
with huge buildings and a large printing house, bringing on board Iraqi and 
Arab writers who declared their ideas and thoughts in support of the Ba’ath 
Party. Many of them had been communists before.  
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1-4-3 Alef Ba Magazine 
This magazine was launched before the coup in 1968, but continued 
publishing until 2003. Alef Ba was one of the most prominent magazines 
published during the Ba’ath Party ruling era. It covered news in depth, and 
ran daring cartoons in addition to “investigative” journalism reports. It was 
published in 52 pages, eight of which were in colour, but the biggest change 
happened in 1978 when the administration increased the pagination to 72. 
The magazine sold well, with newsstands running out of copies in a few hours 
(Al Bakri, 1994). 
 
During the 1980s circulation rose to 250,000 copies, but then declined 
dramatically in the 1990s due to sanctions and paper shortages.   
 
1-4-4 Baghdad Observer 
This was an English language daily newspaper published by Al Jamahir 
House. The editor was Jalal Abdel Kader, and it was published by Naji Sabri 
Al Hadeethi (Batti, 2010). 
 
1-5 Newspapers of Trades Unions and Other Organisations 
The new regime launched many newspapers and magazines, published on 
behalf of trades unions and mass organisations. It was the government’s plan 
to control all sectors of society and to promote the policies of the ruling Ba’ath 
Party. The magazines of these organisations included titles like Sawt Al 
Talaba (“The Students’ Voice”), Al Maraah (“The Women”), Waaee Al Omal 
(“Workers’ Awakening”), Sawt Al Falah (“Farmers’ Voice”) and Al Mussawer 
magazine (“The Photographer”). In addition, state institutions launched 
dozens of magazines. Others were published by the Arab organisations and 
associations hosted by the regime in Baghdad (Saleh, 2008). 
 
Many sports newspapers and publications were published, examples being Al 
Malaab (“The Stadium”), Al Jamhour Al Riyadhi (“The Sporting Public”) and Al 
Malaaeb newspaper (“The Stadiums”), a football association journal. All of 
these newspapers stopped publishing after the launch of Al Riyady (“The 
Sportsman”) by the Ministry of Youth (Hasson, 2008). Few publications were 
licensed between 1969 and 1970. Al Rassed newspaper was an 
“independent” newspaper, while Althaqafa Al Jadida magazine represented 
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the Communist Party (Hasson, 2008). 
 
1-6 The Parties’ Press:  
The parties participating in the National Pan Arab Front in Iraq launched their 
own press in 1972. The Ba’ath authority behaved as if the press were its own, 
and the other parties’ press were not allowed to criticise government policies 
or to form any real opposition. Under this understanding, the Ba’ath Party 
allowed the other parties to publish their newspapers:  
- Tareek Al Sha’ab: representing the Iraqi Communist Party, (but was 
shut down in 1979 when they banned the party). 
- Al Taakhi: representing the KDP, which later on became Al Iraq 
newspaper, one of the official political daily newspapers in Iraq. 
 
These limited publications, Iraqi Radio and TV, and the Iraqi Press Agency 
represented the prominent media outlets in Iraq at that time. Despite 
censorship, the look and content of the press improved, compared to the 
previous years of the Iraqi press. There was a great focus on the appearance 
of each newspaper, its editorial direction and the distribution of articles. The 
materials were informative and in addition, the technical and creative skills 
had improved (Al Dahan 2006). 
 
1-6-1  Al Taakhi Newspaper   
Having been shut down less than a year after the Ba’ath coup, the paper was 
published again after 11 March 1970, which established the basis of the 
coalition between the ruling Ba’ath Party and the KDP led by Mulla Mustafa Al 
Barazani. Al Taakhi newspaper was issued in Arabic and it was the KDP’s 
main mouthpiece (Saleh, 2008). The newspaper began to criticise the 
government after a Baghdad-sponsored assassination attempt on Al 
Barazani. Journalist Hassan Al Alwai remembers this incident, saying: “The 
newspaper launched a campaign on the planners of the assassination and 
the newspaper mentioned Saddam Hussein indirectly” (Al Alwai, 2010).  The 
newspaper was closed down again in 1973 when Barazani resumed his 
insurgency against the central government in the north of Iraq in the wake of 
the assassination attempt. 
 
1-6-2 Al Iraq Newspaper 
When the coalition between the Ba’ath Party and the KDP ended, Al Taakhi 
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newspaper closed, but the government replaced Al Taakhi with Al Iraq 
newspaper and a new management. Al Iraq used the same facilities as Al 
Taakhi, but with views that reflected those of the ruling party especially in 
relation to the Kurdish issue. Al Iraq newspaper continued until the 2003 
invasion (Saleh, 2008). 
 
1-6-3 Al Fekar Al Jadid  
After the announcement of the National Action Charter in 1972, which led to 
the coalition between the ruling Ba’ath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party in 
1973, the weekly newspaper Al Fekar Al Jadid was launched on 18 June 
1972, as an Arab Kurdish cultural newspaper, and had a role in reflecting the 
Communist Party’s opinions and political views (Saleh, 2008).  It was a test 
balloon launched by the Communist Party to check what freedom the ruling 
party would grant to a communist cultural organisation. In reality the result 
showed that there were not many choices available on both sides, either for 
the communists who wanted to have their own publication or the Ba’athists 
who needed the support of the communists at that time. The newspaper was 
licensed as a cultural newspaper, but its contents covered a range of cultural, 
political and strategic issues (Al Aassam, 1984).  Abdul Razak Al Safi, editor 
of Tareek Al Sha’ab said: “Al Fekar Al Jadeed newspaper was issued in 
special circumstances while the nationalisation of oil procedures was still on-
going, and we supported the government in facing the foreign companies. 
However, we heard criticisms of our intervention in this debate, saying that 
our newspaper is cultural and not political” (Al Safi, 2010). 
 
1-6-4 Tareek Al Sha’ab Newspaper 
On the 16 September 1973, the first issue of Tareek Al Sha’ab was published. 
A week prior to that date, a trial issue numbered zero was published to 
assess what people, journalists and professionals thought about the design, 
the look and the page divisions of the newspaper (Al Aassam 1984).  Like any 
political or party newspaper, Tareek Al Sha’ab was the mouthpiece of the 
Iraqi Communist Party. Its price was 25 Fillss (The equivalent at the time of 
five pence) and included an advertising supplement of four to eight pages. 
The newspaper was printed in photo offset and written in red, the colour of the 
party. Unlike previous communist newspapers, it printed the two slogans of 
the party at the top of its first page. The first was “A free country and happy 
people”, and the other was for the International Labour and Communist 
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Movement: “Workers of the world unite.” Next to both of them appeared the 
name of the editor and the owner, who were among the leaders of the party 
(Al Aassam 1984).  The staff at the newspaper were mainly Communist Party 
members who took on other party tasks. Other journalists joined the editorial 
team of Tareek Al Sha’ab from Al Fekar Al Jadid, following the closure of the 
newspaper’s Arabic section.  
 
The first edition of Tareek Al Sha’ab was printed on a small, old printing press 
from the World War II era. This press had at one time been used to print the 
secret newspaper of the German Communist Party at that time. It was given 
as a gift to the Iraqi Communist Party in 1959, and the newspaper’s first issue 
was just eight pages long. When a German delegation came to visit Iraq and 
saw the machine, they asked to take it and put it in the museum of the former 
German Democratic Republic and sent back a new printing press to replace 
it. The newspaper, which was published every day except Saturday, was 
considered as one of the most sophisticated Iraqi newspapers of that time. 
Sections were divided using a professional page layout. It launched 
specialised pages on workers’ and farmers’ lives, popular issues, cultural and 
women’s pages. The party offices used to provide the newspaper with articles 
from Communist Party members, friends and sympathisers. Journalists from 
within or outside the newspaper would edit these articles. The newspaper 
would use other Iraqi journalists living abroad or foreign journalists to get 
reports from all over the world. 
 
Nidhal Al Laithi, one of the reporters who worked in the newspaper offices at 
that time, said: “These offices used to gather all submitted works from 
students, engineers and others. The articles then would be fixed and 
corrected by the editors to make them suitable for the newspaper. These 
articles used to represent the public interests and got a lot of attention; in 
addition this procedure created a significant staff of journalists” (Al Laithi, 
2010). However, like other daily newspapers in Iraq, they also relied heavily 
on the news provided by the Iraq News Agency. In addition to the supplied 
news, the translation section and listening department made a great 
contribution to the newspaper by providing press material translated from 
foreign newspapers or transcribed from the radio. Tareek Al Sha’ab also 
published government activities and formal speeches, like any other 
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government newspaper. This policy was considered wrong by its editor, Al 
Safi, who said: “It was a commitment which we made, but we did not need it, 
and we should not have done it in the first place” (Al Safi, 2010). 
 
Al Safi recalls the decision of one of the paper’s managers not to cover a 
statement by the then Vice President Saddam Hussein, by not printing the 
newspaper that day. But the editor received a phone call asking him to submit 
a written explanation of why the newspaper had not been printed and had not 
published the Vice President’s statement (Al Safi, 2010). 
 
1-7 Press and Publishing Laws 
Before the Ba’ath Party coup in 1968, the ruling regime in Iraq justified the 
decision to nationalise the Iraqi press under law number 155 in 1967, on the 
following grounds that: “The on-going battle by the Arab nation against the 
Zionists and colonial forces, requires directing the press in Iraq to serve Arab 
interests and to raise it up to the level of battle and to block all roads and gaps 
in front of the intruders. It was felt that a general corporation should be 
created to regulate the press and publishing, to launch newspapers and 
political circulations. This would guarantee that those newspapers would 
produce the right views and those wise criticisms which help the state to 
protect its construction in these abnormal circumstances which our nation is 
experiencing.” 
 
Under this law, the government cancelled the privileges of all Iraqi 
independent and public newspapers. The Arif government established the 
General Foundation for Press and Printing which was responsible for issuing 
all political publications, printing and distribution (Al Dahan, 2006). 
 
This decision helped the Ba’ath regime to control the press, although initially 
the regime emphasised freedom of speech and expression. But in practical 
terms, it was adding new laws to restrict press freedom. On 5 January 1969, 
the official Al Waqaaeaa newspaper issued the text of press law number 206 
of 1968, which remained active until the fall of Saddam’s regime on 9 April 
2003. Law 206 of 1968 contained 35 articles on organising press and printing 
work. The law limited the approval for a licence to launch a newspaper to the 
Information Minister.  For political publications, the Minister was obliged to 
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submit a proposal to the Revolutionary Command Council as it was the only 
authority that could grant any political newspaper a licence (Al Bakri, 1994). 
 
In late 1974 pre-censorship of the Iraqi press was removed. It was replaced 
by self-censorship, which was managed by the editors at any Iraqi 
publication.  
 
1-8 Constraints on Freedom of Journalism 
When Al Taakhi newspaper closed down, oppressive practices escalated 
against the only non-Ba’ath Party newspaper - Tareek Al Sha’ab. The 
situation in Iraq was beginning to deteriorate, particularly after the withdrawal 
of the Iraqi Communist Party from the Front Secretariat meeting and their 
decision to abandon any joint ventures with the ruling party in late October 
1978. Prior to the disbanding of the Front, the government exerted pressure 
on the communist journalists and those who were not members of the Ba’ath 
Party but were employed by media institutions affiliated to the government. 
Indeed many were forcibly transferred outside these institutions as a means 
of pressurising them and to clear all publications of non-Ba’athists. The Pan-
Arab Media Bureau headed by Saddam Hussein and his Deputy Tariq Aziz 
carried out these actions. 
 
According to several accounts by Iraqi journalists, by mid-1977 a campaign 
was initiated by the ruling authority to carry out a purge of journalists who did 
not support the regime, from all government media institutions, and transfer 
them to non-media related posts.  Al Jumhuriya newspaper was served with a 
decree issued by the Revolutionary Leading Council signed by Saddam 
Hussein, stipulating the transfer of 14 journalists to other non-media oriented 
institutions. The journalist Mohamed Aref, who was one of those affected by 
this decision, stressed that although his editor, Saad Qassim Hamoudi (who 
was also one of the leading figures in the Ba’ath Party), was reluctant to use 
the new decree, he was forced finally to implement it. Aref said, “I published 
some articles in Tareek Al Sha’ab newspaper, which I think contributed to my 
being transferred to the General Post Depot Company. I was deliberately 
transferred again thereafter. The target was to distance any journalist who 
might be considered affiliated to the current Communist Party. I decided soon 
after that to leave the country and watch how things would pan out” (Aref, 
2010). 
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Aref was one of a large group of journalists who were forcibly transferred from 
media institutions. These transfer practices subsequently had an impact on 
the media landscape in Iraq. Some of the editors objected, such as the head 
of Alef Baa magazine at the time, Hassan Al Alwai. He said: “There was a 
resolution passed by the leadership of the Ba’ath Party to transfer all non-
Ba’athists working under the auspices of the Ministry of Information – which 
included socialists and Pan-Arab nationalists” (Al Alwai, 2010). 
 
Al Alwai stressed that he refused to implement this procedure and 
was personally summoned by Saddam Hussein who demanded an 
explanation and questioned whether his actions were an open act of 
disobedience to orders. “I replied to Saddam saying that it was the strangest 
order to be issued by the government and the party, and the most 
damaging one for the government and its interests. Charge a Ba’athist for 
working in a Communist or Pan-Arab nationalist party because he is offering a 
service to that party. But why charge a communist intellectual who has come 
to work in a newspaper that was owned by the government or the Ba’ath 
Party?  That was an inconceivable notion to me!” (Al Alwai, 2010). 
 
Al Alwai also reiterated to Saddam the role of gatekeeper that “editors” would 
play in filtering and foiling any attempts by non-Ba’athists to pass on 
destructive notions through their writings and contributions, whilst pointing out 
that journalists who were members of Communist or Pan-Arab nationalist 
parties represented the intellectual elite who had no equal amongst Ba’athists 
members. “Saddam admired my take on this issue and said: ‘Indeed! We 
ought to follow this plan,’ yet without deferring his rule on their transfer. This 
was typical of Saddam, who never turned back once he made a decision” (Al 
Alwai, 2010). 
 
Yet, the restrictions on non-government newspapers continued. A memo from 
the Iraqi Communist Party Central Committee sent to the Authority 
Leadership dated 28 September 1978 revealed the reality of what the Party’s 
newspapers had endured.  The newspaper was prevented from distribution in 
several counties and provinces. It was banned from sale in bookshops and in 
the Southern part of Iraq, in places like Basra, Nasseriyah and Amara. The 
Communists were banned from selling it. It was also banned from offices, 
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institutions, universities and factories. Those who carried a copy of the 
Communist newspaper were hounded and violated.  Indeed, many drivers 
distributing the newspapers were arrested and forced out of their jobs. In 
addition government bureaus were incited against the Tareek Al Sha’ab 
newspaper (Al Aassam 1984).  Al Safi, the editor of Tareek Al Sha’ab 
stresses that: “We used to suffer so much harassment that it was no longer 
possible to distribute the newspaper directly. We were only able to distribute it 
though official trustees after getting security clearance.  The situation further 
escalated in 1978, when they banned the newspaper from reaching the 
Southern provinces, so we began distributing it secretly there” (Al Safi, 2010). 
 
After the issue of five warnings, the newspaper editor, Abdul Razak Al Safi, 
was called by the Secretariat of the Progressive National Front, Naim Hadad. 
The Secretariat demanded the withdrawal of the Iraqi Communist Party’s 
statement, which called for democratic changes. “I objected and said that it 
was out of my jurisdiction, and asked why, if the Communist Party had a 
limited influence, did they continue to ally with it?” (Al Safi, 2010). The fifth 
warning was the last that the government made against the Tareek Al Sha’ab 
newspaper on the 5 April 1979.  Before the legal action was delivered, two 
remaining editors of the newspaper were kidnapped, which forced the final 
editor of the newspaper to go into hiding to escape police harassment (Al 
Aassam, 1984).  
 
“By the second half of 1978, I felt things were becoming confrontational and I 
was under surveillance 24/7. I was harassed incessantly so I decided 
therefore to leave Iraq. I joined my brother at a funeral, then slipped out with a 
friend, escaping the watchful eye of the surveillance.  I contacted the party 
leadership and left Iraq using a fake passport,” Abdul Razak Al Safi recounts 
(Al Safi, 2010). The Tareek Al Sha’ab newspaper stopped printing, but 
resumed publication clandestinely on 4 October 1979. It was printed in four 
small pages, hand-written and with limited distribution to members of the 
Communist Party who in turn photocopied and distributed it to others.  
 
Ba’athist journalists working in government institutions at the time had 
another take on the story to their counterparts working in Tareek Al Sha’ab 
newspaper. Dr Sabah Yassin (2010), the ex-editor of Al Thawra 
newspaper, recalls that the newspaper was the cause of problems. He said: 
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“When the announcement of the Front was first made, the publications issued 
by the Front carried out serious intellectual efforts to bring closer their points 
of view on national matters. Only in more recent years of the Front’s 
existence and in view of the disputes amongst its members, some of the 
Front’s newspapers were transformed into forums for incitement and stirring 
up trouble” (Yassin, 2010).   
 
Dr Sabah Yassin reiterates the tight control with which the government and 
the Ba’ath Party gripped the media: “After the disbandment of the Front and 
the cessation of non-Ba’athist newspapers from print, the government was 
now in sole control of media and newspapers in Iraq. There were no longer 
any opposition or private newspapers. No individuals or people were able to 
publish any print other than the government” (Yassin, 2010). 
 
1-9 Brief about the Press under Ba’ath Rule 
Although the press developed both in content and artistic execution compared 
with printed materials of the past, it did not enjoy any freedom of speech 
(Kadham, 1997).  This was despite the fact that such freedoms were set out 
in article 26 of the Iraqi constitution of 1970, which stated that the constitution 
guaranteed freedom of expression, publishing, meetings, demonstration and 
of forming political parties, unions, and societies which should not be in 
conflict with the law. The government said it would work to create the suitable 
environment to practise these freedoms, matching the advanced national 
lines of the revolution (Al Bakri, 1994). 
 
The Iraqi press was a univocal press representing the Ba’ath Party. It was 
widely used to serve the authorities by influencing the Iraqi people to support 
the main goals of the Ba’ath Party. This was mentioned by Latif Nessaif 
Jassim, the Minister of Information: “The revolutionary press and its culture 
were the human resources and technical facilities which were the tools that 
the Ba’ath Party, and which the Party would use to make general opinion 
support our main goals” (Al Dahan, 2006).  Dr Hashim Hassan explains that: 
“The press in Iraq from 1968 until 1979 was full of the Arab Ba’ath Socialist 
Party’s ideologies. The main tool for the policy to implant that ideology in the 
press was the ministry of information, which intervened in every subject and 
chose the terms which suited Ba’ath ideology” (Hassan, 2010). 
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The newspapers were able to publish some articles from time to time 
criticising public services, such electricity or water, but the main blame would 
be directed towards the bureaucracy, not the leadership. This kind of freedom 
was limited and it was controlled so as to serve the “revolution and its 
activities” (Al Dahan, 2006). 
 
Government policy succeeded in preventing the people from accessing all 
sources of Arab or international information except that which matched the 
policy of the government (Zayeer, 2008).  The next chapter presents how the 
Iraqi press witnessed further great changes after the strong Vice President, 
Saddam Hussein, assumed the role of President. 
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Chapter 2:  
Iraqi Media under Saddam 1979-2003 
 
2-1 Introduction 
In July 1979 Saddam Hussein was appointed as the President and the leader of 
the Ba’ath Party, taking over from his predecessor Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr after 
the latter had officially “stepped down” making way for his strong deputy. 
Saddam Hussein demonstrated his feelings about the connection between the 
media and his Party by saying: “Our media is part of our credo and that of the 
country. Its methods are part of the revolutionary methods and principles of the 
Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party.”  It was this stance, which made the party leaders 
place Iraqi media within a specific and inescapable intellectual and ideological 
framework influenced by the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party (Al Dahan, 2006).  But 
how did this ”our media” serve the ruling party? How did Saddam and his family 
use the press? What kind of media did Iraq have between 1979-2003?    
 
2-2 Saddam Hussein and the Media 
Saddam became the Head of the National Information Bureau in 1973 and 
continued in this role until the fall of his regime after the US invasion in 2003. 
Saddam Hussein attended meetings held by this bureau on a regular basis. 
When he was Vice President, according to several journalists’ accounts, he 
would actively contribute to decisions of the activities and direction of the bureau 
and the discussions that took place in the weekly meetings it held. Hassan Al 
Alwai, also a regular attendee, confirms this: “Saddam used to attend the 
bureau’s meetings punctually at 10am every Thursday and listened to everyone 
for the entire four hours of discussions on the current affairs nationally and 
internationally and the news agenda for the coming week” (Al Alwai, 2010). 
 
Saddam continued to head the Culture and Information Bureau even after 
becoming the number one figure in the country. His personal visits became 
sporadic, but his bureau continued its work with unabated vigour. “It was only 
natural that Saddam should secure this important role for the media. If an 
unheard-of journalist mentioned him in a line or two, he would contact him and 
encourage him, regardless of who it was and what side he was affiliated to. I do 
not believe that during this phase, any writer who wrote anything about Saddam 
would have gone unnoticed without being personally contacted by Saddam,” 
Hassan Al Alwai said (Al Alwai, 2010).  Amir Al Hilo, the former editor-in-chief of 
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Al Qadissiya newspaper, stated that a group of agents from the Iraqi intelligence 
service would visit the printing presses, seizing random copies of the 
newspapers to forward to Saddam’s personal secretary:  “Saddam used to read 
all newspapers on a daily basis and would make comments directly to them, 
making decisions for them about newspaper’s pages” (Al Hilo, 2010). 
 
2-3 Features of an Era 
The press adopted the policy of spreading the Ba’ath ideology as the “sole 
ideology” across various fields: culture, media and education, linking all forms of 
media to the Ministry of Information and Culture. All publications stressed their 
total devotion to Saddam Hussein. Both the Ministry of Information and the 
Ba’ath Pan-Arab Bureau played a major role in drafting the media policy in the 
country. All publications continued to print large sized pictures of Saddam on 
their front pages, posed in various guises and attires: military, tribal, modern, 
wearing a hat, wearing Kufiya or without. They published his pictures from the 
point when Saddam came to power in 1979 until the fall of his regime (Saleh, 
2008). These published pictures of the President were distributed by his Press 
Office to all print newspapers every evening or early morning. In the event of the 
pictures not arriving, the editors would resort to searching the archive for an 
appropriate image to match the content of the news item.  
 
In addition, those editors were the gatekeepers, responsible for every word 
published in their newspapers. On their shoulders fell the task of pleasing the 
leadership. “There were red lines imposed on us, lines which we must not cross. 
The fact was that any critical news item relating to Saddam Hussein, or to any 
and all rulings passed by him, or to his policies, was forbidden, non-negotiable 
and must not be discussed. Everything else however could be discussed with 
relative freedom” (Al Hilo, 2010). 
 
2-4 The Iraq-Iran War and the Launching of Al Qadissiya Newspaper 
The outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war on 23 September 1980 marked the beginning 
of a new phase in Iraq. Media was employed for war propaganda and as a 
means to manipulate and fight back at the propaganda of the Iranian enemy. 
The newspapers allocated a lot of space to covering war operations and the 
attacks on the frontline. There were no “scoop” stories in Iraqi newspapers, as 
coverage was no longer spontaneous, but was reserved for official 
announcements or relevant events. Regional or international newspapers would 
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have covered most events before they found their way into the Iraqi press. This 
was due to instructions from the government to have all news sourced from one 
single source. The President insisted on news coverage: “It is vital that the public 
in Iraq is aware of events every hour and on the hour because we stand by truth,” 
said Saddam Hussein (Hassan, 2008).   
 
The “truth” reported however, was well-refined war propaganda, as Dr Sabah 
Yasin, the ex editor-in-chief of Al Thawra newspaper, insists: “Media mobilisation 
played a major role in Al Qadissiya War, ‘the Iraq-Iran war’. Little at the time was 
known about what is called civil and military censorship. The editor-in-chief was 
in charge and acted as the monitor at that time. No news item about the 
progress of war was allowed publication unless announced by the official 
spokesman for the general headquarters of the armed forces. As for life on the 
frontline, newspaper correspondents out on the battle frontline were reporting for 
their daily newspapers. This was also the case with radio and television” (Yasin, 
2010). 
 
During this time military newspapers flourished such as Al Yarmouk, a weekly, 
which covered the war and offered a daily supplementary called Al Qadissiya, 
which later became a daily newspaper on 14 November 1984 (Hassan, 2008; “Al 
Qadissiya”, 1982). The editor of this newspaper was Brigadier Mohammed 
Younis Al Ahmed, who was behind its transformation from a newspaper 
supplement to a daily newspaper. 
 
2-5 Al Qadissiya Newspaper 
The Al Qadissiya newspaper began expanding when several conscripted young 
journalists joined it. Al Qadissiya became one of the newspapers most in 
demand for its daring and up-to-date coverage of the war and publishing articles 
criticising the performance of some of the ministries who had succumbed to the 
Ministry of Defence’s influence - then headed by Adnan Khairallah, cousin and 
brother-in-law of Saddam. This was confirmed by the deputy editor of the 
newspaper Amir Al Hilo, who said: “I exploited the fact that a large number of 
journalists were conscripted for military reserve service. I asked for their 
withdrawal from the army to work in the specialist press of the armed forces. 
They were the most capable and daring of journalists and the newspaper 
achieved huge success compared to other official newspapers, the likes of Al 
Thawra and Al Jumhuriya” (Al Hilo, 2010). 
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The media during this time was tightly focused on war propaganda. This is 
consolidated by what Latif Nassaif Jassim, the Iraqi Minister of Information said 
at the time, in one of his meetings with Iraqi journalists and writers: “Eight years 
of war, rapidly approaching the ninth, were fiercely tactical and mobilising. It was 
primarily an incitement to push people to the battlefield front lines” (Al Dahan, 
2006). 
 
But some exaggerations in the press led to other problems, which took the 
regime by surprise. “The media used to exaggerate sometimes about the 
number of Iranian war prisoners and casualties. This was the cause of a bigger 
problem with Iranians after the cessation of the war. The Iranians referred to the 
military announcements issued at the time, with exaggerated statistics of the 
Iranian war prisoners. These documents were used as a reference in their 
negotiations for the exchange of war prisoners,” said Ma'ad Fayadh (Fayadh, 
2010). 
 
2-6 End of the Iraq–Iran War  
On 8 August 1988 Iran agreed finally to UN Security Council Resolution 598 - 
first issued as long ago as 1986 - declaring both parties’ cessation of hostilities. 
In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein headed a number of 
meetings, which claimed an interest in moving towards a multi-party system in 
Iraq. However, Dr Saad Naji Jawad, professor of Political Sciences at Baghdad 
University, stressed that this was not genuine: “The leadership of the Arab 
Ba’ath Socialist Party issued two books which talked about democracy and a 
multi-party system in Iraq. But we had a shared sense that Saddam was not 
serious about it, as subsequent events revealed” (Jawad, 2010). 
 
The government did not allow anyone to launch any new publications, keeping 
the space empty except for the government press.  
 
2-7 Sports Newspapers 
In the mid 1980s Al Ba’ath Al Riyadi newspaper (“The Ba’ath Sport”) was 
launched. Uday, the son of the President, supervised this newspaper. It grew 
over the years and became a huge institution in itself, which included Al Rashid 
Sports Club and later the Sports Olympic Committee. Al Ba’ath Al Riyadi was 
first published on 2 June 1984 with the title carrying Uday Saddam Hussein’s 
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name as the supervisor, and Al Rashid Sports Club as the publishing institute. 
It was a four-page newspaper, in large broadsheet format printed in a private 
publishing house. It was considered to be daring in the sports topics it 
addressed and debated, which was why it appealed to a large number of Iraqi 
youths who were passionate about sports. It would often sell out in the early 
hours of the morning. Not long after this paper was published, Uday personally 
headed the Olympic Committee. However, the newspaper continued to be 
critical of administrative corruption within the Ministry of Youth and the Olympic 
Committee in spite of Uday’s position in it.  
 
Abbass Al Janabi, who was the press secretary for Uday Hussein for a long 
period, stressed at the time that Uday was aware of the campaign that was 
taking place in the newspaper: “There was a pre-arrangement with Uday that 
70% of the reports would attack officials in the Ministry of Youth and the 
Olympic Committee, whereas 30% of them would be personally initiated,” said 
Dr Abbass Al Janabi (Al Janabi, 2010).  
 
2-8 The “First Gulf War”: Invading Kuwait and the Confrontation with US 
Forces in 1991 
After the Iraq-Iran war, the print media continued its propaganda campaigns, 
now waging a campaign against the Gulf countries. Saddam had emphasised 
that Gulf countries such as Kuwait and the UAE were hampering economic 
growth in Iraq. In an unexpected move, in 1990, the Iraqi forces occupied 
Kuwait and stayed there. The UN Security Council issued blockade resolutions, 
which the Iraqi press challenged, stressing the ability of the Iraqi people to 
stand up and resist what had been imposed on them. The propaganda 
incitements used during the Iraq-Iran war continued, ensuring the trust of the 
Iraqi people in Saddam Hussein’s and the Ba’ath government’s ability to 
confront their opponents and succeed. By 17 January 1991, the United States 
began its operation to remove the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, starting its 
campaign by extensive shelling aimed at the civil infrastructure and later at 
military targets. There were attempts to actively stop Iraqi propaganda 
operations by confronting and silencing them, but the US failed to achieve this. 
The newspapers continued publication without interruption as Amir Al Hilo, the 
editor-in-chief of Al Qadissiya newspaper, confirms: “We continued with our 
work and the newspapers continued to be published, through our management 
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of the papers and through alternating locations. The newspapers never once 
stopped publication during the entire duration of the war” (Al Hilo, 2010). 
 
Al Hilo reiterates Saddam’s interest in the smallest details of the newspaper 
production process during the war. He recalls being summoned once by 
Saddam Hussein’s private secretary regarding the size of headline at his 
newspaper: “The newspaper was about to be published when I received an 
order to publish one of the President’s speeches. I did not have a calligrapher 
available at the time and tried to use a section from the speech for the headline, 
only it appeared slightly smaller than the side title. Saddam sent his personal 
secretary to find out the reason for this, demanding from me a written 
explanation” (Al Hilo, 2010).  
 
Part of the transformation that took place later, which had an impact on 
journalism in Iraq, was the Al Ba’ath Al Riyadi newspaper.  The newspaper that 
was published by the Olympic Committee headed by Uday Saddam Hussein, 
had changed during the war into a political newspaper called Al Ba’ath Al 
Siyassi (“The Political Ba’ath”). It continued publication under this title 
throughout the duration of the war, 17 January - 1 March 1991 (Al Essawi, 
2000). 
 
2-9 Babil Newspaper: A Special Experiment in the History of Iraqi Press 
After the end of the war, Al Ba’ath Al Riyadi newspaper returned to its normal 
sports coverage, but the idea of having a political newspaper was rooted in the 
mind of Uday Saddam Hussein. A few weeks after the end of hostilities, he 
launched a political newspaper, which was initially called Al Ba’ath, as a twin 
newspaper to Al Ba’ath Ariyadi. The first edition was published on the 24 March 
1991. The newspaper, in four pages, described itself as a “general daily 
newspaper” being published by the Olympic Committee, with the five Olympic 
circles as logo. The head of the administrative council was Uday Saddam 
Hussein, while the editor-in-chief was Mudehir Aref whose editorial was entitled 
“A Newspaper for Everyone”.  
 
In the second edition of the newspaper, the name of the Olympic Committee 
and the five Olympic circles were removed from the main headline, but the 
newspaper described itself as a daily political newspaper. The newspaper had 
the name Al Ba’ath until the fifth edition, but the sixth edition appeared with the 
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new name, Babil. The newspaper said that they decided to change the name in 
order to prevent the confusion which might occur between Al Ba’ath and Al 
Ba’ath Al Riyadi, while the name “Babil” was chosen to connect Iraq and the 
civilisation of Babylon, and more especially what that civilisation represented in 
the history of Zionism (Al Essawi, 2000). 
 
Babil was published in the normal large size - first in four pages, then extended 
to eight, but it increased its pages according to the situation and the coverage. 
Latterly, the newspaper was published in tabloid size with the fixed number of 
sixteen pages every edition. On 9 November 1991 the newspaper was stopped 
because it did not have a licence to be published. This issue was sent to the 
parliament - The National Council - for a vote. The members’ vote was 
“unanimous” to continue publishing Babil, which carried the title “Published by 
commission of the people” from that date onwards.  The staff of the newspaper 
were mainly the journalists who had been working in Al Ba’ath Al Riyadi, but in 
many cases the editors would ask well-known writers to make some 
contribution to the newspaper by sending their work to be published in Babil (Al 
Essawi, 2000). 
 
The Ministry of Information stopped Babil again at a later date after it had 
published articles criticising some ministerial performances.  “Uday used Babil 
in his own private wars; the newspaper attacked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Tariq Aziz personally, so it was shut by the Ministry of Information for three 
days” (Al Janabi, 2010).  
 
Uday responded by stopping Babil for a week to put pressure on the Minister: 
Uday liked to show the Minister how powerful his newspaper was by publishing 
“hundreds of thousands” of requests to resume work again.  The matter did not 
rest there. “Uday instructed us to lead an attack campaign on the Minister of 
Information, Abdul Ghani Abdul Ghafour, whom [sic] lost his position after a 
short time from the start of the campaign,” said Abbass Al Janabi (Al Janabi, 
2010).  
 
This was not the only reason behind the confrontation between Uday and 
Abdul Ghafour. The real reason was the evaluation of a committee, which 
Abdul Ghafour had commissioned. The committee had fixed the rent for use of 
the machinery and studios which Uday’s TV station, Al Shabab, was to pay 
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monthly to the Ministry, to a total price of USD 250,000. “When I told Uday 
about it, he got mad and then he went to see his father who ordered another 
committee to be formed, which reduced the evaluation to USD 6,000,” said Al 
Janabi (Al Janabi, 2010). 
 
Dr Hashim Hassan, who was one of the most prominent editors at Babil, 
confirms that Uday used the newspaper to attack his family members: “I was 
allowed to publish articles attacking the Minister of the Interior, Wattban 
Ibrahim Al Hassan, Saddam’s half brother. He lost his position later” (Hassan, 
2010).   
 
The influence that Uday enjoyed gave the journalists a freedom to criticise the 
ministers and corruption in the public services. “Uday was very close to the 
decision maker, so he was a powerful man who could protect us, but at the 
same time he was the main source of information,” said Abbass Al Janabi (Al 
Janabi, 2010).  Uday built up a media empire, which included his own 
newspaper, radio and TV stations. “He was the only one who could publish 
anything without fearing any reaction” (Al Janabi, 2010).  
 
The total circulation of Babil was 150,000 but it was later reduced to 30,000, 
while Al Ba’ath Al Riyadi was 250,000 and reduced later to 15,000, because of 
the UN sanctions. 
 
2-10  Uday Saddam Hussein as the Head of the Journalists’ Union 
In the early 1990s, Uday tried to create his own authority, motivated by the fact 
that his father did not give him a senior position. Uday’s role with the Olympic 
Committee was his only official position.   
 
Uday assumed the position as the Head of the Journalists’ Union from 1993 
until 2003, but he was also the Head of the Cultural House which included 
many arts associations and cultural unions. In practice, the situation changed: 
many journalists were able to move more freely inside the official offices and 
ministries while before they had not enjoyed such freedom and influence 
according to one of the well-known journalists of that time, Ahmed Abdul Majid. 
“Uday managed to get some tangible support for Iraqi journalists. He was able 
to convince his father to give land to the journalists, while he managed also to 
reduce the pressure practised by the chief editors, who were appointed directly 
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by Saddam and who placed huge pressure on their staff before Uday became 
the Head of the Union”, Abdul Majid said (Abdul Majid, 2010). 
 
Like the situation in any totalitarian regime, the press in Iraq was serving the 
regime, but Uday was looking to give more “freedom” to the press. Abdul Majid 
remembers, “In a meeting I attended with Uday, he confirmed that if he had the 
power he would let Iraq have a ‘free’ and liberal press and political parties, but 
they must be under his command” (Abdul Majid, 2010). Majid thinks that his 
point of view was more advanced than that of the senior officials in the regime. 
However, although Uday practised the role of “godfather” towards the press, he 
also practised punishments, which humiliated and insulted many journalists.  
 
In 1993 there was an event which many journalists would not forget. They had 
all gathered for a meeting in one of the Iraqi theatres. The security guards 
brought in the Vice-Head of the Journalists’ Union and two other committee 
members, who had been accused of “betraying” the trust of the Head of the 
Union, Uday, and of the union’s members. When the spokesperson finished his 
declaration, a group of men started throwing bad tomatoes and eggs at the 
three “guilty” men.  
 
Ebtissam Abdullah, the known writer and journalist, was there: “When they 
started throwing the eggs and tomatoes on Lutfi Al Khayat and Ahmed Sabry, I 
started crying, I thought that I might face the same situation and I could not 
take it any more. I started shouting ‘No, No’, and many other colleagues 
followed me shouting, and then they took them out of the theatre” (Abdullah, 
2010).  Lutfi Al Khayat died a month after that shocking event which affected 
everyone who attended that meeting including Ma'ad Fayadh.  “I saw them 
being beaten later; that was the moment that I decided to leave Iraq” (Fayadh, 
2010). 
 
 2-11   Advertisements 
Because of this difficult situation, the government decided that all publications 
should be self-sufficient, and therefore the heads of all publications had to 
consider other sources of funding beyond the government. “The government 
orders were very clear, the government would pay the salaries of the staff of 
the four official newspapers but not the cost of the paper and printing materials 
which should be covered by each institution,” Al Janabi said (Al Janabi, 2010).  
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The only respite for those institutions were the advertisements. Advertisments 
were limited during the 1970s and the 1980s following the traditional idea that 
they would reduce the value of the newspaper, (Al Bakri, 1994) but advertising 
was a lifeline under the sanctions. Commercial advertisements flourished in the 
newspapers, especially when they became an essential source of money. 
 
The newspapers witnessed new kinds of advertisements, the so-called 
“presidential greetings”. These greetings to the “beloved” President usually 
came from the heads of big companies, or from institutes’ directors who wanted 
to keep or inflate their positions (Al Raffideen, 2001; Al Raffideen, 2002; Uruk, 
2003). This extortion to publish a greeting to the President became a 
phenomenon in the middle of the 1990s as the advertising agents started to 
target the owners of small businesses and shops.  “There was no way to 
control such blackmail; when the name of Saddam or Uday were mentioned 
everyone would go silent, so these methods were widely used by the 
advertising agents to make a lot of money,” Al Janabi explains (Al Janabi, 
2010). 
 
2-12    The New Weekly Newspapers  
In the middle of the 1990s a wave of weekly newspapers appeared. These 
newspapers were connected to the Journalists’ Union, and they were named 
as publications of the weekly newspaper committee, which was headed by 
Uday Saddam Hussein. All the weekly newspapers put Uday’s name on their 
headings as a mark of influence and protection from the anger of other officials. 
From the early days of their launch, these newspapers started to highlight the 
fact that they were different to other newspapers, claiming to have a margin of 
freedom much greater than the official newspapers. Like Babil, they were more 
daring than other newspapers. Their reports discussed issues which had never 
before been explored - especially the subject of corruption (Al Ruba’e 2007).  
Dr Hashim Hassan, chief editor of Nabdh Al Shabab, said: “Many journalists 
joined the weekly press. They took this chance to revive the principles of 
journalism and they managed to publish many reports. Those newspapers 
were popular and they exceeded the circulation of the official press. Many 
journalists were fooling the officials by criticising their ministries or directorates, 
who would then think it was under Uday’s instructions” (Hassan, 2010). 
 
New newspaper titles appeared on the market. Many newspapers carried the 
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same titles of newspapers published before the Ba’ath Party coup in 1968 such 
as Al Zawraa, Nabadh Al Shabab, Al Etihad, Al Rafedin, Al Musawer Al Arabi, 
Al Eqtessadi and Sawt Al Talaba. There were also weekly newspapers 
launched in each province for example Al Tamim, Tekrit, and Al Basrah (Al 
Ruba’e, 2007).  The weekly newspapers would cover all kinds of corruption in 
any ministry or by any minister, but without putting any blame on Saddam or 
his policies. There were other “red lines”, which journalists knew they should 
not cross or even try to discuss, mainly concerning news about Iraqi 
oppositionists abroad. Nabadh Al Shabab tried to cross this line when it 
published an article about the exiled government headed by Chalabi. The 
newspaper published the picture of Chalabi and accused him of being traitor 
and an agent of the imperial powers (UK, USA), but this was not enough to 
protect the chief editor (Nabd Al Shabab, 1998). “The article generated huge 
arguments and we received a huge wave of criticism, but Uday took the 
responsibility for publishing that article. I was fired from my position as the chief 
editor of the newspaper and prevented from writing, then the security agency 
started chasing me,” Hashim Hassan said (Hassan, 2010). 
 
The new publications gained a large audience by publishing leaked news on 
topics important for Iraqis, such as land distribution dates, or news which might 
affect the economy.  Many of the leaks turned out to be accurate. Uday’s 
former press secretary, Al Janabi, confirms this fact: “Uday used to buy news 
resources, we could not say it was bribes, but we called it gifts, according to 
Uday’s preference, so we had sources everywhere” (Al Janabi, 2010). After a 
while these newspapers started to cover Uday’s activities on their front pages. 
“They were covering Uday in the same way as the daily official newspapers 
were covering his father’s activities” (Abdul Majid, 2010). 
 
2-13 Press and Freedom of Expression 
Saddam said in his meeting with a group of Iraqi journalists in January 1980: 
“Write without limits or hesitation or fear for the possibility that the state might 
like or dislike your writings” (Al Bakri, 1994) but in practice it was very different. 
The laws and the instructions of the Pan-Arab Cultural and Information Office 
controlled what the journalists were writing about and the way it should be 
written, making all go through the views of the ruler. Everything would be 
considered as part of the national security of the country, so journalists were 
followed by security agencies who were monitoring their work all the time, 
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fearing the effect of their writing on their audience, especially anything which 
might be considered an attack or might oppose the regime’s policies (Al Dahan 
2006).  Dr Hashim Hassan talked about the limited options journalists had at 
that time: “There were not many options, either you praised and got rewarded 
or you kept doing your job to report the news without even a hint of creativity” 
(Hassan, 2010). 
 
2-14  Abuse, Imprisonment and Executions of Journalists 
During Saddam’s era there were 31 execution articles in the constitution, and 
many of them were used to persecute journalists and the educated elite (Al 
Windi, 2008). 
 
The first event was in 1969, a few months after the Ba’ath Party assumed 
power. Two well-known journalists were arrested, then executed. Abdulaziz 
Barakat and Abdullah Al Khayat were accused of spying for the benefit of a 
foreign country. The Pan-Arab writer and the former chief editor of many official 
newspapers and magazines, Amir Al Hilo, doubts such accusations: “Spying 
was a ready accusation in the Ba’ath Party, many were executed because of 
such accusations and there was no evidence or proof except for the Ba’ath 
Party’s claims” (Al Hilo, 2010). 
 
Mohamed Aref remembers this event and says that such claims would be 
made against anyone who confronted the Ba’ath Party: “I remember that 
Barkat’s family mentioned that Abdulaziz was executed because he published 
a book called ‘The Black Guards’ in reference to the first Ba’ath coup in 1963” 
(Aref, 2010).  Other well-known journalists were imprisoned and sometimes 
vanished, like Aziz Al Sayed Jasim, who was one of the well-known writers and 
thinkers. This kind of practice forced many journalists to leave the country for 
exile (Saleh, 2008). 
 
2-15   Iraqi Newspapers Before the American Invasion 2003 
In the last few weeks before the war, the main subjects covered by the Iraqi 
newspapers were the UN Security Council discussions about Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD), and the inspectors’ reports about disarming Iraq. 
The headlines challenged the “super power” to prove that Iraq had WMD and 
claimed that if they tried to attack Iraq they would lose their credibility first and 
ultimately the war. One of the headlines, which can be taken as an interesting 
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turning point, asked for CIA agents to visit Iraq and investigate the information 
they had about Iraqi WMD. This invitation was the last attempt by the regime to 
avoid the war and any possible confrontation. But the United States and its 
allies were not ready to change their plans for whatever Saddam’s regime 
would offer, as they saw the regime as the problem that needed to be tackled. 
The next chapter presents the media campaigns of Saddam’s regime and the 
US administration. It also presents the situation the Iraqi press found 
themselves in during and after the 2003 invasion.  
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Chapter 3:  
The War Campaign and the Collapse of the Regime in 2003 
 
3-1 Introduction 
The United States initiated an official move against Iraq in 1998, when Congress 
passed the Iraq Liberation Act, signed by President Bill Clinton. This law gave 
the US government permission to provide funds to Iraqi opposition movements 
to help to topple Saddam’s regime using any available means, including media 
campaigning.  
 
In preparation the US government launched numerous media campaigns aiming 
to gather support for political change in Iraq. Despite providing huge resources, 
this change did not happen and the media campaigns had no effect inside Iraq. 
During the 2003 invasion, US propaganda failed to make Iraqis rise up against 
the regime, while the Iraqi campaign led by the former Minister of Information 
succeeded in maintaining internal law and order in Iraq until the last moments of 
the Saddam regime.  The Americans came to the country with plans designed in 
a few days before the beginning of the war. There were not enough troops to 
impose law and order. Because they kept changing their plans, they created 
confusion that later had a negative impact on the US occupation of Iraq. The 
confusion included the US plans for the media.  This chapter will explain the US 
media campaigns to gain Iraqi support to change Saddam’s regime. How did the 
US government use the media to achieve such a goal? What kind of propaganda 
did the US-sponsored media and Saddam’s media use during this confrontation? 
What was the landscape of the Iraqi press after the war? Did the US prepare any 
plan for the Iraqi press after ousting the Iraqi regime? 
 
3-2 The American Usage of Media Campaigns against Iraq 
Previously, media outlets had been used as foreign policy tools during the Cold 
War between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. But they were 
also used widely against Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. Radio Free Europe / 
Radio Liberty which the US administration used to stop the spread of 
communism in Europe, had established a department for Iraq called Radio Free 
Iraq after the 1991 war (Isakhan, 2008). The US made a great effort to help 
mobilise the work of Iraqi oppositions. This included recruitment of Iraqis who 
could provide information to the American Intelligence, the Central Information 
 60 
Agency (CIA).  
 
Between 1992-1996, the CIA secretly commissioned Rendon Group to lead an 
operation to bring together a group of opposition players - to be named later as 
the Iraqi National Congress, INC, led by Ahmed Al Chalabi. The Rendon-INC’s 
media campaign highlighted human rights abuses under Saddam Hussein’s 
tyranny. One of the people who worked on that project, Francis Brooke, claimed 
that they were spending USD 40 million a year (Miller, 2004). The Rendon Group 
were making a healthy profit – up to 10% of the amount being spent per year. 
But after passing the Iraq Liberation Act, the resources being allocated to the 
Iraqi opposition increased to USD 97 million. This money was supposedly to help 
the INC to create programmes to administer Iraq during the transition period 
after the fall of Saddam, and then to prepare the ground for democracy in Iraq 
(Miller, 2004). The parties opposed to Saddam’s regime received further support 
of USD 6 million to launch a television station - Al Hurriya (“The Freedom”)  - and 
a newspaper called Al Mutamar (“The Congress”) (Isakhan, 2008). The editor-in-
chief of Al Mutamar was Hassan Al Alawi, a well-known Iraqi journalist who 
described Al Mutamar thus: “It was a proper newspaper unlike the other 
opposition parties’ newspapers in exile which were like leaflets. We were keen to 
make it close to Iraqis in exile and inside Iraq” (Al Alwai, 2010). 
 
The newspaper, which was described by other journalists as being well 
designed, was printed and distributed in London and available in different places 
around the world, including the northern part of Iraq. The newsstands in the 
British capital London were getting the papers for free, and the owners of the 
kiosks sold it for one British pound sterling. The price varied from one country to 
another, but in Iraq the newspaper failed to pose a real challenge to the regime. 
Copies of the newspaper were available in the northern region of Iraq only, 
mainly because security checkpoints checked all material coming from this 
region. The circulation was nearly 70,000 according to Al Alawi: “This is a good 
rate of circulation for a newspaper in exile” (Al Alwai, 2010). 
 
In parallel to the media effort, the political effort continued. The Congress 
allocated another USD 8 million to support opponents of Saddam Hussein in 
1999. The fund was spent on bringing the opposition leaders together to work 
towards a single goal of “getting rid of Saddam Hussein’s regime”. Conferences 
and meetings were held in different places around the globe for opposition 
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leaders to plan their actions (Myers, 1999). The United Kingdom was part of an 
effort to start an extensive propaganda campaign to manipulate the Iraqi media 
landscape. The main aim of this campaign was to raise opposition to Saddam 
and to gain support from the Iraqi people for any American-British military action 
against Saddam’s regime (Isakhan, 2008), similar to the American intervention in 
the Balkans. 
 
3-3 The War Propaganda Campaign 
The main propaganda campaign was launched when the US State Department 
supported a project called “General Diplomacy Group for Iraq”. According to the 
American press, this body aimed to train the Iraqi opposition groups on how to 
respond to journalists’ questions in a way that would support George W. Bush’s 
plan to invade Iraq. Other media campaigns were carried out by research 
institutes and public relations companies and involved the recruitment of large 
numbers of researchers and writers, in addition to commissioning websites for 
the same purpose (Kadim, 2007). 
 
The campaign had a broad focus on many different issues such as dictatorship, 
crimes against humanity, terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction.  The 
scope depended on the resources that intelligence and opposition parties 
provided (Al Bayati, 2007).  In a follow up investigation conducted by the US 
Congress after the war, it was revealed that 108 news stories were based on 
information provided by the INC's Information Collection Programme. This 
included President Bush’s claims, which had suggested links between Saddam 
and Osama bin Laden, the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme and hiding 
biological and chemical weapons (Miller, 2004). The Secretary of the State at the 
time Colin L. Powell used some of these fabricated stories: On 5 February 2003, 
he presented a photograph of training camps inside Iraq, which purportedly 
belonged to Al Qaeda. But Mr Powell did not mention the location of the camps 
because they were in the northern part of Iraq, which was not controlled by 
Saddam’s regime and was being protected by the American planes as part of the 
no fly zone area (Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis, 2003-2004). The minister also 
warned of the “danger”, which Iraq represented, giving the example of the mobile 
biological weapons laboratories, later discovered to be a fabricated story by an 
Iraqi asylum seeker, a defector and engineer called Adnan Ihsan Saeed al 
Haideri (Al Bayati, 2007). The story appeared on the front page of the New York 
Times on the 20 December 2001. The INC organised interviews with Al Haideri 
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who was called “the curveball” by different media outlets (Miller, 2004).  Iraq 
rejected the allegations saying that such laboratories did exist, but these were 
laboratories being imported through the UN and were used to check food quality 
not to manufacture biological weapons (Al Dulaimi, 2008).  
 
These activities show a clear intention of the US administration to invade Iraq - 
aiming initially to get rid of Saddam Hussein's regime and then to draw a new 
map of the Middle East based on the “visions” of American neoconservative 
policy (Kagan, Schmitt, and Donnelly, 2000). One of the leading 
neoconservatives, Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Defence Secretary, organised a 
meeting with the Iraqi exiles to assist in planning a post Saddam government. 
One of the journalists who was part of this training programme was Dr Abbass Al 
Janabi: “This operation meant to demonise the Iraqi regime. Also, to prepare a 
group of journalists to lead the Iraqi media outlets after the fall of the regime. 
Many exiled journalists were being taken for training in the US” (Al Janabi, 
2010). 
 
On the other side, in late 2002, the Iraqi media was leading a propaganda 
campaign against the leaders of what was to become the coalition  - especially 
George Bush and the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Newspaper headlines 
referred to the “loyalty” of the army and the people to Saddam Hussein. Other 
headlines referred to the readiness of the armed forces for the battle to “defeat” 
their enemies (the Americans and their allies). The newspapers also covered the 
latest developments of discussions about the UN inspectors’ reports regarding 
Iraq’s arms programme and the UN searching process.  
 
3-4  Beginning of the 2003 Invasion  
On the night of 19 March 2003, the invasion started, with missile attacks directly 
targeting President Saddam Hussein - focusing on one of his farms in the 
Baghdad area, Al Dora, as he had been expected to be present there 
(Woodward, 2004). The American propaganda effort at the time was 
concentrated on sending specific messages to Iraqi people through radio and 
print material - which would be dropped from aeroplanes - instructing Iraqis to 
remain at home (Baltic Media Centre, Index on Censorship, Institute for War & 
Peace Reporting, and International Media Support, 2003). More than two million 
leaflets were dropped in Iraq on the 21 March 2003; most were thrown into areas 
that the Iraqi army was expected to be occupying, while some were dropped 
 63 
over cities (Clark, and Thomas, 2005).  
 
Other messages were broadcast through radio and TV stations using aeroplanes 
as transmitters, asking officers and soldiers to surrender (Westcott, 2003). The 
messages meant to paralyse the Iraqi resistance by concentrating on the huge 
technological gap between the Iraqi army and the capacity of the coalition forces. 
This was characterised by exaggerating the effect and destruction caused by the 
coalition forces’ rockets, bombs, and missiles. The aim was to force the Iraqi 
soldiers to surrender even before the beginning of the battle (Al Bayati, 2007). 
The Americans used careful terminology, which reflected their “aim” to reduce 
the amount of casualties such as “surgical strikes” and “precision bombing” 
(Herman, 2005), while the name of the war was “Shock and Awe”. 
 
Inside Iraq, the media in general and the newspapers in particular confronted the 
American propaganda with challenging headlines in an attempt to give the 
reader “confidence in victory”. The newspapers described the fighting of the US 
army as being erratic and far from disciplined after encountering strong 
resistance from the Iraqi forces (Al Joubori, 2005). Newspapers enjoyed 
reporting the fall of a US Apache helicopter, as such an event gave the media 
enough material for mocking US technology. Most of the Iraqi media and 
newspapers covered the story, which alleged that a simple farmer had shot 
down an advanced Apache using his old rifle (Al Samaraei, 2003). The Iraqi 
newspapers, in enthusiastic articles, urged the Iraqi forces and people to attack 
the American enemy, confirming that Iraqis would be the victors and the United 
States would be defeated in the end. Iraqi propaganda focused also on the 
civilian casualties as a way to demonise the coalition forces. One incident which 
was widely used involved a missile which exploded in a local market in Baghdad 
in the middle of the day and where the civilian casualties numbered nearly 50 
dead (“Alef-Ba”, 2003; Al Shama’a, 2003). The American and the British media 
officers denied the incident and claimed that it was an Iraqi missile, which 
missed its target. Although most of the western media echoed the coalition 
forces’ point of view, Robert Fisk of the British Independent newspaper 
examined shrapnel from the location and found that it was clearly a US missile 
(Kumar, 2006). 
 
Many Iraqi officials raised this issue in press conferences where they confirmed 
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that the US was breaching international laws and conventions, especially those 
which deal with armed conflict such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 
- concerning the Laws and Customs of War. The former Iraqi Foreign Minister, 
Naji Sabri, often publicly repeated the message that America breached these 
conventions saying: “The aggression led to the death and injury of many civilians 
and displaced thousands of families from their homes, the war deprived the 
population of their basic needs and services such as transportation, telephone, 
electricity, all of these are war crimes and crimes against humanity and it is a 
human genocide, which is punishable under international law” (Al Joubori, 2005). 
Such statements would be covered by all newspapers, which also emphasised 
that America and Britain were two rogue states that were breaching international 
law, while the international community stood against the war. Newspapers would 
publish many statements from international figures, such the Pope John Paul II, 
to support this claim (“Al Qadissiya”, 2003). 
 
One of the old techniques used by the Iraqi media to confront US propaganda, 
was verbally undermining the enemy (America). The Iraqi officials started giving 
funny, humiliating and insulting nicknames to the US troops and the leaders of 
countries that participated in the invasion. The Iraqi press adopted these 
nicknames when referring to these groups or figures. For example, the US 
President George W. Bush was called “The criminal reckless Bush”, while his 
Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld was branded “murderer”. There were also 
other names meant to put down the enemy such as “mercenaries”, “criminals”, 
“outlaws”, “foolish” and Oulooj (infidels) (Al Joubori, 2005). Meanwhile, the 
American Office of Global Communications asked military spokespersons not to 
refer to Saddam’s loyal troops as “Fedayeen” as it carries positive associations, 
they should be called “thugs”, “death squads” or terrorists (Allen, and DeYoung, 
2003). 
 
3-5 The Iraqi Newspapers in the Last Days of the War 
Iraqi newspapers were working until the last day of the war. According to one of 
the editors of the national Iraqi newspaper Al Jumhuriya, Dr Mohammed Bedawi 
Hassan Al Shamari, the newspaper editors were relying on news from agencies 
and other satellite channels such as Al Jazeera or CNN. “We took only what 
                                                 
 This was the same name which was given by the Sada Al Islam (The Islam Echo) newspaper to the British troops 
when they invaded Iraq during the First World War in 1914.  
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served the regime and the war purposes and I believe it was legitimate as we 
were facing a foreign aggression,” said Al Shamari (Al Shamari, 2011).  
According to Al Shamari, Al Jumhuriya newspaper was working normally 
throughout the whole war. Most of the published materials were propaganda and 
were part of the psychological warfare aimed at the enemy (the coalition forces). 
“Normally we printed 16 pages, while during the war we were publishing only 12 
pages, all materials were related to the war,” said Dr Mohamed Bedawi Al 
Shamari (Al Shamari, 2011). 
 
The editor-in-chief of the national magazine Alef Ba, Amir Al Hilo, described the 
contents of his magazine during the war: “We were covering only war activities, 
we did not cover any cultural topics because of the war” (Al Hilo, 2010). 
 
The propaganda effort very much continued with the same momentum as before 
and the Ministry of Information kept working until they themselves were attacked 
by missiles on 30 March 2003. “The Minister of Information Mohammed Saeed 
Al Sahaf refused to evacuate the Ministry, he said that anyone who leaves the 
Ministry should carry a sign saying he/she is a coward. So people carried on 
working despite the great danger,” said Amir Al Hilo (Al Hilo, 2010). 
 
Such steadfastness made many Iraqis trust in Al Sahaf - more than any news 
source. “None of the newspapers stopped; we were using the schools and we 
were running newspapers or magazines editorially from those places,” Al Hilo 
confirms (Al Hilo, 2010). 
 
Warid Bader Salem, an Iraqi writer, recalls the headlines of Al Jumhuriya 
newspaper, which covered Al Sahaf’s statement: “Until the 8th [of April] all 
newspapers were available, and I passed by Al Jumhuriya newspaper where my 
friends were preparing for the next day’s edition with a big statement from Al 
Sahaf saying ‘Americans are burned at the walls of Baghdad’” (Salem, 2010).  
While Al Qadissiya newspaper’s editors were preparing the edition of the 9 April 
2003, they learned some unexpected news. “We heard that the Americans were 
in the presidential palace but we did not believe it,” said Dr. Ahmed Abdul Majid, 
a former editor at Al Qadissiya newspaper (Abdul Majid, 2010).  Dr Abdul Amir Al 
Shemari from Al Iraq newspaper described what happened on the 8 April 2003: 
“We were working in Al Iraq newspaper preparing the next day’s edition while the 
American troops were occupying Baghdad; when I told my colleagues, no one 
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believed me” (Al Shemari, 2010). 
 
The propaganda efforts led by Al Sahaf inside Iraq were so successful, that it 
meant that Al Sahaf himself rejected the facts on the ground. “I told Al Sahaf that 
the American tanks were on the other side of the river, but he was not ready to 
believe me,” said Amir Al Hilo, Alef-Ba magazine’s chief editor (Al Hilo, 2010). 
 
Al Hilo confirmed that Al Sahaf was inventing the news in the press conferences 
he conducted. “He did not have any source for the information; he was holding 
press conferences and he was saying whatever came to his mind” (Al Hilo, 
2010).  Al Sahaf was defiant in his claims that Iraqi forces were defeating the 
Americans and their allies. But most of what he said became a headline and was 
reported in the following day’s newspaper as solid fact. “The last headlines of the 
national newspaper Al Jumhuriya were quotes of Saddam’s speech and 
statements of the Minister of Information Al Sahaf, which denied the American 
claims to be in Baghdad,” said Dr Mohamed Bedawi Al Shamari (Al Shamari, 
2011). 
 
The French news agency AFP reported that many bought “souvenir copies” of 
the four official national newspapers on 8 April (Feuilherade, 2003), but a copy of 
Al Qadissiya newspapers shows it was printed on 9 April 2003. (“Al Qadissiya”, 
2003). 
 
3-6 The Fall of Saddam’s Regime 
On 9 April 2003, Iraqis were following the war developments as the Minister of 
Information Mohammed Saeed Al Sahaf held his last press conference near the 
Palestine-Meridian Hotel in the central part of the Iraqi capital.  He insisted that 
the coalition forces were “defeated”. In a few minutes, the whole scene changed: 
the American tanks appeared suddenly in Baghdad and moved into Al Firdous 
Square near the Palestine-Meridian Hotel. The coalition tanks and the American 
soldiers took over the whole area and the minister disappeared. In an 
orchestrated scene, one of the many statues of former Iraq dictator Saddam 
Hussein was toppled as a symbolic declaration of the fall of his regime - ending 
the Ba’ath Party ruling (Rutherford, 2004).   
 
The fall of Baghdad to US forces spelt a phase of complete anarchy and chaos 
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for Iraq. Official offices and buildings were looted and burned on a large scale. 
Universities, hospitals, public libraries and archaeological sites suffered from this 
mass looting and destruction. Looters targeted everything they could grab from 
these sites including Saddam Hussein’s palaces, his family villas and those of 
other senior officials who had fled. It was a quick collapse of the regime, which 
many observers did not expect (Dobbins, 2003).  This situation broke up the Iraqi 
state, while the media outlets disappeared. There were no newspapers; official 
radio had fallen silent and TV signals suddenly ceased. On the morning of 10 
April, Iraq woke up without the Republic’s official newspapers: Al Jumhuriya, Al 
Qadissiya (the mouthpiece of the army), the Ba’ath Party publication Al Thawra 
newspaper and Al Iraq newspaper (Thamir, 2008).   
 
The dissolution of the state institutions after the fall of the regime was an 
unexpected development as mentioned above, but it was also the moment that 
ended the heavy censorship of the media. The monopoly that Saddam Hussein's 
regime had on publications and other media outlets no longer existed. “When I 
saw the statue falling I did not believe it, I was wondering if it is a joke or it is not 
true, but I was happy that finally we could write what we want without fearing the 
regime,” said Iraqi journalist and writer Warid Bader Salem (Salem, 2010). 
Meanwhile journalists who lived in exile did not believe that it could be the end of 
their suffering away from their country. “I was sitting watching on TV what was 
happening, when the statue toppled, I could not move, I was silent for a while, I 
can not describe how I felt,” said Jumaah Al Hilfi, an Iraqi journalist who had 
lived in exile for two decades  (Al Hilfi, 2010). 
 
Suddenly access to information was not under the official control of security 
agencies anymore - it became available for everyone (Thamir, 2008).  People 
suddenly found themselves able to access anything without fearing the reaction 
of the regime’s agents. People, including journalists, were free to debate and to 
say what they liked about the fate of their nation (Price, Griffin, and Al Marashi, 
2007).  In few days, the controlled media propaganda system was replaced by 
many other outlets, satellite channels, printing presses, and foreign news, all of 
which became legal and available for all. Individuals were also able to launch 
any kind of privately owned media outlet (UNESCO-IREX, 2006).  The media 
environment in Iraq had transformed from the most controlled regime’s 
propaganda to one of the most diverse (Isakhan, 2009). Iraqi streets, bookshops, 
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kiosks, and newspaper sellers started seeing new publications which they had 
not heard of before. Titles like Azzaman, Al Etehad, Al Taakhi, were quite new 
for the young generation, but some of them were familiar to seniors, who knew 
them from before the Ba’ath Party assumed power 35 years before (Khudur, 
2008). Many journalists were inspired by that moment and thought that the 
obstructions that had faced the Iraqi press throughout the years of the last 
century - especially the last three decades - had finally ended with the fall of 
Saddam’s dictatorship and his one-party ruling regime. Many believed that there 
would be no “red lines” or instructions from a central unpredictable authority, 
which forced the media to move according to its wishes and objectives.  
 
3-7 Iraqi Press Proliferates 
The media landscape broadened dramatically and newspapers, magazines, and 
periodicals were launched by several different bodies. Political parties and 
religious groups, who were seeking to expand their base of supporters, launched 
many publications. A considerable number of those newspapers were issued in 
Kurdistan after 1991, but they moved to Baghdad after the collapse of the 
regime.  At the same time many individuals aspired to establish influence in the 
new regime after years of deprivation from political activities. Other groups of 
rich merchants and tribal leaders, who were capable financially, launched 
newspapers hoping that their voices would be heard. For example, Al Rabetah 
(“The Connection”) newspaper represented the national gathering for the 
sheikhs and tribal leaders in Iraq (“Al Rabetah”, 2004). The occupation forces 
joined those groups by issuing their own publications or funding other 
newspapers (Al Azawi, 2008). Baghdad set the biggest example of media 
expansion, but other provinces witnessed the same phenomenon on a smaller 
scale. This flourishing media environment provided work opportunities for many 
writers, reporters, editors, photographers, administrators, technicians and many 
others who worked in the media field (Thamir, 2008). 
 
Observers believe that this flood of publications was the result of pressure and 
the severe restrictions set up by the previous regime. But historians referred to 
many occasions where Iraq had witnessed such explosions in the number of 
newspapers at different stages of its modern history. This increase in the number 
of media outlets was usually associated with big political change. A clear 
example was the number of newspapers after the announcement of the Ottoman 
Constitution reforms in 1908. The same thing happened after establishing the 
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monarchy in 1921. Whilst in the wake of World War II until the end of 1954, when 
the government cancelled the licences of newspapers, the number of 
publications was 255 newspapers and magazines, conversely, the number of 
periodicals after the founding of the Republic in the 1958 coup reduced to just 65 
newspapers (Al Azawi, 2008). Specialists considered this increase in the number 
of outlets as a healthy sign that the situation was moving towards a democratic 
and free society (Al Qazwini, 2004).  But the dramatic increase in the number of 
publications in the whole country slipped into a media anarchy, which was 
expanding without any tangible plan (Al Khafaf, 2006).  The journalist and 
Baghdad media college professor Dr Rasheid Hussein Alwan (2010) described 
the situation: “It was not the right environment for proper newspapers, it was not 
organised at all.” 
 
3-8  The Formation of the New Iraqi Press 
The enthusiasm of the Iraqi journalists for building a free press was reflected in 
the newspaper market, which was showing vibrant journalistic activities. It 
matched the US administration’s propaganda plan to leave the door open 
without putting any restrictions or conditions on starting new publications. The 
plan was to show the world one of the manifestations of “freedom and 
democracy”, by suggesting that it broke one of the biggest constraints of the 
Ba’ath regime (Jasim, 2009). This started earlier when the British and the 
American forces began distributing the Azzaman newspaper to Iraqis after 
seizing areas under their control. The troops were also distributing flyers 
containing messages from the coalition leaders Bush and Blair.  
 
The first issue of Azzaman entered Iraq on 8 April 2003 and it carried a small 
reference saying “Basra edition” under the title of the publication. The newspaper 
was distributed in Baghdad and Basra, Nassiriya and other southern provinces 
of Iraq (Al Mljawi, 2009). Azzaman was not left alone for long; quickly other 
newspapers of the Saddam oppositions moved into Iraq, especially those that 
were printed in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The mouthpiece of the Iraqi 
Communist Party, Tareek Al Sha’ab (“The People’s Road”), was one of the early 
newspapers that hit the streets of Baghdad. “When the regime collapsed we 
moved to Baghdad, and we started publishing there,” said Mofied Al Jazaeeri, 
the editor of Tareek Al Sha’ab (Al Jazaeeri, 2011).  “Our newspaper was weekly 
instead of monthly. We were writing the material in Baghdad, then we printed it 
in Kurdistan, then we brought the copies back to Baghdad, but we thought it was 
 70 
difficult, so we moved permanently to Baghdad” (Al Jazaeeri, 2011). Other 
newspapers decided to leave Kurdistan permanently and move into Baghdad, 
like Nedaa Al Mostaqbal newspaper (“The Future Call”). “When we launched our 
newspaper on the 20 April in Baghdad it was a daily publication, but was 
temporarily only four times a week,” said Ali Eijam the newspaper’s editor (Eijam, 
2011). 
 
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan gained control of the printing house of Al Iraq 
newspaper to launch their publication, Al Etehad (“The Union”) - it issued a 
green coloured edition number 539 from there (Taqai, 2007). “It was Al Iraq until 
the 8 April, but on the 10 April the newspaper was published as Al Etehad. It was 
in only twenty-four hours that the newspaper changed its political path,” said Dr 
Abdul Amir Al Shemari, a former editor of Al Iraq and later Al Etehad newspaper 
(Al Shemari, 2010). “Everything was available to launch Al Etehad: the whole 
press machines were ready, staff were ready, only two people were changed, 
the editor-in-chief and the directing editor,” Dr Abdul Amir Al Shemari added (Al 
Shemari, 2010).   
 
The other major printing house for Al Thawra (“The Revolution”) newspaper was 
seized by the Iraqi National Congress, who then launched Al Moutamer  (“The 
Congress”) (Al Mljawi, 2009). Other local journalists and intellectuals initiated 
attempts to establish their own private newspapers. Publications from the 
neighbouring countries started appearing on the streets of Baghdad, such as the 
Saudi-financed newspaper, Asharq Al Awssat. In addition, Iraqi newspapers that 
had been printed abroad, such as Azzaman, established offices in Baghdad.  
 
The new media outlets became an arena for political debates characterising 
people’s different views about Iraq’s post-invasion era. Political parties and 
individuals who were hoping to play political roles in the new Iraq launched many 
newspapers. There were also profit-driven newspapers that became popular as 
they used a tabloid style in their approach, for different issues in the country 
(Zanger, 2005).  The financial value of these newspapers varied according to the 
publishers and the amount of funding the publication received. Not many were 
experienced in designing newspapers so it became a good business for those 
who were working for the former government newspapers. “We were designing 
                                                 
 Al Mutamar Newspaper was a totally new publication and the previous London edition had no ties with the new 
one which was launched in Baghdad after the fall of Saddam’s regime.  
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several newspapers from our small offices. For example Hamid Al Gailani’s 
office was in charge of 15 newspapers everyday,” said Sabah Muhsin, a former 
graphic designer from Al Jumhuriya newspaper (Muhsin, 2011).  In most cases 
newspapers were poorly structured, although there were a few adequate to good 
publications, reflecting the quality and experience of people who were entering 
the media field. “No-one was using computers to design a newspaper, but in 
September we started using computers in our design,” said Sabah Muhsin of Al 
Destor (Muhsin, 2011).  Most of the new publications’ owners were non-
journalists: they were traders, entrepreneurs or ambitious individuals (Jasim, 
2009). These newspapers covered diverse news content such as religious, 
political, economic and cultural issues, which were mostly prohibited under the 
repressive regime of Saddam Hussein. Nearly 150 newspapers appeared on the 
market in quick succession, raising the hopes for more press freedom in Iraq 
(Hun-Shik, and Hama-Saeed, 2008). 
 
3-9 Free Press or Media Anarchy? 
A free press is one that enjoys the freedom to express and communicate ideas, 
freedom from prior restraints on publishing, and freedom from censorship. Press 
freedom comes as a result of freedom of speech, which is considered an 
essential element of liberal democracy. A free and pluralistic press would serve 
the public’s right to access information related to different communities in their 
society. It would also assess the performance of government institutions, and 
would play the role of public watchdog and advocate (Article 19 and UNESCO, 
2006). This free press would be expected to be a public platform for debate, but 
this in turn requires a certain standard of journalism that would hold journalists 
accountable if not followed. This press would be responsible for promoting 
tolerance and reconciliation between different communities within the same 
society.  
 
The press has failed to meet these standards and requirements in some 
developing countries that experience conflicts. Besides Iraq, examples include 
the Balkans and Afghanistan (Sinjari, 2006). In order to attract readers and to 
stay in business, and because of a lack of professionalism, some newspapers in 
Iraq used sensationalist language in their coverage. Rumours were exaggerated 
and presented as hard facts on many occasions. This kind of irresponsible 
reporting made the public question the credibility of the newly launched Iraqi 
press. Such phenomena are considered by media experts to constitute media 
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“anarchy”. “Freedom-disorder” could mean the same thing: whether the press 
covers something, or avoids it, it would lead to the same result, as topics would 
not be read or believed by most of the public (Sinjari, 2006).  
 
3-10 The US Project for Iraqi Media 
As mentioned before, the American administration led by George W. Bush did 
not follow the previous Clinton administration’s model of managing post-conflict 
media in Bosnia or Kosovo when the State Department was in charge of the 
Balkans. Instead, the US strategic planners adopted a post World War II model 
of direct military administration, similar to the occupations of Germany and 
Japan, to stabilise Iraq. For the first time since 1953, the Department of Defence 
and the Pentagon were in charge of building or rebuilding everything in post-war 
Iraq including “free” media (Rohde, 2005). Part of the invasion plan was “how to 
deal with the media in Iraq after toppling the Ba’ath regime” (Kadim, 2007). 
Training programmes were designed and introduced for Iraqi journalists to help 
them to run different media outlets and to ensure that the media allied to the US 
after the removal of Saddam Hussein. 
 
With the end of the regime, the majority of reporters in Iraq were not prepared to 
handle the responsibilities of a free press (Schaper, 2003).  The US claimed 
publicly that they were willing to rebuild Iraq’s national broadcasting system, 
including creating one national newspaper. The idea was to create a public 
broadcasting system, which included two television channels, two radio channels 
and a newspaper (Rohde, 2005). Media development experts raised their doubts 
about such mission saying: “Imposing a system like a Public Broadcasting 
Service in a country which was run by a savage series of dictators for a long time 
is impossible, it is a process which needs time and capable team to tackle such 
mission,” said Simon Haselock, a media expert and former UN spokesman in 
Kosovo (Haselock, 2011). 
 
The talks, claims, and slogans about “Iraqis ruling Iraq” were not implemented 
and everything was controlled by the Americans’ advisers (Cockburn, 2006) 
within the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which 
was a ruling body introduced by the Americans - responsible for rebuilding Iraq 
after the war. The head of ORHA was the retired general, Jay Garner, while the 
director of the Iraqi Media Project under ORHA was Robert Reilly (Schaper, 
2003). Jay Garner and his team arrived in Baghdad on the 21 April 2003 
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escorted by many Iraqi and non-Iraqi advisors. On the 7 May, the US 
Ambassador Paul Bremer III, a former head of the National Commission on 
Terrorism, replaced Jay Garner, while ORHA was replaced by the CPA which 
was another ruling body to administer all affairs of the occupied Iraq (Polk, 
2006).  
 
George W. Bush titled Bremer as Mr “Can do” who “goes with the full blessings 
of this administration”. Bremer, a supporter of the neoconservatives, (Polk, 2006) 
explained that the aim of creating any interim authority such as the CPA, or any 
institution for governing Iraq, was to show the Iraqis and the world the 
seriousness of the US administration about leaving the country, and that it was 
not determined to stay in Iraq for long time (Kadim, 2007).  
 
Paul Bremer took the Iraqis by surprise by offering resolutions which were similar 
to that which the allied forces agreed in occupied Germany after World War II. 
Many institutions were dissolved by CPA order number 2, starting from the Iraqi 
army and the security forces.  They disbanded the Ministry of Information on 23 
May 2003. This meant abolishing all media networks and all newspapers, which 
were issued before and during the former regime. Many experts agreed about 
the negative effect of this order on the media sector and on Iraq. One of the 
journalists affected by this order was Dr Eiman Abdulrahman. “It was a big shock 
for us when they dissolved the Ministry of Information because we were in an 
institution which was similar to any other institution like the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, we were part of the state not the government,” she said (Abdulrahman, 
2010). 
 
3-11 The First Iraqi “National” Newspaper 
The US administration wanted to issue an official newspaper immediately after 
the collapse of Saddam’s regime. It was agreed with Hassan al Alwai - the head 
of the opposition’s newspaper Al Mutamar - to launch such a newspaper, but Al 
Alwai claimed it was his idea in the first place: “I was thinking of launching a 
newspaper a long time ago which was called to be called Sumer” (Al Alwai, 
2010).  The senior journalist wanted it to be called Al Kufa in the beginning, but 
he changed it to Sumer following a friend’s advice. “Before the war, Hassan Al 
Alwai visited me in London and he told me that he wanted to launch a 
newspaper called Al Kufa, so I said that Al Kufa represents a specific sector in 
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Islamic history (The Shi’a) and sectarianism is a big concern, so I suggested 
another iconic Iraqi name such as Sumer and he agreed,” said Ahmed Mehana, 
Al Alwai’s editor for Sumer (Mehana, 2010). 
 
Al Alwai went to Kuwait where he had meetings with Robert Reilly who was in 
charge of creating the media network in Iraq after the war. Ahmed Al Rekabi, 
who was working with Reilly and then became the Iraqi Media Network’s 
television director, attended that meeting: “I met Hassan Al Alwai first in Kuwait 
where he was looking for a role in a media project, and then we met Robert 
Reilly. Hassan doesn’t speak any English and I was translating to Reilly, so 
Hassan was asking for many expensive things, to which Reilly replied saying 
‘We are not Saudi Arabia’” (Al Rekabi, 2008).  “After few meetings between 
Reilly and Al Alwai, they reached an agreement to publish Sumer after printing it 
in Kuwait,” he added (Al Rekabi, 2008). 
 
Sumer was a daily political publication with a printed slogan that said, “Iraq for 
Iraqis”. The first edition was printed on 25 April 2003, in 12 pages, broadsheet 
size and printed on white paper. Only the first and last pages were in colour. The 
newspaper was printed in the Al Ressalah print house in Kuwait.  
 
In the information column of page 11, Sumer described itself as a daily 
newspaper but it was initially published twice a week. The publisher and editor-
in-chief was Hassan Al Alawi, while the managing editor was Dr Osama Mahdi. 
Sumer introduced itself in the first editorial as a newspaper without opinion or 
attitude.  Sumer staff members were mainly Al Mutamar newspaper former 
cadres who had worked with Al Alwai. But many senior journalists wrote in the 
first edition such as Faisal Hassoun, a former chair of the Iraqi Journalists’ 
Syndicate; Jalil Al Attiyah the well-known Iraqi writer, in addition to two Jewish 
Iraqi writers - Mir Bassri and Samir Naqash (Khudur, 2008).  But Al Alwai was 
less keen on doing his job as time went on.  He recalls: “I noticed the anarchy 
and there was an occupation which I wasn’t expecting. The Americans wanted 
the newspaper to be their mouthpiece, they wanted to know what we were going 
to publish and who would be writing, and they wanted to distribute it themselves, 
so I decided to leave,” he said (Al Alwai, 2010).  The senior journalist said that 
he was expecting a smooth transition – similar to those he had experienced in 
                                                  
Sumer is the name of an ancient civilisation that once inhabited parts of modern day Iraq. 
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the three previous military coups in Iraq, but this time he found a lot of 
obstructions: “When I arrived I discovered that I was not allowed to launch a 
newspaper in my name so I had to create a company in Cyprus to launch a 
newspaper in Baghdad which was something very odd” (Al Alwai, 2010).  The 
newspaper stopped publishing after the 7th edition. “I met Hassan at the gate of 
the presidential palace and he told me that he was unhappy and he was 
leaving,” Ahmed Al Rekabi said (Al Rekabi, 2008). 
 
Al Alwai claimed in an interview conducted for this research, that he was the 
newspaper’s owner and that he had decided to close it - an act which cost him a 
lot financially. However his colleague Ahmed Al Mehana said that the 
disagreements between Hassan Al Alawi and the new US administration of Iraq 
started when the CPA wanted the newspaper to be issued within Iraq, while Al 
Alawi insisted that the newspaper be issued from outside the country. “Al Alwai 
was supported by the coalition forces, but in Baghdad Hassan Al Alwai asked 
the Americans that Sumer’s budget would be sent to his account in Cyprus and 
the newspaper would be printed in Kuwait and then the distribution would be in 
Baghdad,” Ahmed Mehana said (Mehana, 2010). Al Mehana confirmed that the 
health of Sumer’s editor was an issue, which made him hesitant to stay in 
Baghdad.  “He was not keen on taking such adventures, because the health 
system in Baghdad was not great” said Ahmed Al Mehana (Mehana, 2010).  Ali 
Eijam who was Baghdad correspondent for Sumer, said: “We were working 
normally and suddenly we were told that the newspaper was closing” (Eijam, 
2011). 
 
The US administration of Iraq had another arrangement with Ismael Zayeer who 
was asked to publish Al Sabah. The two plans conflicted with each other and the 
Americans wanted to stick with one of them, as will be explained below. “Hassan 
launched Sumer and Ismael Zayeer was asked to launch Al Sabah. One of these 
two newspapers should be closed down, and I think Ismael was willing to stay in 
Baghdad so his newspaper continued,” explains Ahmed Al Rekabi (Al Rekabi, 
2008). In another interview, Zayeer confirmed that Sumer was about to be Iraq’s 
only national official newspaper. “After the second edition of Al Sabah, I received 
an order from the CPA to close the newspaper and I was fired. I asked why? The 
CPA said that the legal department was busy sorting out the problem with Sumer 
and Hassan Al Alwai because he complained that he was the one who had the 
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contract with the Americans to publish a national official newspaper, so they 
stopped me and I went home,” Zayeer said (Zayeer, 2011). But the situation 
changed suddenly. “Late in the evening of that same day, I received a phone call 
from the CPA asking me to come early next morning and I was told that Al 
Sabah should resume working as Sumer was being terminated. I was told that 
Hassan Al Alwai would be visiting me and I should give him a position in Al 
Sabah, but Hassan came and apologised because, I think, he got compensation 
from the Americans for them breaching the contract he had with them,” Zayeer 
said (Zayeer, 2011). Zayeer added, “Bremer and Garner did not like Sumer 
because it was not in touch with the people and they had to spend a lot to 
transport it by plane,” (Zayeer, 2011). 
 
3-12 The American Plan to Create “Friendly” Media in Iraq  
The American administration handed many projects in Iraq to the Pentagon. The 
American media project was highly motivated by a stated need to create a 
“friendly” local media environment. For this reason SAIC was selected to run the 
projects, on the basis that it had expertise in controlling the information that the 
public would receive. SAIC was concerned about the nature of staff who would 
be working on the project. For this reason, the selection process for potential 
candidates was influenced by the need to employ certain individuals who would 
defend the position of the United States by any means. The number of staff 
working on the project was limited and insufficient to undertake the massive job 
of building a media entity. The Americans’ plan to create a media entity was 
unrealistic and poorly designed. Meanwhile, the Iraqi press developed quickly 
and many newspapers were launched to flood the market with different kinds of 
publications representing different agendas. The next chapter explores the 
media chaos that followed, as Iraqis began to read new titles and new 
newspapers every day. 
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Chapter 4: 
The Iraqi Press Under the American Occupation 2003 
 
4-1 Introduction  
The dramatic increase in publications, which was described as a press 
explosion, represented the new freedom that newspapers and other media 
outlets enjoyed after three decades of strict government control. Iraqi journalists 
began embracing the meaning of press freedom and implementing this freedom 
in their editorial judgements and journalistic activities (Hun-Shik and Hama-
Saeed, 2008). Journalists reported freely on what was happening in Iraq. News 
and stories were covered based on facts not according to what the authorities 
wanted them to be shown as to the public (Hun-Shik and Hama-Saeed, 2008).  
But what kind of news did these newspapers cover? How were they distributed? 
What kind of categories could this new press be divided into? What were the 
main characteristics of these new publications? Why were the majority ethno-
sectarian publications?   
 
A few weeks before the American invasion, Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul 
Wolfowitz, said in an interview on American radio that: “The Iraqis are . . . by and 
large quite secular. They are overwhelmingly Shi‘a which is different from the 
Wahabis of the peninsula, and they don’t bring the sensitivity of having the holy 
cities of Islam being on their territory” (Cole, 2003, p.544). Many pundits tried to 
predict the future of Iraq, some saying that it would be another Vietnam, some 
that it would resemble Somalia, others the Balkans, but the closest parallel to 
what happened afterwards in reality is Lebanon. Although religious 
fundamentalists had previously existed in Iraq, American policy had a significant 
effect in paving the way to the "Lebanonization" of Iraq (Hirst, 2006).  
 
After 2003, much of media outlets’ ownership was in the hands of competing 
political factions, reflecting the country’s conflicting sectarian agendas. Iraqi 
media outlets started to use inflammatory language, which led later to incitement 
to violence instead of preventing it. The religious motives and differences among 
communities played a significant role in the events that occurred after the US 
invasion of Iraq. In order to understand why so many of the media outlets were 
religiously motivated, there must be an understanding of such divisions among 
Iraqis, and how they were formulated. 
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4-2 Ethnic and Sectarian divisions  
A few days after the US occupation of Iraq, a large number of Shi’a pilgrims 
marched to the holy city of Karbala, to mourn the 40th day of the death in a battle 
at Kerbala in AD680 of Imam Hussein, grandson of the prophet Mohammed. It 
was the first time in decades that the Shi’a were free to practise one of their 
rituals without fear of being persecuted by the authorities. But at the same time, 
the event found the Shi’a reviving a religious identity that would later be their 
political one also (Steele, 2003). Soon after the Americans gave their recognition 
to the powerful central authority for the Shi’a, which is known as the Al Hawza Al 
Ilmiya - the supreme seat of Shi’a learning - headed by Ayotallah Ali Al Sistani. 
Al Hawza was able to make people walk in millions towards the holy shrines just 
a few days after the occupation, and it was also able to retrieve many of the 
looted possessions after calls to people to surrender anything they took from 
government offices to mosques. These signs of their power to rally large 
numbers of the Iraqi population show that a great deal of the society is not 
“secular”, indeed that the majority are religious to a degree the Americans had 
not previously understood.  
The Americans did not understand that Al Hawza had become strong only in the 
absence of the authority of the civil powers, and because the Americans dealt 
with it as an authority. If the Americans had imposed an efficient government 
from the beginning, as in Germany, Al Hawza would not have enjoyed such 
power. Equally, if the looting had been dealt with strictly, people would have 
recognised the Americans’ authority.  
On the other hand, it would not be right to deny that Iraqi society had become 
more religious than it had been before 1991. But in order to understand this 
change, we need to know what had produced it. In the late 1970s the Ba’ath 
Party massively persecuted the religious Shi‘ites of the south, fearing the 
influence of the Iranian revolution 1978-1979. One of the biggest Shi’a political 
parties, which suffered seriously from the regime’s campaign of brutality, was the 
Al Da‘wa Al Islamiyya Party. The party, founded by Mohammed Baqir Al Sadr in 
1958, aimed at establishing a Shi’ite-dominated Islamic state (Cole, 2003, 
p.545). Saddam executed Muhammad Baqir Al Sadr and his sister, Bint Al Huda, 
in April 1980. This execution made many Shi’a sympathise with the Al Da’wa 
religious-political movement (Davis, 2008). During the war with Iran, many Al 
Da’wa party members fled Iraq, to Iran and other neighbouring countries. In 
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1982, a Tehran-based group of Al Da‘wa members split and formed the 
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. In addition, there was the Al 
Dawa Movement, and the Sadr Movement, but the main party remained 
separate from these sub-groups. But in contrast with the new system based in 
Iran, the mainstream Najaf-based religious leaders in Iraq, Al Hawza, led by Abu 
Al Qasim Al Khu’i (d. 1992), preferred to separate religion from politics. (Cole, 
2003)  
After the First Gulf War in 1991, one of the events most significant to the shaping 
of Iraqi Shi’ite identity took place. On 1 March 1991, many Shi’ites in the south 
rose up against the regime. Although for a period they were able to control most 
of the southern part of the country, the regime moved swiftly to crush the 
uprising, in a particularly brutal way. Many were executed and buried in mass 
graves, while others were sentenced to death and hanged, or disappeared after 
being captured by the security agencies (Dawoody, 2005). For his part, Saddam 
consistently blamed the Shi’a for the uprising, saying that it was not a 
spontaneous Iraqi rebellion, but a plot sponsored by Iran.  Following the First 
Gulf War, the situation inside Iraq changed very radically as a result of the 
collapse of the economy and the national education system following the 
imposition of the United Nations’ punitive sanctions. Many Iraqis turned inwards 
to religion as a means to survive the hardships they were undergoing and the 
unpredictability of daily life (Davis, 2008). Increasing numbers started to go to 
the mosques to get food or medicine, and also moral support. In some cases 
however such charitable support was in fact politically motivated.  Saddam 
himself became more religious, and displayed this publicly when, for instance, he 
later closed bars and nightclubs all over Iraq. He launched a so-called “faith 
campaign", and the government started to support at least some religious 
activities.  
 
Under the sanctions, Islamic feeling was revived among many in the population 
at large. During the 1990s, Muhammad Sadiq Al Sadr (a cousin of Muhammad 
Baqir Al Sadr) started to gain popularity among much of the Shi’a youth. In 1999 
Muhammad Sadiq Al Sadr was assassinated with his two sons by militants in the 
outskirts of Najaf. Accusations were made against the regime, while the regime 
accused a group working for Iran (Cole, 2003, p.553).  
 
Outside Iraq, after 1991, the United States, and many neighbouring countries of 
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Iraq, started to support the anti-Saddam opposition parties. Many of these 
parties represented different political and religious agendas, but mostly they 
were based outside Iraq, claiming to have covert supporters inside (Davis, 
2008). One of these was the Islamic Party, considered the Iraqi branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood or MB (Al Ikhwan Al Muslimun), the most important 
mainstream Sunni Islamist movement in the Arab world. In 1991, the 
Brotherhood decided to re-establish the party within Iraq from the United 
Kingdom, using its old name “The Iraqi Islamic Party” (Fuller, 2003).  
 
After the collapse of Saddam’s regime on 9 April 2003, the mosques became 
centres of power. The clerics started organising charity work in the 
neigbourhoods, such as cleaning the roads, organising traffic and preaching 
against the massive looting of government institutes. In the meantime many 
political parties, including the religious ones, started to return to Iraq. Many of 
these parties were either hosted or financed by neighbouring countries, mainly 
Iran and the Gulf states: Iran supporting Islamist movements among the Shi’a, 
while Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states sought influence among Sunni Islamists 
to confront the Iranian influence (Davis, 2008). 
 
Religion thus became subject to power struggles among many factions to gain 
political influence. Religious ideas were widely used to mobilise and achieve 
political goals (Davis, 2008). But what about secular Iraqis? These were often 
torn between their belief and their background. For example, to be “Shi’a” or 
“Sunni” outside of any religious context is difficult, since it is primarily religion that 
would make you either Sunni or Shi’ite. If any “secular” Shi’a or Sunni were to 
ignore their religious or even tribal background as part of their identity, they 
would win little support, but if their self-presentation included their sect and 
maybe their tribe, they would gain the support of the community and the sect 
they belong to.  
 
In the years following the invasion of 2003, divisions between Sunni and the 
Shi’a increased among both secularists and Islamists on each side (Fuller, 
2003). This division came as a result of religious extremists’ attacks on both 
communities. The Shi’a were accused by radical Salafi Jihadists such as 
“Tawhid and Jihad” (which later became “Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia”) of being 
US collaborators, which made it legitimate to attack them.  As sectarianism 
increased, many moderate Shi’a found it hard to be segregated from belonging 
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to their community. Non-radical Sunni experienced the same situation, when 
Shi’a militias were attacking Sunni neighbourhoods during the civil war following 
the bombing of the holy Shi’a shrine in Sammara in February 2006. Whereas in 
the past, religious parties had gained their popularity from opposing Saddam’s 
regime, by the time of the first national elections in 2005 some Islamic 
movements were gaining popularity at the expense of national unity (Fuller, 
2003). More importantly the American administration of Iraq gave legitimacy to 
such ethno-sectarian movements when they were part of forming the Iraqi 
Governing Council as will be explained later.  
 
In a multi-ethno-sectarian society like Iraq’s, the media would be expected to 
reflect the diversity of the population, and to be a platform for reconciliation. 
Instead, the ethnic and sectarian-oriented media that appeared and expanded 
after the war were raising fear among the community each was representing with 
regard to other communities within Iraqi society. The emergence of such media 
has deepened the political and sectarian disagreements among different 
communities at the expense of national unity.  
 
4-2-1 Iraqi Newspapers: Different Names, Directions and Styles 
Publications carried different kinds of names, new and old, serious and funny. 
Titles like Al Shahed (“The Witness”), Al Akhbar (“The News”), Al Haqiqa (“The 
Truth”), and others. Some of these newspapers were published with the same 
names as well-known newspapers published in the past during the monarchy 
and the first republic such as Al Manar (“The Beacon”), Al Belad (“The Country”), 
Habsboz (a funny Iraqi nickname), Azzaman (“The Time”), and other names (Al 
Ruba’e, 2007). 
 
However, because of the return of religious political parties from exile and the 
ones formed inside Iraq, the printing market witnessed a relatively high stream of 
religious books, circulars and leaflets, and the newspaper market was no 
exception. For example, the newspapers Al Bassaaer (“The Foresight”), Anssar 
Al Hawza (“Supporters of Al Hawza”), Al Daawah (“Advocacy”), Al Bayan (“The 
Declaration”), Al Majles (“The Council”), Qamar Bani Hashem (nickname for 
Imam Hussein), Al Kufa (name for a city), Sawt Al Jumaah (“The Sound of 
Friday”), Al Wefak Al Islami (“The Islamic Harmony”), and others represented 
different religious Islamic factions (Al Ruba’e, 2007). These publications mostly 
 82 
asked to make Iraq into an Islamic state, which was the same demand many of 
these publications made when they were published in exile (Batti, 2006).   
Competing ideas among political factions emerged in the pages of these 
publications, which reflected a conflict of ethno-sectarian agendas (Al Marashi, 
2007). For example Al Saah, headed by Sheikh Ahmed Al Kubaisi, is regarded 
as a platform for Sunni Iraqis. A newspaper like Al Da’wa represented the Al 
Da’wa Party, which is an Islamic Shi’a political party. Al Adallah is the organ of 
the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which is another Shi’a 
party.  
 
Rohan Jayasekera of the London-based “Index on Censorship” gives a reason 
for this boom of publications: “Iraqi media became very sectarian very quickly, 
not only because of the political situation, but simply because of the income to 
sustain the media there; they became reliant on political factions, who have the 
money” (Jayasekera, 2011). 
 
Al Da’wa and Al Adallah did not criticise either the other parties or the occupation 
forces, unlike the anti-occupation agenda, which was clear in the newspaper of 
the radical Shi’a clerk Muqtada Al Sadr, Al Hawza Al Nateqa (“The Spoken 
Hawza”) (Al Mljawi, 2009). 
 
The market also witnessed the emergence of community and ethnic newspapers 
such as the Turkman Daily newspaper, Al Tayef Al Mendaaee (“Mandaean 
Spectrum”) newspaper and Sada Al Saurian (“Al Saurian Echo”) newspaper (Al 
Ruba’e, 2007).  In addition to the political newspapers, there were specialist 
journals.  Examples of arts newspapers included Addasat Al Fan (“Lens of Art”) 
and Eyoon Al Fan (“The Eyes of Art”). Sports publications were represented by 
such publications as Al Kora (“The Football”) newspaper, Al Alem Al Riyadhi 
(“The Sport World”) newspaper, and Al Safer Al Riyadhi (“The Sports 
Ambassador”) (Al Ruba’e, 2007). Some newspapers specialised in economy and 
industry such as Al Aswaq (“The Markets”) newspaper (Al Aswaq, 2003) and 
Mujtama Al Aamal Al Iraqi (“The Iraqi Business Community”) newspaper 
(“Mujtama Al Aamal Al Iraqi”, 2005). Many newspapers were very well 
presented, but the majority repeated old stories or fabricated news stories. 
Meanwhile, the columns in many publications were used for insulting others or 
for raising prohibited issues from before 9 April 2003 (Jasim, 2009). 
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Dr Nabil Jasim (2009) said in his book, “Extracts from Iraqi Press History after 
2003”, that not many publications survived this “shallow” kind of journalism. He 
added that the formats of the majority of newspapers were poor in general and 
lacked institutional style.  They relied on a very small number of people, 
sometimes only one person who was the editor, sub-editor, and writer (Jasim, 
2009). “There were few professional newspapers, the Iraqi press was still 
immature which is clear on what kind of coverage we have had, also the effect of 
the old taboos which could cause trouble to the journalist and the newspaper,” 
said Jumaah Al Hilfi (Al Hilfi, 2010). The majority of these newspapers did not 
follow a specific writing style or editorial guidelines. Internet plagiarism became 
common among those publications, which would publish any article from any 
website without mentioning the writer’s name or checking the credibility of the 
website or the article (Jasim, 2009).  Sabah Muhsin, the former graphic designer 
of Al Jumhuriya newspaper, launched a newspaper with his colleagues: “We 
were four journalists and we launched a newspaper called Al Iraqi depending on 
the Internet,” said Sabah Muhsin of Al Destor  (Muhsin, 2011). 
 
The phenomenon of publishing leaders’ pictures continued. Many publications 
were putting the picture of parties’ leaders or religious figures at the centre of the 
front pages, while other newspapers printed pictures of tribal leaders (Baltic 
Media Centre, Index on Censorship, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, and 
International Media Support, 2003; “Al Fadeela”, 2003). This was happening on 
an almost daily basis which was a tradition inherited from the newspapers of the 
former regime (Al Ani, 2008). Many of the newspapers that were launched did 
not have an office, a building or even a specific location. Most of the material for 
these publications was created from the homes or work places of the people who 
published the newspaper (Al Ruba’e, 2007). 
 
The Iraqi media experts attribute the increase in the number of publications to 
the low cost of starting or launching a newspaper or any publication. The amount 
of USD 1,000 was enough to publish a daily tabloid-sized newspaper of 16 
pages. The publisher could put his/her name on the front page as the 
Chairperson of the Board or the General Director or publisher or the editor. Many 
had done this, but these publications existed for only a few editions (Al Azawi, 
2008).    
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To illustrate the situation, for instance, Al Ahrar newspaper was a publication 
launched by Dr Abdul Jawad Al Karbalai in 1933 (Al Hassani, 1971), but it was 
re-launched by a trader in 2003.  “I was in charge of Al Ahrar (“The Free 
People”) weekly newspaper, which was launched by Mohamed Al Hamdani, who 
was a confectionery trader, on 26 May 2003, but the owner of the newspaper 
decided to close it because he considered it as a bad investment,” recalls Sabah 
Muhsin of Al Destor (Muhsin, 2011).  Al Ahrar described itself as an independent 
newspaper for “all Arabs” (Harmston, 2003), but after releasing a few editions 
like many other newspapers, Al Ahrar stopped.  
 
There were many reasons for such a step - some publishers lacked the 
objectivity to build a journalistic name and in many cases it was an exciting 
venture for some individuals. Others wanted to bestow prestigious titles on 
themselves, for example the Chairman of the Board was often without a council 
or a management board. Sometimes the chief editor did not have any 
qualification or he/she had not ever written before. “Many traders like Mohamed 
Al Hamdani thought of having prestige in the society so he decided to launch a 
newspaper,” explains Sabah Muhsin of Al Destor (Muhsin, 2011).  There were 
also many newspapers that published lies and fabricated stories.  These quickly 
disappeared, but this gave a negative reflection to the public, and credibility of 
the newspapers was damaged (Jasim, 2009).  
 
Nearly 100 news publications and a handful of news broadcast outlets became 
available in Baghdad by the end of May 2003 (Isakhan, 2009). These numbers 
increased substantially throughout the year, all over Iraq. For example, in a small 
city like Najaf, there were more than 30 newspapers while the population was 
only 300,000 people (Whitaker, 2003). 
 
4-2-2 Coverage of the New Press 
The new publications mostly cribbed reports from the wires and major 
international and Arabic newspapers (Daragahi, 2003), but Saddam’s pictures 
kept appearing on the front pages (Al Khalid, 2003). The new newspapers were 
obsessed with Saddam and the Ba’ath Party's ruling days. Articles about his 
atrocities and the discovery of mass graves filled the pages. Newspapers were 
breaking the old taboos about Saddam and his family. For example, one 
newspaper headline read: “Qussay Grabbed $1 Billion and 70 Billion Euros 
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Before The War” (Daragahi, 2003).  Others: “Saddam Entered Guinness Book of 
Records” and “Tariq Aziz Hungry and Dirty” (Al Aswar, 2003). Many newspapers, 
like Al Shahed, increased their circulation by using such headlines. “Al Shahed 
had great success because it was relying on exciting news and the scandals of 
the previous regime,” said Dr Hashim Hassan who was the chief editor of Al 
Shahed at the time (Hassan, 2010). 
 
Newspapers started criticising the Americans and their plans in Iraq, but not in 
an overtly bold or challenging way. Al Ahrar (“The Liberal”) newspaper published 
a picture of the American President George W. Bush with a title, “Will you be the 
finest dream come true for all Iraqis as you promised or will you be occupier No 
1?” (Al Ahrar, 2003).  Al Adalah newspaper said in an article that Iraq would not 
gain security if the Americans stayed in Iraq. The article title read: “Security Has 
Become a Dream that will Never Come True” (Daragahi, 2003).  
 
But the practices of the former regime were still affecting what journalists wrote 
and how they directed their criticism towards authority. The former exiled Iraqi 
journalist and the spokesman of the Iraqi Governing Council, Hamid Al Kifaey, 
described this kind of culture:  “We don't have to criticise sacred values, 
especially in the beginning” (Daragahi, 2003).  
 
The newspapers also contained entertainment content, but on the back pages. 
Stories of Arab and international celebrities were given part of the last page. 
Titles like “Sailor Sinbad Cartoon by Hollywood Celebrities’ Voices”, appeared in 
Al Sabbah Al Jadeed, and a picture of Brad Pitt topped the article (“Al Sabah Al 
Jadeed”, 2004). Another story: “An American Lady Celebrates Her 95th Birthday 
Riding Harley motorbike”, was located on the same page (“Al Sabah Al Jadeed”, 
2004). Some reported bizarre stories such as the Al Thaqalain (Symbolic to 
Prophet Mohammed family) front page headline which read: “There is an Influx 
of AIDS Through Jewish prostitutes” (Oppel Jr, 2003), while Al Tajamu’a (“The 
Gathering”) newspaper headline was “Israel Trying to Get Back the Properties of 
the Jews in Iraq” (“Al Tajamu’a”, 2003). 
 
Most of the newspapers, whether owned privately, by a political party or even the 
government, were recycling street rumours, conspiracy theories, and editorial 
comments that were predominantly not based on fact  (Zanger, 2005). For 
example, Al Shams (“The Sun”) newspaper carried the title “Saddam in his 
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Sister-in- Law’s Bed” (“Al Shams”, 2003). Such provocative headlines helped 
those newspapers to hit sales peaks, but the circulation deteriorated and was 
soon unable to exceed more than a few hundred.  
 
One of the factors which contributed to the failure of these newspapers, was a 
flood of big, state-backed or party newspapers, which began to offer more in 
terms of the number of pages, their appearance and cheaper price. Many 
newspapers that could not provide good content disappeared from the market. 
One strange factor, which affected circulation rates, was the number of pages. 
The newspapers that printed the largest number of pages compared to the 
lowest price possible would attract more readers. Readers were soon being 
drawn towards the government press as a “reliable” news source, unlike the 
private newspapers, which lost their credibility (Jasim, 2009). Most of the news 
pieces published by a large majority of the newspapers were highly opinionated - 
in a style normally used by columnists (Emara, 2009). 
 
Most of these newspapers relied on new young writers who were not committed 
to any sort of party or authority. This helped to create a new generation of 
journalists, carrying different ideas and ready to break the inherited taboos 
(Sinjari, 2006).  
  
4-2-3   Names and Titles Anarchy in the Iraqi Press 
There have been some incredible paradoxes and ironic moments experienced 
by the Iraqi press after 9 April 2003. As mentioned before, many of the historical 
media names that had a memorable presence before the Ba’ath Party era began 
to reappear, but under new management that had no tie with the original 
founders of those newspapers. Iraqi law reserved the names for the concession 
owners, but when the Ba’ath Party closed those publications, these concessions 
were terminated. Azzaman (“The Time”), Al Hawadith (“The Events”) (“Al 
Hawadith”, 2003) and Al Manar were old titles, which reappeared, but the 
owners of the original concessions were either dead or their heirs were not 
interested in re-launching the publications. Some of these publications wanted to 
keep the connection with the original founder of the newspaper, like Al Manar. 
The newspaper referred underneath the title to its foundation by Abdulaziz 
Barakat in the middle of 1945 (“Al Manar”, 2003). Such repetition of the old well-
known titles was a clear attempt to attract readers’ eyes by re-publishing familiar 
titles (Khudur, 2008).  But for some families these titles became a historical 
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privilege and maybe legal heritage. In one event Dr Adnan Pachachi, a senior 
Iraqi politician, wanted to revive Al Nahdha (“The Renaissance”) newspaper (“Al 
Nahdha”, 2004), which was founded by his deceased father Muzahim Pachachi 
with Ibrahim Helmy in Baghdad in 1913 following the first Arab conference in 
Paris before the First World War. Dr Adnan Pachachi decided to re-publish Al 
Nahdha in Baghdad in late June 2003, as the mouthpiece for his political 
movement, the Liberal Democrats. However, another newspaper was issued 
under the same name, Al Nahdha, in Basra - it claimed under the title to be “the 
voice of the South” (Khudur, 2008). 
 
The name of his newspaper was also an issue for Mr Hussein Sinjari, who 
published Al Ahalee (“The Public”) newspaper in Kurdistan, which he launched in 
2002 (Iraqi Centre for Information and Studies, 2008). When he moved it to 
Baghdad after the fall of the former regime, Al Ahalee was already the 
newspaper of the National Democratic Party, which had originally belonged to 
the founder of the party and the newspaper Kamel al Jadraji since the 1930s. 
The re-established National Democratic Party confirmed that it would not permit 
anyone to take the historical name of “Al Ahalee” to be the name of another 
publication. The party had already re-launched Al Ahalee to be its mouthpiece 
(Khudur, 2008; “Al Ahalee”, 2004). 
 
There were other similar clashes. There was more than one newspaper called Al 
Noor (“The Light”), Al Haqeqa (“The Truth”), Al Zawra (“The Heaven”), Al 
Khayma (“The Tent”), Al Akhbar (“The News”), Al Rassed (“The Observer”), and 
Al Raya (“The Flag”).  
 
To differentiate themselves from other newspapers, some added another word to 
the title such as Al Raya Al Iraqia (“Al Raya Al Iraqia”, 2004).  On the other hand 
there were many newspapers, such as Al Saah, which were split into two 
publications, so their readers would find two editions of the same newspaper. 
Edition number 14 of 18 June 2003 was issued in two editions, one of them read: 
“Al Saah: politically independent, mouthpiece for all Iraqis, issued on Saturday 
and Wednesday, editor and director, Neama Abdul Razak, issued by Al Mansur 
Publishing House”; while the other claimed to be “Al Saah: political newspaper, 
the mouthpiece of the United National Movement, published every Saturday and 
Wednesday. Chairman of the Board Dr Ahmed Kubaisi. Supervisor Dr Hashim 
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Hassan, editor-in-chief. Dr Abdel-Salam Al Samer”. Both editions had the same 
number of pages, colours, articles and design. “Many newspapers were splitting 
for many reasons, such as disagreements between the owners or the editors. 
Most of them would use the same name but they would add some words  - like 
what happened with Al Shahed, when we launched Al Shahed Al Mustakil (“The 
Independent Witness”). But on other occasions the group who would leave the 
newspaper would insist on launching a newspaper with the same name like what 
happened with Al Saah,” said Dr. Hashim Hassan  (Hassan, 2010). 
 
There is no doubt that the troubles caused by this negative phenomenon serve 
only to confuse the reader, distributor and publisher (Khudur, 2008). Media 
experts criticised this phenomenon saying that it made it look as if the Arabic 
language has scarcely the vocabulary to choose an attractive new title (Khudur, 
2008).  The reason for this confusion was the absence of a responsible body or 
an authority to regulate the registration of the name of a media institution or a 
newspaper. In addition, the failure of the Iraqi Journalists’ Union to practise its 
role - as a result of the chaos that prevailed in all institutions of the Iraqi state - 
contributed to this situation.  
 
4-2-4 Advertisements 
Among the issues which handicapped the media sector in Iraq were illiteracy in 
business management, low professional standards and a lack of industry 
services and organisational skills. All of those factors needed to be overcome 
before it would be possible to build a strong free media foundation. Media outlets 
had been seen by society as propaganda tools, rather than businesses that 
could be supported by advertising (UNESCO-IREX, 2006). Most businessmen 
and even media professionals were unaware of the potential of advertising in 
generating income. There was a lack of understanding for the means to attract 
advertisers. In many cases the ministries, government institutes and even private 
companies would stop advertising in any newspaper that had criticised their 
performance, or published a story about corruption in their institution. In most 
cases newspapers became more dependent on political parties, government, or 
ethnic groups for sponsorship, instead of gaining financial security through 
commercial advertising (UNESCO-IREX, 2006).  “The advertising market is not 
developed enough to think about sustainability for new entities,” said Jacky 
Sutton, director of IREX office in Baghdad (Sutton, 2011). Some independent 
newspapers attempted to establish financial revenue through advertisements. 
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The newspaper would assign editors to sell a specified number of 
advertisements or face redundancy. This kind of strategy led to a diminishment 
in editors’ concentration and creativity - the newspaper might succeed in getting 
more advertisements, but it would lose out on quality. The owners did not 
differentiate between specialised employees in marketing, and journalists 
(UNESCO-IREX, 2006). 
 
Government institutions and ministries started to rely on the “official” newspaper, 
Al Sabah, for advertising which was a heritage of protocol from the former 
regime. This was criticised by Al Mutamar newspaper saying that it was unfair to 
subsidise Al Sabah by giving it exclusive contracts for government advertising. 
This complaint highlighted how difficult it was for other newspapers to get 
advertisements, even for a newspaper like Al Mutamar, which was being backed 
by one of the political parties (Barker, 2008). However, publishing an official 
advertisement would put the newspaper under the influence of that government 
institute. “Since the main source of adverts was coming from the government, 
some newspapers were punished because they had published an article against 
a particular ministry or politician and even when they come to an advertising 
company like us, ministries would specify where their advert should be published 
or they could exclude a particular newspaper,” said Hussein Ali, advertisement 
designer in Noor Al Sabah advertising company (Ali, 2011). This policy started 
affecting the size of the newspapers: “We were publishing in 12 pages because 
we didn’t have financial support or revenues coming from adverts, because they 
commissioned people who are pro-government, pro-American or the ones they 
like,” said Amir Al Hilo, the former Alef-Ba magazine editor and the current 
editor-in-chief of Al Eshteraki (“The Socialist”) newspaper (Al Hilo, 2010). 
 
Eventually, Iraqi ministries decided to launch their own publications, and they 
started using advertising space in those publications instead of in other national 
newspapers. Throughout Iraq’s history, newspapers refused to publish 
“advertising” coming from the imperial or occupying powers, but after 2003 many 
publications printed advertisements commissioned by the CPA and the US army. 
“The public notices that condemning terrorism acts would be coming from the 
CPA or the US army and they would choose the companies or the newspapers 
they liked or those who they thought to be loyal, so it was up to them (army or 
the CPA) to choose who would publish these public notices,” explains Hussein 
Ali, of Noor Al Sabah advertising agency (Ali, 2011).  
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Iraqi journalists confirmed that revenue generated from publishing public 
notices for the US army meant that the coalition fell into favour with some 
newspapers: “The Americans were trying to use these public notices as a 
means to gain the support of newspapers which were at the same time very 
keen on financial support. In order to convince the army to publish these 
adverts the journalist would present how much his newspaper was pro-
American as he/she would get also some commission money on the whole 
deal,” Ahmed Al Zubaidi said, (Al Zubaidi, 2011) a journalist at Al Qassim Al 
Mushtarak (“The Common Base”) newspaper which was published in Baghdad 
(“Al Qassim Al Mushtarak”, 2004). 
 
4-3 Characteristics of the Press after 2003 
There were many important issues in common among the huge number of 
newspapers, which were published after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime: 
 
1. The financial situation of each publication or the entity it was representing 
was clearly reflected in the look of the newspaper. Some of them were 
elegant, with coloured pages, satin white paper, and professional graphic 
design, such as Al Hadath (“The Event”) newspaper (“Al Hadath”, 2003). 
The number of pages varied from eight to 12 pages containing different 
kinds of journalistic topics. Those publications were supervised by a 
professional cadre of writers and journalists, who had experience and skill. 
At the same time other newspapers were simple, printed on cheap paper 
and did not show professional journalistic values. They had low standards 
technically and editorially. Many grammatical and printing mistakes could be 
found on their pages - which demonstrated their lack of funding (Al Shimari, 
2008). For example Sada Baghdad (“Baghdad Echo”) newspaper numbered 
its edition on the 9 September 2003 as edition 6, but the newspaper gave 
number 6 as well to the edition that was published on the 24 September 
2003 (“Sada Baghdad”, 2003).  Both copies were full of typing mistakes. 
 
2. There was no official body to licence printed publications. Many Baghdad 
newspapers put in the heading “registered with the Journalists Syndicate 
Under [edition number e.g. 361]”. So, a newspaper heading might read: “Al 
Manar Al Yawm, 2004, registered with the Journalists Syndicate, edition: 
361”. This kind of statement was endorsed to gain a degree of legitimacy (Al 
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Shimari, 2008). Newspapers in some provinces, however, received 
approvals for publishing from the local provisional councils (Jasim, 2009).  
 
3. Most newspapers, including the official newspaper, Al Sabah, started either 
weekly or bi-weekly before becoming daily.  Readers would find a note 
saying “published once/twice a week, temporarily” (Ashiraa, 2003). This 
would give the impression that the publication would be published daily after 
a while, but often this did not happen and the newspaper would later close 
due to lack of funding (Jasim, 2009). 
 
4-4 Iraq’s Press Types 
The print media that appeared after 2003 could be defined in terms of 
ownership: press owned by the Iraqi government; political religious/sectarian 
groups; ethnic political parties; and press owned by independent individuals or 
groups (Al Marashi, 2007). This classification could be narrowed in terms of 
freedom into “independent profit motivated press” and “politically motivated 
press”. The “independent profit motivated press”, which was being financed by 
Iraqi investors or private companies, enjoyed a large margin of editorial freedom 
and criticism. While, the other type of press, the “politically motivated press”, 
supported the attitude of the government, the political party or ethnic group it 
was representing, backing its ideology. In many cases there was a limit to the 
editorial freedom inside the publication. Such press would be used as 
propaganda tools for the government, party or the ethnic group and may have 
been used to attack other parties and individuals, spontaneously or following 
instructions. Images of certain government, party or ethnic leaders would be 
given space on the front page  (Hun-Shik, and Hama-Saeed, 2008). 
 
4-4-1 Politically Motivated Media 
This type of press included: 
1. The government or state press: 
These are the publications published by the Iraqi Media Network, such as Al 
Sabah (“The Morning”) and Al Fayhaa (name of Basra city) (Al Ruba’e, 2007). 
These publications were not official according to the law, because they were 
published by “independent bodies”, but in terms of practicality these 
institutions and media outlets represented the official viewpoint (Jasim, 2009). 
The government or state press can be divided into:  
A. The state-run newspapers: these are the newspapers or magazines 
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which the state supports being published. This group of newspapers were 
backed by money and influence because they reflected the view of the 
ruling authority. Al Jumhuriya (“The Republic”) newspaper was an 
example during Saddam’s regime, and Al Sabah (“The Morning”) 
newspaper and Al Fayhaa an example after 2003 (Al Musawi 2008; “Al 
Fayhaa”, 2004). 
 
B. The Official Newspaper (“Official Gazette”): the Official Gazette records 
the decrees, decisions, laws, minutes of Parliament meetings and 
statements issued by the governing authority of the state. In many 
countries including Iraq, legislation would be effective only after being 
published in the Official Gazette. This is a purely legal issue and content 
was published in a journal like Al Waqaa’a newspaper (Al Musawi 2008). 
 
2. The partisan press 
A huge number of partisan publishers invaded the market and demonstrated 
the competing ideas of the political parties.  These represented different 
ideologies or different ethnic groups, and were desperate for power and 
position in the country (Al Qazwini, 2004).  These kinds of newspapers had a 
blind loyalty to certain political parties or the ethnicity they represented (Hun-
Shik, and Hama-Saeed, 2008). News coverage of the partisan press was 
focused on promoting their parties’ ideologies and the views of the party or 
ethnic leaders in addition to covering their activities.  As a political 
mouthpiece, these newspapers defended the actions or the decisions made 
by the parties and ethnicities they were representing, but at the same time 
attacked the opposition parties if there was a disagreement at any point (Al 
Ruba’e, 2007).  
 
Publications of this type were funded by the party or the organisation which 
they represented. For this reason the partisan press continued whatever their 
losses, since each newspaper was sponsored by a party that needed the 
publication to serve its political interests. “The parties were using these 
newspapers to support their attitudes and decisions, so it not only lost 
credibility but professionalism,” said Dr Rasheid Hussein Alwan (2010), a 
media professor from Baghdad University. “The readers were confused about 
certain issues, one newspaper praised and the other one criticised the same 
issue so the reader was puzzled about who to believe” (Alwan, 2010). 
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Ibrahim Al Marashi points out that various ethno sectarian styles evolved in 
the Iraqi Fourth Estate (Isakhan, 2009). There were newspapers being run or 
funded by ambitious individuals who aspired to become politicians, or ethnic 
and religious leaders and who wanted to gain some political influence (Coons, 
2004; Fisk, 2003; Hun-Shik, and Hama-Saeed, 2008). This kind of publication 
could be considered in the same category - as partisan press - as it adopted a 
certain political agenda. But this kind of highly partisan press had a negative 
impact on the fragile post-war society (Al Qazwini, 2004). 
 
4-4-2 Independent Profit Motivated Press  
“Independent” was the most used and favourable term for new publications, 
even those that represented a political party or a certain group. The term 
“Independent press” has different meanings in different places in the world. In 
the West the press has long since gained its independence from government 
influence, it has fallen instead under the influence of big corporate 
businesses, and therefore “independent press” is considered as the 
alternative to the mainstream (i.e. corporate controlled) press, or as the press 
that covers areas which are being neglected. In this thesis, discussing the 
press in Iraq in 2003-2006, the expression “Independent press” is used to 
refer to the private sector press that is not influenced by any authority, i.e. the 
CPA or the succeeding Iraqi governments. For a long time, in the Middle 
East, much of the available press consisted of government-controlled 
newspapers, so alternatives would consider themselves, and would maybe be 
considered by the public, as “Independent” press. However, some 
newspapers would claim to be independent, but would be influenced by the 
government, and journalists would develop self-censorship and would still 
have to cover topics favoring the government. 
 
In a democratic society an ideal press must be independent and free to take 
any editorial decision and able to resist external pressures. Such a press 
must be committed to the public interest, not to any policy of any party. To 
achieve such independence and freedom, the press must resist improper 
influence, and it must follow a culture of professionalism that ensures 
accurate, even-handed reporting (Berman, 2006). This research project 
considered the newspapers to be “independent profit motivated” if they were 
owned by the private sector, and not representing any political, ethnic or 
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religious group.   Many newspapers were backed financially by political 
parties or religious sects and only claimed to be independent (Hun-Shik, and 
Hama-Saeed, 2008). The true independent publications are not associated 
with any third party, whether it is government or an institution with any political 
objective. However, in most cases these independent newspapers were 
subject to the interests of the funder, since they were not fully self-sufficient 
financially (Al Musawi, 2008). Those publications also made some revenue 
from commercial advertisements (Al Ruba’e, 2007).  These journals often 
suffered from the pressures and threats by authorities. The options available 
would be, either to surrender to the pressurising current of the occupation 
authority or influential parties, or to stumble, suffer recession and reduce their 
effectiveness. Examples of this type of press are Azzaman (“The Time”), Al 
Mashreq (“The Sunrise”), and Al Mada (“The Range”) (Al Khafaf, 2006). 
 
The market also witnessed the flourishing of commercially motivated press 
and the “yellow” press* (tabloid style). Such publications were launched by 
journalists and businessmen for business reasons to make financial profits (Al 
Ruba’e, 2007). These publications had some success in the beginning, 
especially when covering the former regimes’ scandals, but content was 
mostly rumours and news taken from the Internet. Al Yum Al Akiar (“The 
Other Day”) newspaper reported that Saddam’s intelligence service head 
would be leading the new intelligence service (“Al Yum Al Akiar”, 2003). “In Al 
Shahed we were relying on the Internet and some reporters,” said Dr Hashim 
Hassan who was the editor of the most successful tabloid Al Shahed 
(Hassan, 2010). The pages were full of reports of political or financial 
scandals, which helped achieve sales far higher than other newspapers 
(Thamir, 2008).  Al Shahed was a great success in the beginning, but Dr 
Hassan, the editor of Al Shahed and Al Shahed Al Mustakil respectively, 
complained that independent newspapers could not compete with other 
politically motivated publications. “The whole market was corrupted by low 
priced newspapers which represented the political parties; unlike us they did 
not care about making any revenue or finding any resources since their main 
support was coming from the political party.  For this reason independent 
newspapers like ours could not compete so they started to disappear day 
after day,” Dr Hashim Hassan said (Hassan, 2010). 
                                                  Yellow press is representing the kind of journalism that aims to grab readers’ eyes with exciting news and 
entertainment pieces, but usually not well researched or covering the facts as they are.  
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4-5 Newspapers Published by the US Army in Iraq  
Between 2003 and 2005 the US led coalition “occupation” forces published 
many newspapers all over the country. The soldiers were distributing these 
free newspapers from the 9 April 2003  (Al Ruba’e, 2007). One of the best-
known publications, issued by the US occupying forces in Iraq, was called 
“Baghdad Now” or Baghdad Al Aan. 
 
4-5-1  Baghdad Now 
Baghdad Now was a bi-monthly newspaper, tabloid size, printed with both 
colour and black and white pages. Different American units participated in 
providing the content for the “newspaper”, but the publication did not give the 
names of the Editorial Board. The newspaper, which was distributed free of 
charge, was divided into two halves, one half in Arabic and one in English. 
This first issue was launched on 1 July 2003 (“Baghdad Now”, 2003). The 
publication had 28 pages in its first edition, but the pages were reduced to 24 
in the editions published thereafter. Most of the articles were written by 
American soldiers, but in some cases there were articles being published by 
American writers such as Hannah Allam of the Knight Rider Newspaper 
(Allam, 2004) and Kim Barker of the Chicago Tribune (Barker, 2004). The 
language of many articles, whether English or Arabic, was weak because of 
non-professional translations in both languages. The directing editor of 
Baghdad Now newspaper at the time, Uday Lutfi, confirmed that the 
newspaper was printed in large quantities - nearly 500,000 copies. Mr Lutfi 
was heading the team of Baghdad Now, which included another four writers. 
“My job was to check the material and then send the final copy of the 
newspaper edition to the US army. They printed it and distributed it,” said Mr 
Lutfi (Lutfi, 2011).  But Uday Lutfi was dissatisfied with the work style in the 
newspaper: “It was the worst kind of journalism, each one of us would be 
writing one report and the rest of the articles were coming from the 
Americans, but being translated to Arabic, and we just put them in as they 
were,” said Uday Lutfi (Lutfi, 2011). The directing editor confirmed that the 
newspaper audience was meant to be American soldiers and Iraqis: “It was in 
English and Arabic, because it was targeting Iraqis and American soldiers.  It 
was meant to help Iraqi people to know how to deal with the American 
soldiers. At the same time it helped the American soldiers to understand the 
culture of Iraqis and the issues the soldiers should be aware of when they are 
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dealing with locals,” said Lutfi (Lutfi, 2011). Many locals rejected the 
newspaper; it was also the cause for confrontation between the American 
troops and students of Al Mustanseriyah University in Baghdad. I recall an 
event when American personnel carriers and tanks surrounded the whole 
University of Mustanseriyah, because some students of the university were 
protesting by burning piles of Baghdad Now a few minutes after the American 
unit distributed them. 
 
According to Uday Lutfi the newspaper would be left in piles in the morning in 
certain busy areas of Baghdad, but he believed this was the wrong policy: “I 
told General Martin Dempsey that Baghdad Now is not worth printing and I 
advised him to make it more Iraqi” (Lutfi, 2011). 
 
4-5-2 Other Publications 
There were many newspapers launched by the US military units directly. For 
example Rooh Al Huriya (“The Spirit of Freedom”), Sada Al Rashed (“Al 
Rasheed Echo”) and Al Huria (“The Freedom”). However, in many cases the 
US army sponsored publications like Al Iraq Al Yom (“Iraq Today”). This was 
a tabloid-sized, weekly publication, printed in colour, and published in eight 
pages. Under the name of the newspaper, it read: “Issued by a group of Iraqi 
journalists, editor-in-chief Israa Shakir” (Al Ruba’e, 2007). 
 
4-6 Iraqi Press Expansion 
Observers considered this burgeoning growth in news media outlets as a 
healthy step towards creating a free press, based on fair competition. The 
situation in Iraq was unique, as it was an occupied country and there were 
many conflicting interests of many parties within Iraq. For this reason there 
was no base for fair competition. It was hard for the Americans to exclude 
their need to confront the anti-American messages, while other political 
parties were trying to influence the public with their political agendas. But 
what kind of framework organised the work of those newspapers and 
publications? What kinds of reforms were introduced to the previously active 
legislation to guarantee the freedom of expression? The next chapter will 
cover the media legislation in Iraq and what kind of “reforms” took place after 
the toppling of Saddam’s regime. 
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Chapter 5: 
The Publishing Legislation 1968-2005 
5-1 Introduction 
One of the aims of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was to create a “democratic” 
state that would be a “beacon” for other countries in the Middle East.  One of the 
most important factors in any democratic state is “independent” media. The Bush 
administration wanted to show the world that Iraq after “liberation” would have 
such independent media. But assuming that free and independent media will 
help to establish democracy is not always the case in post-conflict countries. The 
US approach, based on such assumptions, did not consider adequately the 
complexity of Iraqi society (Putzel, and Der Zwan, 2005). After the end of the 
short war, media outlets became a centrepiece of the struggle between different 
factions in Iraq. In order to gain popularity among certain religious or ethnic 
groups, many media outlets escalated hatred and spread fear against one 
another. In addition, the pre-conflict abuse by the former regime was used to 
inflame internal ethnic-religious differences, and this could be considered as 
providing motives for an escalation towards civil war  (Erni, 2005). This raises 
the question, “To what extent should foreigners intervene in post-conflict society 
to build media space?” The American intervention in Iraqi media space was 
motivated by three goals: firstly, serving the US message that it was creating a 
democratic state; secondly, serving the military goal of winning support from the 
public; lastly, serving as a peace-keeping mechanism to achieve the stability of 
the country (Price, Griffin, and Al Marashi, 2007). 
 
During the Ba’athist period, although different communities in Iraq may have 
suffered discrimination, the media had rarely used the terms “Shia,” “Sunni” and 
“Kurd” in a negative manner to refer to any part of Iraqi society, as this would 
harm national unity (Al Marashi, 2007). Conversely, the Iraqi media after the US 
invasion in 2003 developed the capability of reinforcing the country’s ethnic, and 
religious-sectarian divisions. Most of the media outlets with ethno-sectarian 
agendas were granted access to funds provided by the political parties (Al 
Marashi, 2007). The media space was soon filled with locally launched 
newspapers, and others representing political parties returning from exile. Just 
as much as the Iraqi political parties’ opposition movements abroad, their press 
organs in exile had been scattered and highly sectarian. Saad Al Bazzaz 
described the press in exile acerbically, saying: “Unfortunately, the newspapers 
in exile are not radically different from the official press in Iraq and harbour the 
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same totalitarian style. Each paper expresses just one opinion and disqualifies 
all others from the outset” (Cazes, 2003).  
 
In a fragile society like Iraq there was a need to impose control on the media. 
Some attempts were made by Major General David H. Petraeus to control the 
output of TV in Mosul. He had concerns that local politicians and the returning 
exiles might be saying things that incited violence. The 101st commander said: “I 
want to be certain that nothing is shown that would incite violence in a city that 
was extremely tense when we took over two-and-one-half weeks ago, and which 
still has folks who are totally opposed to what we’re doing and are willing to do 
something about it.” He added: “Yes, what we are looking at is censorship […] 
but you can censor something that is intended to inflame passions” (Price, 
Griffin, and Al Marashi, 2007). Such steps were widely criticised by many media 
experts, who assumed that the norms that function so well in established, stable 
democracies would also do the same in a society coming out of long-term 
conflict and dictatorship. Those who would like to apply such norms fail to 
distinguish between stable democratic societies and a democratising society. 
Such experts argue that media outlets could employ free expression to promote 
tolerance and understanding among the different factions. This role of the media 
is crucial in post-conflict situations in order to put in place a solid base for 
reconciliation and to prepare for fair democratic elections. But since democracy 
did not exist in Iraq, the US media experts and war planners should have 
recognised that Iraq needed to be democratised first. For pragmatic reasons 
democratic characteristics should be established first before implementing the 
norms of a free press.  
 
Moreover, the typical “hands-off” approach to media taken by the US authorities 
did not work because the media in Iraq did not have any sense of how to serve 
the public interest, or awareness that their reporting should be subject to factors 
such as independence and accuracy. For these reasons, in post-conflict 
circumstances there will be a risk that the media will play a role in increasing 
violence, rather than it being eased by expansion of the media output.  The 
conditions in a transitional Iraqi society did not reflect democracy, and 
consequently the application of democratic media norms proved to be 
ineffective. For this reason, strict adherence to such otherwise laudable norms 
should not have been required. Even when the CPA did attempt to regulate the 
media to a certain extent, the order that they issued (order 14) failed to deal 
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effectively with challenges that needed a far more robust regulation system 
(Berman, 2007). A democratising nation’s media regulatory framework is 
considered fundamental to promoting pluralism, and a way of ensuring 
independence. The people working on media projects in a post-conflict country 
must be given achievable goals, within a realistic deadline. This would allow 
media policy regulators to begin the work required to create a vibrant media 
sector (Article 19 and UNESCO, 2006). In the case of Iraq, the planning and the 
implementation of measures to regulate and promote a free, independent media 
were lacking. 
 
Despite the absence of any law that could be implemented in practice after the 
collapse of the former regime on the 9 April 2003, the press law number 206 
from as long ago as 1968 was still technically in force. This law prescribed that 
any new publication must be licensed first, but in reality new publications in Iraq 
were launched without being granted such permission (Al Ruba’e, 2007), while 
the Americans thought it was the best practice, unlike the severe restriction 
imposed in post-war Germany and Japan. There was a crucial need to reform 
these laws, but what kind of changes took place? Were there any efforts being 
made to limit media from inflammatory reporting that could incite violence in 
Iraq? 
 
5-2 Preparations for New Media Legislation 
In order to introduce new legislation to organise the media activities, an Iraqi/US 
working group of 20 Iraqi journalists was formed and participated in a conference 
in the Greek capital, Athens, on the 1 June 2003 (Hume, 2004). Internews 
Network, Internews Europe (sponsored by USAID), the UN, the European Union, 
and other non-governmental organisations had set up this conference. These 
non-profit organisations, which support “independent media” worldwide, aimed to 
help in drafting legal key points for a democratic media in post-Saddam Iraq (Al 
Mljawi, 2009). The conference hosted seventy experts from fifteen countries who 
contributed to the first draft of the press law in Iraq after the 2003 invasion 
(Hume, 2004). 
 
One of the key participants was Simon Haselock, a former Media Commissioner 
in Kosovo and a spokesperson for the Office of the High Representative in 
Bosnia. He was the principal architect in drafting the final guidelines (Price, 
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Griffin, and Al Marashi, 2007). Haselock, in an interview for this research, 
referred to an earlier conference that was organised in Cairo about the future of 
Iraqi media, which the Athens draft was based on. “In the middle of the war I was 
contacted by Internews, who had a contract with USAID to develop media 
entities in Iraq, to be part of a tight meeting in Cairo where I had written a 
framework for the media in Iraq based on the discussion we had in that 
conference,” Simon Haselock said (Haselock, 2011). Drawing on his experience 
in Kosovo and Bosnia, Haselock emphasised the need for a mechanism to gain 
independent media, allowing an impartial hearing and appeals process (Al 
Mljawi, 2009). “We produced this report which is known as the Framework for 
Iraqi Media,” said Simon Haselock (Haselock, 2011). The participants were 
supposed to submit these “Media guidelines” to the first elected parliament in 
Iraq in order to establish a legal framework for the new Iraq (Khudur, 2008). 
Hamid Ali Alkifaey, one of the Athens conference organisers, emphasised the 
importance of putting such guidelines in place: “You can't have new media 
without a new media law that clearly defines the relationship between the press 
and the government” (Daragahi, 2003). The representative of the US 
administration in charge of the Iraqi Media Project, Robert Reilly, asked to take 
the proposed framework back to Baghdad for further discussions with other key 
decision-makers. He emphasised that the critical questions that were being 
raised needed to be answered if the media were to be open and responsible in 
the “new” Iraq (Al Mljawi, 2009). 
 
5-2-1 Legal Framework 
The final guidelines from the Athens conference were issued in a report called 
“Framework for Change: Transforming Iraq’s Media Landscape”. This framework 
suggested a plan and recommendations for the legal and regulatory measures to 
be followed in the transitional period. The proposal also drafted a framework to 
prevent misuse of the freedom, which might affect the process of building 
freedom and democracy (Al Mljawi, 2009). The key proposals of the framework 
included:  
- Guaranteeing freedom of speech, ending all kind of censorship.   
- The creation of an independent broadcasting authority in Iraq, and 
regulation to facilitate the broadcasting frequencies (Hargrove-Simon, 2009). 
- Penalties for media offences, ranging from apologies to the closure of the 
media outlet.   
- Abolishing any licensing requirement in the law. 
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- The US interim governing authority (CPA) should guarantee the freedom to 
access all documents and decisions by the press or the public.  
- Transforming the official media outlets, TV and radio into Public 
Broadcasting Services.  
- The government newspapers to be turned over to private and independent 
owners (Hargrove-Simon, 2009). 
- The subsequent laws should abolish imprisonment penalties because they 
are not suitable for charges that might be used against media (Jasim, 2009). 
 
The conference urged the CPA to confirm that any regulations for the media 
would be subject to internationally recognised standards of human rights, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Jasim, 2009). Many Arab journalists, 
union members and government officials attended the conference. But Iraqi 
journalists from inside Iraq did not attend the workshop, either for security 
reasons or because they rejected the idea of “helping” or collaborating with the 
occupiers (Price, Griffin, and Al Marashi, 2007). “It was difficult to get someone 
out of Iraq, because there was no air transportation, and communications were 
difficult after the war, although I did not think that we needed to get Iraqis from 
inside because free media has the same international standards. However there 
were many Iraqis at the conference who were living in the diaspora,” said Hamid 
Ali Al Kifaey, one of the conference organisers (Al Kifaey, 2011). 
 
Based on this framework, The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the 
CPA assigned Simon Haselock to work on structuring media policies and 
regulations in Iraq (Al Mljawi, 2009). “I was contacted by the UK Foreign Office to 
take part in the CPA to implement what was called the Athens framework,” 
Simon Haselock said (Haselock, 2011). Simon was heading the advisory media 
team for the CPA and later for the interim Iraqi government headed by Ayad 
Alawi. Whilst in reality the press was expanding on the ground, it took Haselock 
and his team a year to come up with a proposal for a framework to regulate the 
Iraqi media. 
 
5-3 The Situation inside Iraq 
5-3-1 The Active Media Laws 
The expansion in media landscape in Iraq made the US administration work in 
two different directions. It needed to fulfil the promise to establish a “healthy” 
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media environment up to the standards of a free society, to replace the ex-
totalitarian regime media, but at the same time, it wanted to control anti-US 
messages (Al Mljawi, 2009). Simon Haselock referred to his meeting with 
Bremer regarding implementing the Athens framework for Iraqi media: “I met the 
head of the CPA Paul Bremer and he asked me to implement the framework and 
he was enthusiastic about it” (Haselock, 2011). Haselock also raised the 
importance of having an independent regulatory body that would deal with 
different issues such as incitements, political radicalism and ownership conflicts: 
“We said from the beginning that this regulator should be an independent body 
and not another Ministry of Information or any government institute. But 
American groups were arguing, why should we regulate at all, we should let a 
thousand flowers bloom, and in the end it will sort itself out. But my argument 
was that there was no commercial imperative in Iraq at that time, so the only 
people who would set up a media outlet were those who would have a certain 
agenda, either pro or antagonistic.” Mr Haselock added, “in this case you will get 
pluralism but you will not get objective independent journalism” (Haselock, 
2011). 
 
The CPA followed one of the Athens conference’s recommendations and 
suspended, by its order number 7 for 2003 and published on the 10 June 2003, 
the previous Iraqi Penal Code number 111 from 1969, which applied to 
publishing crimes. But the order number 7 issued by the CPA permitted only the 
head of the CPA to take a legal action against any publication (Al Ruba’e, 2007). 
The CPA worked first on filling the vacuum that was left by the disappearance of 
the Iraqi state media outlets. The plan was intended to establish and launch the 
new media network, the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), where Iraqis could get the 
“right” information. On the other hand, the US authorities in Baghdad tried to 
draft a media “code of conduct”, with the intention of creating a licensing 
authority and a body to monitor the media. This issue angered some of the Iraqi 
journalists, who demonstrated against such legislation (Daragahi, 2003). Later, 
the idea for a specific media code of conduct was shelved.  
 
5-3-2 CPA Introducing Order Number 14 
The CPA specified the publishing regulations by issuing order number 14 in 
2003. This code prohibited the media from broadcasting or publishing any 
material that incited violence, disorder, riots or damage to property. If any 
media outlet violated articles in order number 14, the law authorised those 
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bodies responsible to take legal action against the media outlet. These actions 
might include inspection without prior warning, confiscation of goods or 
prohibited material, shutting down the building and arresting employees of the 
media organisation who might be tried and sentenced to up to one year’s 
imprisonment and a fine of USD 1,000  (Al Ruba’e, 2007). 
 
Order number 14 specified the following offences:  
1. Inciting violence against any ethnic or religious group or against 
women. 
2. Inciting civil disobedience or disorder.  
3. Inciting violence against the coalition forces.  
4. Inciting change to the Iraqi border by force.  
5. Calling for the return of the Ba’ath Party to power, or to speak on 
behalf of the Ba’ath Party. 
Under this act any person or group of people breaching any of the above-
mentioned articles, would be liable to arrest or detention by the coalition forces 
on the basis of Article IV of the Geneva Conventions, which is related to 
security matters (Al Azawi, 2008). But from the view of international law and 
best practice, order number 14 was problematic for many reasons: 
- It failed to specify the meaning of “incitement” that would be acceptable 
internationally. 
- Authorities such as the police or the army were allowed to punish the 
media outlet directly using its executive powers. 
- The nature of punishment included imprisonment and “huge fines”, which 
are not acceptable internationally (Price, Griffin, and Al Marashi, 2007). 
This meant that many Iraqi newspapers, which had been critical to the US 
forces, could face closure since it would be up to the CPA official to 
differentiate between incitement and genuine criticisms (Sharp, 2003). Order 
number 14 was subject to criticism by media observers and journalists. The 
vague and flexible nature of the Act allowed the CPA to use it against any 
publication (Al Azawi, 2008). “Order number 14 was driven by the 
requirements of the military, who wanted the authority to be able to arbitrarily 
close any media outlet, who they thought was against them. It was an action 
of fear,” Simon Haselock said (Haselock, 2011). Others believed the order 
was created to force news organisations or journalists to impose self-
censorship (Hama-Saeed, 2007). “Order 14 put in the hands of Paul Bremer, 
and later the Prime Minister, the right on their own, to close media outlets and 
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we advised that it was not a good idea from the international perspective,” 
said Douglas Griffin, a lawyer who joined the Media advisory team headed by 
Simon Haselock (Griffin, 2011). Considering the huge number of Iraqi media 
outlets and the lack of professionalism among the new generation of 
journalists, this order was not used on many occasions because the CPA had 
insufficient capacity to deal with each case of violation of order number 14. 
 
5-3-3 Iraqi Penal Code Punishments for Journalists and Media Outlets  
The changes, which the CPA conducted in regard to the Iraqi media, were in 
theory essential, but the Iraqi Penal Code still contained a large number of 
constraints that specified what could be published in Iraq (Najjar, 2009). The 
reform abolished only two articles, concerning the criminalisation of 
incitement to change the constitution, and insulting the President. The CPA 
stopped only articles 200 and 225, while the rest remained in force (Al 
Ruba’e, 2007) such as decree number 840 of 1986 signed by the 
Revolutionary Commanding Council, which ordered the death penalty for 
anyone insulting the President, Saddam (Rugh, 2004). However, these laws 
and changes were redundant, given the collapse of Saddam’s Ba’ath regime. 
 
Articles like 226 of the Saddam period Iraqi Penal Code, gave the courts the 
right to sentence for up to seven years imprisonment, those who “publicly 
insulted” officials or government institutions. Articles 433- 437 allowed the 
court to punish the offenders with up to a year’s detention. The definition of 
prohibited acts was vague and non-specific in these articles (Price, Griffin, 
and Al Marashi, 2007). Other articles could punish publications if they 
published “False News”:  
  Article 210 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable with 
detention, to broadcast or to intend to broadcast false and ill-intentioned 
news, statements or rumours or to disseminate inciting propaganda if this 
disturbs public security, intimidates people or inflicts harm on public 
interest. 
  Article 211 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable with 
detention, to publish by any means false information if this disturbs the 
public peace. 
  Article 179 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable with 
detention, in times of war to broadcast false or biased information, 
statements or rumours that may lower the morale of the population. 
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 Article 180 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable with 
detention, to broadcast abroad false or biased information concerning the 
internal situation in Iraq that would undermine financial confidence or tar 
Iraq’s international standing.  
(Article 19, 2004, p.24) 
 
Other articles punished those who demonstrated or published certain 
ideologies or beliefs:  
 - Article 201 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable by up to life 
imprisonment, to promote Zionist or Masonic ideologies, including by 
joining related institutions, or by promoting these ideologies morally or in 
any other way. 
  Article 208 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable by up to 
seven years’ imprisonment, to obtain materials that incite constitutional 
change or that promote banned ideologies with the aim of publishing 
them. 
- Article 214 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable by up to one 
year’s imprisonment, to shout or sing in a manner that provokes dissent.  
 Article 215 of the Penal Code makes it a crime to possess, with the aim 
of publication, trade or distribution, materials that disturb public security 
or tarnish the country’s reputation.  
(Article 19, 2004, p.25) 
 
There were more articles affecting the work of any journalists in Iraq, such as: 
  Article 305 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable by up to two 
years’ imprisonment, publicly to incite others to withdraw capital invested 
in banks or public funds, or to sell or not to purchase State bonds or other 
government securities. 
  Article 403 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable by up to two 
years’ imprisonment, to possess for publication any material “that violates 
the public integrity or decency”. 
  Article 404 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable by up to one 
year’s imprisonment, to sing or broadcast indecent or obscene songs or 
statements. 
  Article 438 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable by up to two 
years’ imprisonment, to publish private information where this causes 
offence.  
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(Article 19, 2004, p.30) 
  
 - Article 182 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable by detention, 
to publish or broadcast any governmental material the publication of which 
has been prohibited.  
  Article 228 of the Penal Code makes it a crime to publish proceedings of 
secret sessions held by the National Assembly or, dishonestly and ill-
intentionally, to publish proceedings of the Assembly’s open sessions.  
 - […] 
 Article 437 of the Penal Code makes it a crime, punishable by up to two 
years’ imprisonment, to divulge secrets obtained through employment or 
professional activities, except when the aim is to report or prevent a crime. 
 (Article 19, 2004, p.40) 
 
The problematic issue here is the vague nature of terms like, “inflicts harm on 
public interest”, “lower the morale of the population” or “intimidates people” 
(Article 19, 2004). Such lack of clarity in the wording of these articles gives any 
executive authority great influence over media outlets through the way they are 
interpreted. Experts say that the large number of publishing crimes in the Iraqi 
Penal Code provides any authority with great potential to pressurise any media 
outlet. “The Penal Code is still active from before Saddam and after the fall of 
his regime and we kept advising and we drew plans for changing such laws but 
it never happened,” said Douglas Griffin (Griffin, 2011). 
 
For this reason any media organisation could face serious problems with the 
authority if its coverage did not fit with the government agenda. There were no 
institutions or legal bodies to regulate the media after the dissolution of the 
Ministry of Information and the abolition of its institutions. The Interim 
Governing Council, which was appointed by the CPA (BBC, 2003) formed a 
media committee in early September 2003. The commission included nine 
members to follow up the media policy in Iraq. The members were as follows: 
Adnan Pachachi, Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, Ibrahim Al Jaafari, Mahmoud Othman, 
Muwaffaq Rubaie, Yonadam Kana, Samir Sumaida'ie, Akila Al Hashimi and 
Snkol Jabaok (Khudur, 2008). The commission did not take any decisions apart 
from threatening to close one of the Arabic satellite channels, Al Arabiya. The 
spokesman of the Iraqi Governing Council and former SAIC contractor, Hamid 
Ali Al Kifaey, commented: “The media committee was supposed to discuss 
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media issues and to deal with media outlets. Also in theory it would draw up a 
plan on how to deal with the previous regime’s Ministry of Information and 
publishing houses, but the Governing Council had no power or money; the real 
authority was in the hands of the CPA in most issues, including the media” (Al 
Kifaey, 2011). 
 
There were no copyright laws enforced in the country. This became a problem 
due to the increase in Internet plagiarism. The availability and the ease of 
accessibility to the world wide web meant that many newspapers start relying 
on the Internet as an information service. In this way, articles by veteran Arab 
and international writers would make their way to the pages of very small 
publications (UNESCO-IREX, 2006). 
 
In April 2004 the CPA issued order numbers 65 and 66 in regard to establishing 
a Communication Media Commission (CMC). The Governing Council members 
had agreed that the CMC should be an independent body away from the 
influence of any authority (Piper, 2004). The new institution received criticism 
for its structure and influence. Al Sabah said that the CMC could be more 
powerful than the Ministry of Information during Saddam’s time (Al Mljawi, 
2009) but Douglas Griffin said something different regarding the situation with 
the press: “Order 65 stated that newspapers don’t need to obtain any licence 
before being launched. There is a little area where the CMC would have a 
limited right to regulate press during elections” (Griffin, 2011). Mr Griffin, who 
helped to draft order number 65, which was mostly concerned with the 
broadcast media not the press, said that sanctions against journalists or media 
outlets in order 65 should not be money or imprisonment but just a [warning] 
letter. “Although order number 65 stated that imprisonment is not an acceptable 
punishment they could use the penal code to put someone in prison for 
defamation,” said Douglas Griffin (Griffin, 2011). 
 
When the CPA headed by Paul Bremer handed sovereignty to the interim Iraqi 
government headed by Ayad Alawi, all laws and orders made by the CPA were 
active, in addition to the former regime’s penal code unless either of them had 
been replaced.  More laws were introduced by the Iraqi governments, which 
succeeded the CPA, using  laws from Saddam’s era to restrain media freedom. 
The Iraqi Communications Media Commission (CMC), which in theory should 
have been protecting media freedom, was widely influenced by government 
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opinion (Ricchiardi, 2011). 
 
5-4 Interventions in Media and Closure of Newspapers (CPA)   
The head of the CPA Paul Bremer referred to the new freedoms in Iraq, saying 
to a group of journalists in June 2003 that they were no longer bound by the 
government instructions and they were “free to criticise” whoever, or whatever, 
they wanted, according to Index on Censorship (Gourevitch, 2003). Despite 
these statements and calls for freedom of speech and democracy by the US 
administration and the support provided to some newspapers to spread the 
culture of “free” opinion, the occupation forces at the same time proceeded to 
close some newspapers, which published articles opposing its occupation of 
Iraq (Al Khafaf, 2006). The regulations, which were implemented, were serving 
the interests of the occupation authorities who did not allow anyone to exceed 
the “red lines” (Al Khafaf, 2006). 
 
The former director of the Iraqi Media Network’s television confirmed that there 
was a mechanism used by the army to follow the news published by local Iraqi 
newspapers. “The army had a monitoring system for local newspapers; the 
headlines would be translated etc, there were many categories such as pro-
American or anti-American or neutral,” said Ahmed Al Rekabi (Al Rekabi, 
2008). Based on information provided by their monitoring system, American 
forces warned different publications about certain kinds of coverage, which the 
US army or the CPA would consider to be carrying an “anti-American 
message”.  
 
Dr Abdulsalam Al Samer who was the editor of Al Sa’ah newspaper recalls a 
warning his newspaper received after publishing a series of articles and reports 
that were embarrassing for the occupation authority. “It was an official warning 
from the press officer of the coalition forces saying that the American troops 
were in a state of war and that what our newspaper, Al Saah, was publishing 
was putting the US troops in danger and we might have to take serious action; 
it was nearly two pages long,” Abdul Salam Al Samer said (Al Samer, 2010).  
                                                 
 The New York Times reported on 29 September 2006 that three journalists working for a small newspaper 
were brought to court after publishing articles accusing local officials of being corrupted. They were tried 
under the Penal Code No. 226 which meant a possibility of imprisonment for up to seven years because of 
public insult (Zielbauer, 2006). 
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The Freedom House rating of Iraq’s legal environment for journalists referred 
to a drop in freedom rating from 2003 to 2004. The drop in the freedom of the 
press resulted from the CPA’s closure of media outlets and the interim Iraqi 
government’s steps to take legal actions against journalists. Media rights 
experts said that the closure of many newspapers by the CPA set a bad 
example for Iraqi politicians in practice, although Iraq’s media laws were still 
“liberal” (Rohde, 2005). 
 
5-4-1 Closure of Newspapers 
In the absence of a regulating body, there were many events where the Iraqi 
press were in confrontation with the occupying authorities or forces. Some 
newspapers were raided by the US army, temporarily suspended from 
publishing or closed. Many employees of these publications were arrested 
(Khudur, 2008). The first temporary closure was on the 14 June 2003, when 
Sadda Al Auma (“Echo of the Nation”) newspaper was suspended for a few 
days in Najaf and its employees were detained for a short time by the 
occupation troops. The newspaper represented the Supreme Council for the 
Liberation of Iraq and Ayatollah Mahdi Al Awadi, who opposed the American 
occupation and their plans for Iraq (Sadda Al Auma, 2003). The newspaper 
closure happened after it had published articles asking Najaf’s people to join 
the Ramadi resistance movement. The newspaper was back on the market 
after three days (Barry, 2003). 
 
On 21 July 2003, the occupation forces raided Al Mustaqila (“The 
Independent”) newspaper and closed its offices in the Waziriyah district of 
Baghdad. American soldiers destroyed the contents of the office and arrested 
the chief editor Abul-Satar Al Shaalan, accusing him of inciting violence against 
the US army  (Khudur, 2008). In a press release, the CPA referred to the 
headline “Death to all Spies and Those who Cooperate with the US; Killing 
them is a Religious Duty” which was published after announcing the name of 
the US appointed Governing Council (Carroll, 2004). The CPA spokesperson 
Charles Heatley told CNN that the newspaper crossed all the “red” lines: “They 
had very, very clearly crossed any red line however you draw it. They were 
                                                 
 Freedom House is an independent watchdog organisation, based in the US, that supports the expansion of 
freedom around the world. 
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calling on Iraqis to kill anybody cooperating with the coalition” (Brahimi, 2006). 
 
Al Shaalan was held for a few weeks, but after his release in September 2003, 
he said in a press conference at the newspaper: “Our offices were raided by 
the American force backed by armoured vehicles and Iraqi police cars. They 
attacked the newspaper using heavily armed soldiers.  Offices have been 
broken into and searched in a hostile way. They took me to the back after 
being handcuffed, and they confiscated everything in our office including 
money in our safe, computers, journalists’ identity cards, and other things. 
Then, they wrote my statement after accusing me of making propaganda for 
the former regime and, of course, this is not true. They tried to find new 
charges but they did not succeed. After rejecting their accusations I was 
released by an Iraqi judge for the lack of evidence on 11 August 2003” (Jasim, 
2009, p.89).  
 
The chair of Al Mustaqila’s administration board, Dhari Mohammed Al Dulaimi, 
defended the paper’s editorial policy, saying that the headlines were simply 
quotes from a cleric in which his views reflected the feelings of the people in 
Iraq (Isakhan, 2009): “If this is American or world democracy, we reject it. 
Democracy means dialogue and exchange of views. Not attacking in this way,” 
Al Duleimi said (Brahimi, 2006). After the release of the newspaper’s chief 
editor from prison, the publication continued to pursue the same line, attacking 
the American occupation forces strongly and the overall political process. The 
newspaper published a few editions, which were modest in terms of design and 
material, and were not issued on a regular basis. The newspaper continued, 
but the chair of the administration board, the lawyer Dhari Mohammed Al 
Dulaimi, died. The last issue was number 44 on Sunday, 18 November 2004, 
which stated on the heading that Al Shaalan had become the chief editor and 
the Chair of the Board. He was detained again until the end of 2007 (Jasim, 
2009). 
 
In late September 2003 the occupation authority in Mosul closed the Sada Tal 
Afar (“Tal Afar Echo”) newspaper. The newspaper had published an article 
calling for Turkey to send troops to Iraq and said Turkey had the right to take 
Mosul province as part of Turkey. The Americans accused the newspaper of 
violating the “press laws” (Khudur, 2008); there were no press laws at the time, 
but it was referring to order number 14.  
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The closure of the radical Shia cleric Moqtada Al Sadr newspaper, Al Hawza Al 
Nateqa (“The Spoken Hawza”), on the 28 March 2004, resonated widely 
because of the number of Al Sadr’s supporters. Also, Al Hawza was one of the 
first newspapers published after the first week of May 2003, and continued 
publishing for a while until it was closed in 2004, claiming a circulation of 
15,000 copies (Cockburn, 2008). The eight-page newspaper claimed on its 
masthead that “It is the mouthpiece of the honoured, religious Hawaza”, while 
on the right of the heading it described itself as a “daily newspaper, issued 
temporarily every Sunday and Wednesday”. Its editor was Sheikh Abbas Al 
Rubaie (Jasim, 2009). Problems started when the Civil Governor of Iraq, Paul 
Bremer, ordered the US troops to close the newspaper and fine it a sum of 
money. The coalition forces closed the newspaper’s building and sealed it, 
warning that anyone attempting to re-publish the newspaper might face up to a 
year in jail and USD 1,000 fine (CNN, 2004). The CPA warrant mentioned in 
the closing order, that Al Hawza could reopen in 60 days (Gettleman, 2004). 
 
The order, which was signed by L. Paul Bremer III, also included several 
examples of what were considered “false reports” carried by the newspaper 
(Gettleman, 2004). One of them mentioned was the newspaper’s claim that 
American helicopters fired missiles which caused the death of 50 Iraqi police 
recruits - when it was in fact a suicide truck attack, which took place in 
Alexandria 25 km south of Baghdad in February 2004. The newspaper said 
that they were reporting what eyewitnesses had said about the explosion. 
Bremer also did not like the newspaper’s editorial comparisons between 
himself and Saddam Hussein. Many people in Iraq felt that the closure was a 
political punishment for the defiant opposition to the American occupation. 
There was also strange timing with the CPA’s announcement that an arrest 
warrant had been issued against Moqtada Al Sadr in April 2004 with regards to 
the killing of a rival cleric back in April 2003 (Al Sheikh, 2004). All of these 
consequences sparked an armed uprising by Sadr followers, which 
destabilised southern Iraq in the spring of 2004 (Rohde, 2005). Bremer 
mentioned in his book, “My Year in Iraq”, that he had wanted to imprison 
Muqtada Al Sadr in August 2003 (Bremer, 2006).  
 
Al Mustaqila, Al Hawza and others were closed by the Americans for different 
reasons. “That period was not clear regarding some procedures against some 
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newspapers because Iraq was under occupation,” said Mofeed Al Jazaeeri, the 
former editor of Tareek Al Sha’ab newspaper and the former Minister of Culture 
during Bremer’s era (Al Jazaeeri, 2011). Some journalists accused these 
publications of lacking professionalism, which gave justification for the 
Americans to take such steps. “Al Hawza and Al Mustaqila were closed, 
because they were not directed by professional journalists. They fell into an 
area where they could not separate their feelings from the work they were 
publishing,” said Dr Mohammed Bedawi Al Shamari, the former editor of Al 
Sheraa newspaper (Al Shamari, 2011). 
 
The Iraqi Governing Council was involved in closing or banning media outlets. 
On 23 September 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council closed down the Baghdad 
offices of the two Arabic satellite channels, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya (Coons, 
2004) but they were reopened shortly afterwards. Al Jamhour newspaper 
reported that after these events, the Governing Council was willing to introduce 
new media regulation (Al Jamhour, 2003).  
 
In February 2004, the Governing Council’s press office punished one of the 
reporters because of her “rudeness” in wording her question to public officials 
and members of the Governing Council. The reporter from Radio Sawa was 
banned from future Governing Council briefings. Journalists walked out of the 
conference in protest (Carroll, 2004). Although closures in a few cases could 
be justified for security reasons, in other cases it seemed to be mistaken 
(Rohde, 2005). The Americans were using order number 14 to close these 
publications, but such punishments against those publications did not appear to 
improve the situation. “The actions where the CPA used this law backfired 
because it made the public sympathise with the closed media outlet,” Douglas 
Griffin said, a former member in the media advisory team in Iraq (Griffin, 2011). 
 
5-4-2 Iraqi Interim Government’s Practices Against Media Freedom 
The appointed interim Iraqi government succeeded the CPA, and on 27 July 
2004 the Prime Minister, Ayad Alawi, decided to create the Higher Media 
Commission (HMC). This body mirrored the US Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and the UK’s communications regulator OfCom (Cochrane, 
2006). The HMC allegedly intended to impose a requirement to license 
newspapers following certain conditions, which few publications could meet, 
and also impose punishment for criticising the authority. Alawi expressed his 
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own interpretation for media freedom, saying, “We will not allow some people 
to hide behind the slogan of freedom of the press and media” (Isakhan, 2009, 
p.17). The appointed interim Iraqi government wanted the HMC to control print 
and broadcast through introducing new sanctions such as the power to close 
any outlet. The HMC would draw new “red lines” and journalists or media 
organisations would be punished if they ignored them (Khalil, 2006). “Alawi 
wanted to highjack those laws by creating the Higher Media Commission which 
was controlling the whole media spectrum,” said Simon Haselock, the head of 
media advisory team in Iraq 2003-2005 (Haselock, 2011). 
 
Many events showed restrictions and oppressive practices being imposed on 
journalists. For example in August 2004, when the journalists were covering the 
confrontation between the government and Moqtada Al Sadr, the Iraqi police 
ordered all journalists to leave the city of Najaf. The police forces raided the 
hotel, where the journalists were residing, kicking open the doors to their 
rooms, and threatening a group of British journalists that they would be shot if 
they did not leave (Rohde, 2005). During the attack on Fallujah in November 
2004, the Iraqi interim government introduced a new media regulation after 
declaring a 60-day state of emergency. The new temporary guidelines for 
media coverage warned journalists of legal action if they didn’t follow them and 
asked journalists “not to label terrorists, criminals and killers with any national 
tags”. Media outlets were asked to “set aside space in your news coverage to 
make the position of the Iraqi government, which expresses the aspirations of 
most Iraqis, clear” (Reuters, 2004). Although order number 14 was active, the 
interim Iraqi government did not use it, but it did not stop closing media outlets. 
“The government would close newspapers or radio stations or TV without even 
quoting any law,” Douglas Griffin said (Griffin, 2011). 
 
 
                                                  Two weeks after the creation of the Higher Media Commission, on 9 August, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior 
decided to close down Al Jazeera in Baghdad. “This decision was taken to protect the people of Iraq and 
the interests of Iraq,” appointed Prime Minister Ayad Alawi said in a news conference. “[The commission] 
came up with a concise report on the issues of incitement and the problems Al Jazeera has been causing,” 
Alawi added. But the channel rejected the accusations (Hama-Saeed, 2007). In other events, Sawt 
Baghdad (The voice of Baghdad) radio station was closed a month before it was reopened (Al Mljawi, 
2009). 
 
 The Higher Media commission was dissolved after the end of the term of the Iraqi Interim Government 
headed by Ayad Alawi. 
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5-5 The Security Situation and the Iraqi Press 
The continuing violence, which threatened the basic stability and safety of 
individuals in Iraq, was a main factor affecting media developments (Al Mljawi, 
2009). Iraqi and international journalists were in the same boat, suffering from 
attacks by different militant groups or the fire of American forces. It was difficult 
or impossible in some areas to do a single reportage or even to enter and 
check the scene of news events, or to conduct interviews with eyewitnesses 
(Rohde, 2005). Many journalists started to refuse to make reports from the field 
after a dramatic increase in attacks against journalists. Killing, kidnapping and 
other assaults traumatised them (Hun-Shik and Hama-Saeed, 2008). The 
situation became even worse; journalists started to notice that many 
eyewitnesses or people in the streets were too scared to talk, fearing attacks 
against themselves or the reporter they were speaking to (Hun-Shik, and 
Hama-Saeed, 2008). Many journalists became cautious about what kind of 
stories they would report, hoping to avoid physical harm. They were hesitating 
or outright avoiding reports on controversial issues, which might create trouble 
for them or for their media outlet (Hun-Shik, and Hama-Saeed, 2008). Ismael 
Zayeer, Al Sabah former editor, and Al Sabah Al Jadeed current editor, said 
that journalists in most cases couldn’t say what they knew, fearing the 
consequences afterwards. “You could write a beautiful article but it might be 
your last piece of work,” Zayeer said.  
 
5-6 “Old”-New taboos to be observed again  
Despite the promises made by the CPA and the succeeding Iraqi government 
to guarantee freedom of expression, in practice this was not the case. Many 
provinces like Basra, Najaf, Karbala, Arbil and Duhok publicly declared they 
were practicing censorship. Many journalists stopped criticising the provisional 
councils or the local security officers in order to avoid closure of the publication 
they were working for or to avoid facing physical harm (El-Rikabi, 2007). 
Political parties and other religious or ethnic groups started to practise 
censorship on what would be printed in their publications or by other media 
outlets. In addition, these groups used the same propaganda methods which 
had been used by Saddam’s regime. Journalists were accustomed to 
publishing stories to attack their rivals and the contenders of the group that 
their publication represented. Journalists raised their dissatisfaction about the 
danger which some news organisations put them in by publishing fabricated 
stories, and unverified rumours or scandals (Hun-Shik, and Hama-Saeed, 
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2008). The Freedom House report of 2004 described the media situation in Iraq 
by saying: “Continuing violence poses the greatest short-term threat to the 
work of journalists in the country. In the long-term, political stability and the 
ambiguous legal framework will need to be resolved in order for Iraq's media to 
truly function freely” (Freedom House, 2004). Some Iraqi journalists 
complained about the censorship practised by the US-led coalition forces and 
the Iraqi government, especially when they were reporting stories related to the 
militant groups. The Iraqi Association of Journalists (IRIN) said that two 
journalists were detained after shadowing insurgents and publishing stories 
about them (IRIN, 2006). The increase of violence prevented the growth of a 
free press in the country (Rohde, 2005). But the shadow of security had always 
affected the American plan for the Iraqi media. The next chapter explains their 
detailed plan for the Iraq media. The chapter specifies the failure of the 
American plan, as well as the CPA and the American official interventions in 
the work of the Iraqi Media Network and other local media outlets. 
 
 
 116 
Chapter 6: 
The US Plans for Iraqi Media and The Iraqi Media Network Project 2002-2003 
 
6-1 Introduction  
The American President, George W. Bush, who led the invasion in 2003 said: 
“All successful democracies need freedom of speech, with a vibrant free press 
that informs the public, ensures transparency, and prevents authoritarian back-
sliding”  (Rohde, 2005).  Bush may have held those beliefs in free press, but 
was that what his administration offered to Iraq? In order to answer this question 
there are certain events that need to be recalled. 
 
As soon as Bush assumed the presidency his team, formed from senior 
neoconservative figures, escalated a media campaign against Iraq.  It accused 
Saddam Hussein of hiding weapons of mass destruction and hosting Al Qaeda 
members, to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The neoconservatives had 
earlier achieved a degree of success in their attempts to promote the use of US 
military forces, as they demanded in their report in 2000 - “The project for the 
new American century” - to rebuild the US defence (Clifton, 2007). In his speech 
in Congress on the 10 September 2001, Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld 
urged the US government and Congress to "liberate" the Department of Defence 
(DoD) from institutional lethargy. He declared that he believed that the staff of 
the Department were his allies in the fight against bureaucracy. 
Mr Rumsfeld said that he would change Pentagon bureaucracy and encourage 
innovation.  "Why is DoD one of the last organisations around that still cuts its 
own checks?" Mr. Rumsfeld asked. "At bases around the world, why do we pick 
up our own garbage and mop our own floors rather than contracting those 
services out, as many businesses do? And surely we can outsource more 
computer systems support” (Garamone, 2001). Based on this new strategy of 
outsourcing, the DoD started using private companies and contractors to take 
over many of the jobs that the US army were not willing to nor had the expertise 
to do. Amonst the outsourced missions were media projects, psychological 
operations, and public diplomacy.  
In January 2006 a secret document signed by Defence Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld was declassified. “The Information Operations Roadmap” considered 
                                                 
 President George W. Bush, May 18, 2005, speech to the International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C. 
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information operations as a “core military competency,” and urged the launch of 
psychological operations using defensive and offensive strategies. The report 
suggested expanding information operations through 57 recommendations. 
However, as the DoD was short on in-house media experts, the department 
turned to private contractors (Cary, 2010). 
 
These contractors were not notably efficient, and proved more focused on profits 
than on providing the services they were paid for. In a hostile environment or war 
zone, however, it is almost impossible for anyone to assess whether a media 
contractor has fulfilled the requirements of the contract or mission they have 
been asked to carry out. 
 
Most of the projects turned out to have been used as a means to make huge 
profits by relying on a cheap, inexperienced labour-force. The contractors were 
not paid according to the level of success that the project they were building 
would achieve, but according to the theoretical workload for which they claimed. 
For this reason, the DoD contractors and many of the other organisations which 
worked in Iraq, ended up following a “box-ticking” culture.  SAIC, the main 
contractor used to build Iraq’s Public Broadcasting Service, was criticised by the 
Pentagon auditors, saying that “SAIC was paid for work not completed, 
electronic equipment was missing, and that SAIC paid top salaries to executives 
and security officers, but skimped on equipment for journalists” (Cary, 2010). 
 
Although American policy was to repeat the same approach they had tried after 
World War II, what the US army had done in Germany and Japan was quite 
different. In those cases they had been able to assess and gradually measure 
the success of building media entities. Donald Rumsfeld stated that his idea 
about outsourcing was intended to find a way to avoid bureaucracy. However, as 
he admits in his book, “The Known and the Unknown”, there were many staff 
involved in post-war Iraq who were under-qualified and yet were holding critical 
jobs in the CPA (Rumsfeld, 2010). 
 
The United States allocated a budget of USD 100 million for the media project in 
Iraq (Sharp, 2003).  The final costs were closer to USD 200 million (spent 
between 2003-2005) – representing the largest attempt ever in any country or by 
any other country, to build a “free” media. The whole project was almost a 
complete failure in its first year, when it was run by the Pentagon. Local Iraqi 
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journalists, American officials and trainers confirm that the project was money-
wasting, amateurish and counter-productive (Rohde, 2005). 
 
So what kind of plans were US government working with? 
 
6-2  US Pre-War Suggested Plans for the Iraqi Media  
6-2-1 The State Department Plan 
The early plan, designed by the US State Department, was called “The Future of 
Iraq Project”, and it included a framework for the future Iraqi media (Al Mljawi, 
2009). The State Department plans went back to October 2001, when the US 
government began planning for post-Saddam Hussein transition in Iraq.  The 
Department gathered together nearly 200 Iraqi professionals to work within 17 
teams, and the collective group came up with a 1,200-page 13-volume report, 
entitled, “The Future of Iraq Project”. The project suggested a range of 
strategies, approaches and warnings to the decision makers (Al Mljawi, 2009). 
With regards to the media, the group was tasked to develop a long-term strategy 
to train Iraqi journalists, legislators, officials, and judiciary members to raise the 
importance of the role of the free press in any democratic society. The 
participants recommended preparing several editions of a new Iraqi (weekly) 
newspaper, and two months of entertainment programmes. Further 
recommendations were included relating to the standards of those Iraqi 
universities which gave Bachelor’s degrees in media and communication (Al 
Mljawi, 2009). 
 
The media group conducted only one meeting, because most of the participants 
were hired by the Pentagon contractor SAIC - according to page 2 of the media 
report in “The Future of Iraq Project”  (The National Security Archive, 2006).   
Choosing SIAC was a clear indication that the Pentagon would be in charge of 
Iraqi media in the next stage. 
 
6-2-2 The United States Institute of Peace 
Many organisations discussed the situation of the Iraqi media after the war. In 
February 2003 one such organisation - the United States Institute of Peace - 
drafted a special report called “After Saddam Hussein - Winning a Peace if it 
comes to War”. The report included some suggestions for reform of the Iraqi 
media: “Within the first month of occupation, Iraq’s Ministry of Information, 
Journalism Syndicate, and government censorship offices should be dismantled. 
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International civilian media professionals should be placed in charge of state-
owned organisations, with Arabic-speaking and international media specialists 
being necessary to fill out the numerous positions that will open as incumbents 
are vetted out of state media outlets. Iraqi journalists will need to be trained and 
a new media law developed. Support for the professionalisation and expansion 
of diverse media throughout the country should be provided. One channel of 
state television should be developed into a public broadcast entity. Iraq’s public 
should be encouraged to see the media as their window, not simply a conduit for 
official disinformation. There will be a strong temptation for the occupation 
government to insist on broadcasting “hearts and minds” programming and 
optimistic forecasts about the activity and intentions of the occupation 
government to a sophisticated Iraqi audience. The temptation should be 
moderated. Iraqis may see this as just more state-sponsored nonsense. In other 
places, this approach has seldom worked, with various Commander Solo 
operations and the “Ring Around Serbia” initiative being examples. Control over 
the media should be relegated to an independent advisory board composed of 
Iraqi and expatriate professionals” (United States Institute of Peace, 2003). 
 
6-2-3 The US Defence Department Plan 
The US Department of Defence started handing out contracts to reconstruct the 
Iraqi media more than a week before the start of bombing and the invasion in 
March 2003. The Pentagon contracted Science Applications International 
Corporation (SAIC) to reconstruct Iraq’s national media following the Pentagon 
plan (Barker, 2008). The Pentagon specified in the contract that SAIC was going 
to be in charge of creating a “free and independent local media network” and to 
provide “training of a cadre of independent Iraqi journalists to go with it” (Najjar, 
2009). The Department of Defence plan was revealed only in 2007 after lifting 
the classification on a document, which was called “The white paper on the Iraqi 
media”. The paper shows that in mid-January 2003, during the preparation for 
the invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon recommended the formation of what was 
called a “Rapid Reaction Media Team” (RRMT). The task of this team was to 
serve as “a quick start bridge” between Saddam’s controlled media and a long-
term “free” Iraqi media (Battle, 2007). The paper was prepared by the Special 
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Office - which also specialised in 
psychological warfare - and the Special Plans Office under Undersecretary of 
Defence for Policy, Douglas Feith (Lobe, 2007).  
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The plan suggested employing “hand-picked American, British, and Iraqi media 
experts in order to provide ‘approved US government information’ to the Iraqi 
public” (Battle, 2007). The “hand-picked” Iraqi experts would help other experts 
to “select and train Iraqi broadcasters and publishers to be ‘the face’ of the US 
government and coalition sponsored information effort” (The National Security 
Archive, 2007). This “strategic information campaign” would take between 1 and 
2 years’ transition period (Battle, 2007). The plans for “Entertainment and News 
Magazine programming” ranged from “De-Ba’athification”, to “Saddam bomb 
maker” to “Hollywood”. The US media white paper suggested categorising the 
news according to ethnicity and sectarian factions, for example the new 
newspaper would have sections for “Shia news, Kurd News, Sunni News etc” 
(Battle, 2007). The paper shows that the RRMT focused on US/UK Government 
pre- and post-war efforts to prepare programmes for training US/UK media 
experts with a team of “hand-picked” Iraqi media experts to immediately act after 
the end of the war (Lobe, 2007). 
 
The paper declared that: “The mission will be to inform the Iraqi public about 
USG/coalition intent and operations, to stabilise Iraq (especially preventing the 
trifurcation of Iraq after hostilities) and to provide Iraqis hope for their future. This 
team will deploy from Washington immediately upon cessation of hostility, 
collocate and interface with the designated CENTCOM  commander in 
Baghdad, and begin broadcasting and printing APPROVED USG information to 
the Iraqi public” (The National Security Archive, 2007). The media White Paper, 
asserted that the US government would, within 12 months, build an information 
system that would serve “as a model for free media in the Arab world”. This 
would counter the “hate” messages (Battle, 2007) by other Arab media which the 
paper described as an “equivalent to weapons of mass destruction” (The 
National Security Archive, 2007). At the same time, Pentagon planners 
expressed their hopes that the US government could control information 
distribution in post-invasion Iraq with the help of a new “friendly” Iraqi 
government. The paper did not mention any plans about building independent 
media outlets or freedom of access to information or even the Internet (Battle, 
2007). 
 
Some observers feel confident in saying that the US politicians were following 
                                                 
 CENTCOM stands for US Central Command. 
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US political interests in Iraq, pursuing their own agenda to help the coalition, 
while their plan to build a proper public broadcasting system was a much less 
serious concern to the politicians and the US planners (Al Qazwini, 2004). “The 
US media control was entirely in keeping with the entire strategy of the United 
States in those days,” said Rohan Jayasekera of London-based Index on 
Censorship. But he describes this paper as showing a very simplistic attitude 
towards how Iraqis would react to an independent media: “I think that document 
was fairly typical of the stupid thinking which was going around before and after 
the invasion in April 2003” (Jayasekera, 2011). 
 
The failure of the plan was due to the incapability or the unwillingness of the US 
administration in Iraq to keep the media development plans separate from the 
political interests of the Americans in the country (Al Qazwini, 2004). In 
November 2003 a Washington Post article referred to how the Defence 
Department Office saw SAIC’s operations as “specialising in psychological 
warfare operations, or Psy-Ops”. The article said that some parts of the 
Pentagon know the Iraqi Media Network as “Psy-Ops on steroids” (Rohde, 
2005). 
 
6-3 The Pentagon Launch the Iraqi Media Project, and the Iraqi Media Network 
is born 
In order to build the Iraqi national state media, the US recruited a diverse team of 
exiled Iraqi consultants, to help editorially and to start TV, radio stations and a 
newspaper. This group would be acting as a policy unit, to provide advice on 
media strategy (Al Mljawi, 2009). One of the journalists who joined the team was 
Ahmed Al Rekabi: “There were preparations to shape the media after Saddam, 
this was approximately in the last three months of 2002. I went to the States to 
participate in workshops held by the State department to discuss the future of 
Iraq” (Al Rekabi, 2008). Bob Reilly, an active player in the Iraqi Media Project 
during the 1990s and until 2003, contacted Al Rekabi to discuss the future of 
Iraqi media after Saddam. Both agreed on a European Public Service style such 
as the BBC or the Swedish Media Public Service. Al Rekabi drafted a proposal 
for Reilly, who had asked him to consider the issue as secret (Al Rekabi, 2008).  
 
In mid March 2003 the Americans gathered together the Iraqi Media Project 
team, which consisted of Robert Reilly, Mike Furlong, Shamem Rassam and 
Ahmed Al Rekabi.  They met in an American air base near Washington (Al 
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Rekabi, 2008). Mike Furlong, who had a meeting with Jay Garner, told Al Rekabi 
that the war would start in a few days and the attack would start from the south, 
where their base would be Kuwait (Al Rekabi, 2008). Al Rekabi remembers, “I 
said, how could we manage to have newspaper, TV, and radio among ourselves, 
but Furlong assured me that there was an advert in Detroit where the Iraqi 
community was based, regarding vacancies to join our project,” (Al Rekabi, 
2008). Al Rekabi went to Detroit with other SAIC employees where he 
interviewed many candidates at Hayatt Hotel: “I was desperate, I did not ask for 
experience, I was looking for educated people who could talk properly and write 
in an acceptable way, it took a matter of hours to choose the team” (Al Rekabi, 
2008). 
 
The team, which gathered in Kuwait, came from all over the world - Al Rekabi 
had been recruiting people over the phone (Al Rekabi, 2008). The team moved 
into Iraq after 9 April and three weeks later the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) was 
formed. It was led by Robert Reilly, a former director of the Voice of America, 
and Mike Furlong, a Pentagon contractor who had worked before on 
broadcasting issues in former Yugoslavia (Al Mljawi, 2009). The Iraqi face was 
Ahmed Al Rekabi, who had previously been running a radio station in Sweden. 
Mike Furlong explained to the journalists about the media mission in Iraq: “The 
vision is to provide the Iraqi people with a European broadcasting system model” 
(Daragahi, 2003).  
 
This assurance, in principle, raised hopes of getting an independent free media 
network, however the assurance was delivered by Furlong who had been head 
of the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force in Bosnia from 1995 to 1997 
(Chatterjee, 2010). “Furlong was a former army officer, but he knew nothing 
about media, he was interfering in our coverage of many events” said Hamid Ali 
Al Kifaey a former SAIC contractor (Al Kifaey, 2011). 
 
The media project in Iraq was significant because it was by far the grandest 
effort of the Pentagon to build post-conflict media in the Middle East (Cary, 
2010). The US administration documents show that the Pentagon contracted 
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in February 2003, one 
month before the war, for a sum of USD 82 million. The US government 
allocated another USD 96 million for the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) project. The 
money came from the special operations and low intensity conflict department 
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(Psy-Ops) (Cotts, 2003).  
 
Regular radio broadcasting started on 10 April 2003, while the television aired its 
first new programme on 13 May 2003. The official newspaper, Al Sabah (“The 
Morning”), was the last new media outlet to appear when its first edition was 
published on 17 May 2003 (Kadim, 2007). In the beginning Al Sabah was 
published twice a week, then three times, and finally it was published on a daily 
basis, as this thesis will present later. 
 
The team responsible had started to prepare news and entertainment materials 
two months prior to publication, and they planned for several editions of the new 
newspaper (Cary, 2010). Several hundred local journalists joined the IMN, which 
was given access to the old government premises, facilities and equipment (Al 
Mljawi, 2009). Many members of the former regime media network were fired, 
but some returned, because there was a need for their services (Sharp, 2003).  
“I started recruiting most of the old technicians, but not reporters or presenters,” 
said Ahmed Al Rekabi (Al Rekabi, 2008). The network started using the stations 
and sites which had belonged to the Ministry of Information, as Iraqi specialists 
and technicians were better acquainted with these studios than were experts 
from outside. SAIC chose one of the studios at the Convention Centre in 
Baghdad to be the main television production studios and Al Salehiya 
broadcasting station was chosen for local transmitting, while places outside of 
Baghdad were fixed and kept running by the effort of the local staff in each 
province (Al Sudani, 2008). 
 
Al Sabah was printed on a private press, and the editorial team were housed in 
one of the old historical houses in Baghdad. A few weeks later, Al Sabah started 
using press house number 3, the same one that had been used by Babil - Uday 
Hussein’s newspaper.  
 
SAIC provided equipment through US funding in the beginning, but according to 
SAIC’s contract, the equipment would later become the property of the new Iraqi 
government. The US officials claimed that they wanted to create a network that 
was similar to other public information agencies, who receive funding through 
governments, but have their own independence (Al Musawi, 2008). After few 
weeks, the American civilian governor Paul Bremer, the chief of the CPA issued 
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order number 6, which stated that the Iraqi Media Network would replace the 
former Iraqi Information Ministry that was dissolved in May 2003 (Al Mljawi, 
2009). 
 
Although the US tried to present the Iraqi Media Project as an attempt to build a 
truly independent media network, many key facts made observers wonder about 
the feasibility of this project. For example, the division that provided the grant, 
which was supporting the Iraqi Media Project, was responsible for psychological 
warfare operations (Psy-Ops) in the US Defence Department. The company 
which handled the contract, SAIC, was itself a major Defence Department and 
CIA contractor (Chatterjee, 2004). Finally the person who was placed in charge 
of IMN was Robert Reilly, a former propagandist in the White House for the 
Nicaraguan contras during the 1980s (Barker, 2008). SAIC appeared much less 
interested in presenting itself as a company building an “independent” media 
network and the company press officers were “notorious for not providing 
information” (Barker, 2008). SAIC did not have any former experience in the 
media sector, but it had good connections with the Pentagon (Goodman, and 
Goodman, 2008).  
 
SAIC had a lot of experience in setting up radio and television transmitters, but 
one of the essential parts of the SAIC contract was to provide training for 
journalists, something which the corporation had little experience of (Al Mljawi, 
2009). Such lack of experience caused serious problems between the 
administration of SAIC and it contractors. In June 2003 the IMN's programme 
manager and SAIC contractor, Mike Furlong, and the government liaison, Robert 
Reilly, left because their initial contracts expired, but there were rumours they 
were fired. John Sandrock, who had no previous media experience, became the 
head of IMN (Gourevitch, 2003). There were many differences between what 
SAIC reported and what was actually being built. According to four of the 
Pentagon-contracted investigation officials, the infrastructure which SAIC was 
paid to build did not exist; For example only 11 containers out of 16 full of 
equipment for the IMN were unloaded while the officials in Baghdad thought the 
job had been completed. Large quantities of gear, cables and transmission 
equipment went missing (Auster, 2004). 
 
The process of building the network was unsuccessful due to the political, 
technical, and security difficulties. Many problems were caused because of the 
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unsettled situation within the CPA itself. The media project in Iraq lacked a 
transparent strategic plan that could be implemented to create a proper 
independent national Iraqi media network (Al Qazwini, 2004). 
 
6-4 Criticisms of the IMN 
The plan for the media project in Iraq was designed to create an official media 
network – The Iraqi Media Network - which would not receive any private 
funding. The network was considered to be within the public domain, i.e. state 
ownership. In theory, the network had its own full independence, so it did not 
have to follow the guidance of the Head of State by any means. The network had 
the right to develop its own independent plans, which may or may not 
correspond with the programmes of the government. The Iraqi Media Network 
was not bound to present the policies, ideas and position of the government, but 
it would follow the national interests of the country – and serve the people 
regardless of who is leading the government and who manages its affairs. 
However, the American authority represented by the CPA confused the IMN's 
role in Iraq because it could not be the occupiers' mouthpiece at the same time 
as following a PBS-style network. Furlong, the former programme manager for 
the Iraqi Media Network said, “Both roles can't be done by the same animal” 
(Gourevitch, 2003).  
 
Stephen Claypole (2003), one of the advisors of ORHA, described how in the 
early days IMN coverage attempted to give the impression that it was 
broadcasting the opinions of ordinary Iraqi citizens, but the official American 
contractors carefully checked these opinions. “We have got to have “vox pops” 
became the mantra, so that the Iraqi people can see themselves talking in an 
atmosphere of liberty” said Stephen Claypole, a veteran journalist who joined 
Iraq’s TV project. “When the vox pops came back to the temporary studios with 
anti-American opinions, they were shelved for a day or two to be intercut with 
official requests,” Stephen added (Claypole, 2003). Dr Eiman Abdulrahman who 
worked for a Lebanese TV company called LBC [Lebanon Broadcasting 
Corporation], which was supervising the IMN, said, “I prepared a programme 
about Abu Ghraib prison, but they did not air it. Also we got a former 
Guantanamo detainee and they did not allow that programme either” 
(Abdulrahman, 2010). The “independence” of IMN and their propensity to be 
influenced was evident when a representative of the political programmes at 
LBC suggested having an American “guest” on a panel show that was hosted by 
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Al Iraqia, and Dr Eiman Abdulrahman followed this “suggestion” (Abdulrahman, 
2010). 
 
One of the former contractors of SAIC who helped in building the IMN, Don 
North, criticised the whole media project in his speech to a special committee in 
the American Congress. He said that the IMN staff were ordered to cover the 
daily activities of the CPA news conferences, interviews, etc while giving little 
time, personnel or equipment to cover real news stories from the street (North, 
2005). North mentioned that the US authorities told him, “we were running a 
public diplomacy operation” for the occupation government (Margasak, 2005). 
Paul Bremer referred, in his book “My year in Iraq”, to the concerns of the US 
administration regarding the coverage of the situation in Iraq. He recalled an 
occasion when Donald Rumsfeld exploded after reading a newspaper headline 
of 11 April 2003, referring to the violence and chaos. Rumsfeld said that Iraqis 
deserved better coverage, as they were being “liberated” from a brutal dictator 
(Bremer, 2006). 
 
American officials at the CPA were attempting to use the IMN and to manage 
news content aimed at Iraqis and Americans to explain the American policies to 
Iraqis, Americans and to the world - but this would make the IMN simply another 
“Voice of America”. One of the senior CPA public relation officers, Dan Senor, 
had a long-time involvement with the IMN (McCaul, 2003). He was also 
intervening in the work of the reporters as the Iraqi Media Network’s TV director. 
Ahmed Al Rekabi said of Senor: “Once we sent a reporter to do an interview with 
Paul Bremer while Dan Senor was present. Dan Senor did not like the reporter’s 
questions so he did another version of the interview and asked us to broadcast 
it, but we refused” (Al Rekabi, 2008). But Senor insisted that IMN was providing 
“factual and authoritative information”. “IMN was not supposed to be the 
dominant media in Iraq, but one of many voices. We never viewed our goals as 
being built around a propaganda war,” Senor said (Williams, 2003). However, 
Dan Senor was also making a “great” effort to convince different media outlets to 
report the “good news story” (Bremer, 2006). 
 
Another intervention came from the US ambassador to Morocco, Margaret 
Tutwiler, who went to Baghdad to help with the diplomacy effort of the US 
                                                  Voice of America is an official American radio representing the United States government. 
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occupation. She intervened with strong judgments about programmes. She 
insisted that the wife of the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Hero Al 
Talabani, should check programmes in advance before they were broadcast by 
the IMN.  The reason she gave for this intervention was that Hero had a “good 
sense of Iraqi’s tastes” (Slevin, 2003). Media experts like Don North agreed that 
in the time of conflict it was difficult for the US Department of Defence and the 
CPA to support independent reporting and publishing (Cary, 2010). So the IMN 
became a propaganda tool of the Coalition Provisional Authority (North, 2005). 
“The irony was that the Americans wanted to have independent media, but at the 
same time they wanted to control the IMN,” said Simon Haselock, head of the 
media advisory team for the CPA (Haselock, 2011).  
 
As was mentioned above, the Iraqi Media Network was considered to be one of 
the most expensive projects, but it lacked operating capital, which forced the 
IMN to run on a shoestring, which in turn was reflected by a poor quality 
presentation. According to Don North, senior advisor for IMN, “There were no 
funds for basic equipment such as camera batteries, tripods or editing 
equipment” (North, 2005). 
 
The first editor of Al Sabah newspaper, Ismael Zayeer, accused SAIC of not 
being efficient: “They were very bureaucratic; it took them ages to supply only 50 
PCs. They promised us many things, but we got nothing” (Zayeer, 2011). Ahmed 
Al Rekabi, The IMN television director blamed SAIC for not being willing to 
spend anything and being a corrupt company: “They were sending bills to the 
Pentagon for transmission towers which were there before Saddam’s time,” (Al 
Rekabi, 2008). This issue was emphasised by Ismael Zayeer: “We asked them 
for electricity generators, but they were stealing them from other provinces or 
cities, for example we read on the label in Arabic that they belonged to Kut City 
Council” (Zayeer, 2011). 
 
Although the Iraqi Media Network in theory was a national service, neutral and 
not biased politically nor affiliated with any sector or ethnic group, the IMN was 
accused of being sectarian following the government’s Shi’a political party after 
they won the 2005 elections (Gambill, 2009). 
 
6-5 SAIC: Essential Pentagon Contractor to Build the Iraqi National Media 
Network 
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Science Application International Corporation (SAIC) was one of the Pentagon’s 
major contractors in information and communication control. On 5 March 2003 a 
contract for USD 33 million was given to SAIC - on a non-competitive bid basis - 
to help the Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC), a group of 
Iraqi exiles put together by Paul Wolfowitz, (Battle, 2007) to create a secret 
shadow government, a predecessor to the Iraqi Governing Council (Barker, 
2008).  Six days later, on the 11 March 2003, SAIC was given another USD 15 
million sole-source contract to rebuild the “Iraqi Free Media Project”. The 
company had experience in working with US Special Forces, but it did not have 
any media experience. The contract was given under the purview of 
Undersecretary of Defence Douglas Feith (Battle, 2007). The occupying forces 
awarded SAIC eight contracts in total, seven of which were on sole-source basis 
(Calbreath, 2004). The US Department of Defence justified the no-bid contract to 
SAIC by saying: “We need their immediate services” (Cary, 2010). Furthermore, 
the Pentagon described SAIC as a “fully qualified contractor who has the 
unqualified support and confidence of the Pentagon leadership and who was 
prepared to begin work and deploy as soon as possible” (Calbreath, 2004). 
Rohan Jayasekera of London-based “Index on Censorship” criticised the 
Pentagon contract saying, “SAIC didn't have any suitable qualifications to run a 
media network. The whole thing was so incredibly badly planned by them that 
no-one could make sense of what they were doing” (Dauenhauer and Lobe, 
2003). Jayasekera recalled how SAIC brought equipment that was incompatible 
with local systems in Iraq. He accused the company of not having plans for TV 
programming (Dauenhauer and Lobe, 2003). Ahmed Al Rekabi, who worked with 
SAIC and the former Iraqi Media Network television director said, “This was the 
biggest disaster. SAIC had not done a media project before, that was why they 
chose someone like Mike Furlong who in theory had previous experience in 
installing TV when he was in Kosovo and Bosnia, but more importantly this guy 
had worked with psychological war operations” Ahmed (Al Rekabi, 2008). The 
US Department of Defence kept the project limping on because of the short-term 
contracts with SAIC, but the Pentagon was actively looking for an alternative 
(Dauenhauer, and Lobe, 2003). 
 
These contracts raised many questions about the practices and procedures 
which had been followed in choosing or handing these lucrative contracts to 
SAIC that were not subject to competitive bidding (Calbreath, 2004), especially 
the relations between SAIC staff and the Pentagon. The contracts - which were 
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given to SAIC - were issued by the US Undersecretary of Defence for Policy, 
Douglas Feith, while his principal deputy, Christopher Ryan Henry, was the head 
of SAIC strategic development. Admiral William Owens who was a member of 
the Defence Policy Board, advising Donald Rumsfeld, later became SAIC's vice 
chairman. Another retired general, Wayne Downing, worked for SAIC on 
domestic and international business development. But he was also a board 
member of “The Committee for the Liberation of Iraq” (Battle, 2007). “The San 
Diego Union-Tribune” said that after SAIC employed Downing, he “became a 
vocal advocate for overthrowing Saddam Hussein, becoming a part-time lobbyist 
and military planner for Iraqi dissident Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress” 
(Calbreath, 2004). One of the people who worked for SAIC was David Kay, a 
former weapons inspector in Iraq who had confronted the Iraqi government 
during the inspection processes under Saddam’s regime (Witte, 2005). He had 
problems also with Hans Blix over whether Iraq was producing weapons of mass 
destruction (Kull, 2004). Kay, who was SAIC vice president of counterterrorism 
initiatives, told the American Congress that Saddam was a few months away 
from making nuclear missiles (Calbreath, 2004). 
 
On 27 March 2003, in the middle of the bombing of Iraq, SAIC was awarded a 
further contract in excess of USD 800,000 for an “Advisor for Democracy and 
Governance Group”. One of the members was Shaha Ali Riza  (Battle, 2007). A 
member of the Defence Department contracting team claimed that the SAIC had 
received an order to employ Riza - on 21 March 2003 someone from the Office 
for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) sent an email asking 
SAIC to employ four names as “Subject Matter Experts” to advise about voter 
education, business development, politics, women, and government reform, and 
one of the names was Shaha Ali Riza (Battle, 2007). “It would have been easy to 
hire ex-BBC, or ex-CNN personnel but SAIC decided to hire people like Mike 
Furlong who came from a military psychological warfare operation,” said Simon 
Haselock the head of the CPA media advisory team (Haselock, 2011). Mr 
Haselock added, “Many of the people who were involved did not know much 
about how to move from a totalitarian media system to a free media, for example 
Robert Reilly was a broadcaster not a media expert” (Haselock, 2011).  
 
                                                 
 One of Iraq’s invasion planners, Paul Wolfowitz, was romantically involved with Shaha Ali Riza, who worked for 
SAIC from March to May, 2003. Mr Wolfowitz arranged for Riza to be granted several posts and large raises in 
salary to more than USD 193,000 it was revealed in April 2007. 
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Although SAIC was generous with its international staff this was not the case 
with the local ones: “SAIC officials said to me, when I was complaining about the 
salary of our employees, the USD 60 per month salary is enough, SAIC said 
they were paying the salary of what the employees in the Iraqi government 
would get. This was unrealistic,” said Ismael Zayeer the former editor of Al 
Sabah (Zayeer, 2011). 
 
6-6 Information Control 
One potential reason for the SAIC’s lack of success in Iraq was their company 
focus on  information control: the SAIC website offers a programme for 
“Information Dominance/Command and Control”, which includes “Battlefield 
Control”, and ending with “Information Warfare/Information Operations” 
(Chatterjee, 2004). SAIC’s contract with the IMN was ended in December 2003 
amid complaints about the company’s performance and accusations that they 
had made what was theoretically a project for a “Public Broadcasting Service” 
into a propaganda tool for the occupying forces (Calbreath, 2004).  
 
This kind of propaganda was thought essential by the Americans, who used 
many other companies to confront the anti-American messages and to win the 
“hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people. The next chapter investigates the efforts 
of the US army and other US institutions to wage an information war against the 
“rumours” spread by the insurgents in Iraq.  
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Chapter 7: 
American Propaganda: Means and Methods after the War 2003-2006  
 
7-1 Introduction  
The US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told the Washington Times in 
October 2003: “We are in a war of ideas, as well as a global war on terror.”  Mr 
Rumsfeld, who was the mastermind of outsourcing, affirmed that such ideas 
need the right channels: “The ideas are important, and they need to be 
marshalled, and they need to be communicated in ways that are persuasive to 
the listeners,” he added. (“The Washington Times”, 2003) 
The United States concentrated on “publicity”, as it is perceived by them, as an 
essential part of psychological warfare and military action, and a means to help 
governments or armies to achieve their strategic goals. The US government 
accountability office reported that there were a total of 343 media contracts for 
USD 1.62 billion for their whole programme between 2003-2005. The report said 
that 40% were for advertising contractors and 38% with media organisations, 
while 16% went to public relations companies (The US Government 
Accountability Office, 2006). However, much of these efforts have not been 
productive and cannot even be measured despite the huge budgets allocated for 
such media operations, because they have tended to be conducted in secrecy. 
For this reason, the effectiveness of many projects is still a question that no-one 
can answer. Many media operations launched by private contractors hired by the 
DoD ended as big embarrassments to the US government (Cary, 2010). 
 
This chapter will explore how the Americans tried to influence the Iraqi press, the 
US psychological operation work and how such practices undermined the effort 
to build free media in Iraq.  
 
7-2 The US Army and the Iraqi Press 
The USD 200 million fund, provided by the Pentagon to rebuild Iraq’s national 
media, could be considered a classic “media development”. But in reality it was 
meant to influence Iraqi public opinion to improve the security environment or to 
counter anti-American messages (Cary, 2010). But this was not enough; in 
addition, the US military divisions attempted to improve their image through the 
launching of newspapers in different names.  All of these publications attempted 
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to promote the activities of the US military, to give a good impression of the US 
soldiers to Iraqis, and to establish good relationships between the American 
troops and locals. For example, on frequent occasions these publications 
showed images of American soldiers kissing children or helping elderly men or 
women (Kadim, 2007). The military brigades and divisions created their own 
means of communication by issuing “newspapers” in Arabic and English. Some 
of them were printed in colour, and in different size formats - some large, while 
others were in tabloid size.  
 
These publications did not cover the news or local issues, but concentrated on 
the US forces’ efforts to build or establish local service projects for Iraqis in the 
areas the relevant division was occupying. The newspapers showed the 
engineering efforts of these forces and their attempts to fix local water stations or 
to clean the area. Often the publications contained messages to counter the 
attacks against the American troops. These publications could be considered as 
propaganda leaflets, as the images and the topics focused on the US military 
power, exaggerating their force’s capabilities. These publications were usually 
given to locals for free (Kadim, 2007). 
 
The US army formed the Combined Press Information Centre (CPIC) in 2003. 
This centre’s responsibilities included the coverage of US forces’ and 
multinational forces’ activities and to transmit news and information about such 
actions to the public through local, Arab and international media outlets (Kadim, 
2007). 
 
 
7-3 Psychological Operations Play Major Role in Iraqi Press After the 2003 
Invasion 
7-3-1 Army Officers Offered Help to Journalists  
The US government which formed the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance, ORHA, created its provisional offices in all of Iraq’s provinces, except 
the northern region of Kurdistan. When the CPA succeeded ORHA, the regional 
offices of ORHA changed its name to CPA in the province it settled in. Many of 
these regional CPA offices launched or helped journalists to launch newspapers. 
These offices provided funding or offered help to different publications, 
newspapers or magazines. It was an attempt to keep the mass focusing on anti-
insurgent, democracy, and civil and human rights. Mohammed Al Shamari of Al 
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Sheraa (“The Canvas”) newspaper recalls a visit by two US army officers to his 
publication offering him any kind of support to promote his publication. Al Shamari 
recounts, “Our correspondent in Babil province was approached by the Americans 
and they offered their support. In November 2003, the commander of Iraq’s Heart 
base of Babil province visited us at the newspaper and he offered to furnish our 
office, but we refused. I told them: ‘We don't want financial support or equipment 
or any other kind of help, but if you have any news tips, scoops or exclusive 
access to us, please give them to us’” (Al Shamari, 2011). 
 
In a paper entitled “The Nature of the Iraqi Media Under the American 
Occupation”, Fadhil Al Badrany (2008) refers to an attempt by the American forces 
in Faluja to persuade him to launch a newspaper. “An American colonel called 
Alan Nicolson offered to help me in launching a newspaper. He assured me that I 
would be free to write what I want or to criticise the American troops or the US 
policies in Iraq, but the newspaper should be publishing specific reports which the 
Americans would ask the newspaper to cover or to publish” (Al Badrany, 2008, 
p.128). Dr Hashim Hassan, an experienced editor, explains the American attempts 
to influence these publications: “The Americans did not care much about a certain 
level of criticism because they wanted to keep the situation within the areas of 
discussion instead of using arms” (Hassan, 2010). Many professional journalists 
refused to meet the Americans because of specific attitudes towards the 
occupation according to Dr Hassan, whilst others accepted: “There were many 
contracts which were given to local journalists to start a newspaper” (Hassan, 
2010). Most of the newly launched newspapers did not direct much criticism 
towards the Americans. Some praised them highly, such as Al Ahead Al Gadied 
newspaper which said in its main headline: “Have a nice day Mr Bosh”  (“Al 
Ahaed Al Gadied”, 2003). Some published pictures of American soldiers talking to 
Iraqi children in a friendly way (Al Hilal, 2003).  
 
Although the US authorities in Iraq, either the CPA or ORHA, were keen not 
appear to have been spoon-feeding the new “independent” newspapers, many 
newspapers published stories in their favour. Al Nass (“The People”) newspaper, 
headed by Dr Saadi Al Khalidi, published a special greeting in English on the first 
page, which read: “Thanks to the office of civilian and military for assistance this 
daily, on the occasion of the first issue, has the honour to inform the office of 
                                                 
 The newspaper was referring to the American president George W. Bush, but there was a typing mistake. 
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civilian and military for assistance in Baghdad in general and to Major Jacka Nales 
and Rena Brownridge in particular its great attitude for good manners and this 
kind of treatment which they used to do it with anybody else especially with the 
editor. Thanks to ORHA this newspaper appreciates (ORHA) in general and 
justice ministry in chief who has received while asking”  (“Al Nass”, 2003). The 
newspaper gave a complete third page to an American judge, Mr Campbell, who 
was the representative of the occupation authority for the establishment of the 
Iraqi judicial system. On the sixth page the newspaper repeated the same 
greeting as on the first page but with more specification, saying “Thanks to the 
office of civilian and military for assistance this daily, on the occasion of the first 
issue, has the honour to inform the office of civilian and military for assistance in 
Baghdad in general and to Major Jacka Nales and Rena Brownridge in particular 
its great attitude for good manners and this kind of treatment which they used to 
do it with anybody else especially with the editor. Thanks to ORHA: this 
newspaper appreciates (ORHA) in general for all moral help and encouraging 
have been delivered to starting its work for the purpose at first issuing” (“Al Nass”, 
2003).  
 
7-3-1-1 Wassit’s Publication 
This research project looked at the experience of the editor of Wassit Al Aan 
(“Wassit Now”) to present an example of newspapers being specifically sponsored 
by the CPA after 2003.  In an interview the editor, Jamal Fayadh Al Jumaili, 
explained the development of Wassit Al Aan newspaper and the support it had 
received from the CPA regional office of Wassit province.  “In July 2003, the 
coalition forces wanted to publish a newspaper which was a basic A4 size. The 
Americans asked me to launch the “newspaper”, which was called Awqat Wassit 
(Wassit Times), on a weekly basis, it was nearly 2,000 copies per week, then we 
moved to three days a week. It was distributed for free by the coalition forces and 
it lasted for three months,” Jamal Fayadh Al Jumaili said (Al Jumaili, 2011). 
 
The newspaper covered local news and the activities of the coalition forces in 
Wassit province, but it was modest. “We decided to move to a proper newspaper 
and we called it Dhifaf Wasit (“Wassit Boundaries”) where we received more 
support from the coalition forces, but it was published on weekly basis,” Jamal 
Fayadh Al Jumaili said (Al Jumaili, 2011). The editorial policy of the newspaper 
                                                 
 This is the exact text which was published in the newspaper which was poor in the language and full of 
typing mistakes. 
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raised problems amongst the staff: Al Jumaili continues: “I told the American 
coordinator about these troubles. He advised me to launch another newspaper 
promising to move the financial support they were providing to my newspaper, 
and he said let them find other financial backers” (Al Jumaili, 2011). 
 
The editor decided to drop the word Wassit from the old title and call his new 
publication Al Dhifaf (“The Boundaries”), which was another weekly publication. 
His former colleagues complained about re-allocating the funds provided by the 
CPA regional office. Al Dhifaf did not last long and was replaced by yet another 
title, as Al Jumaili decided to close it and to launch a new political publication 
called Wasit Al Aan (“Wassit Now”) on the 22 May 2004 (“Wassit Al Aan”, 2004). 
Jamal Fayadh Al Jumaili explained, “Wassit Al Aan issued twice weekly with a 
circulation of 2,000 copies” (Al Jumaili, 2011). The newspaper was not sold 
outside the province it covered, and it was keen on covering the activities of the 
local government and the coalition forces (“Wassit Al Aan”, 2005). “We covered 
the provisional council meetings and many activities like the installation of a water 
station by the coalition forces,” Al Jumaili confirmed (Al Jumaili, 2011). 
 
Al Jumaili referred to the coordination between his newspaper and the coalition 
forces on the coverage of coalition activities: “The coalition forces would inform us 
about any activity they wanted us to cover in advance, then either I would go or I 
would send one of the reporters” (Al Jumaili, 2011). The editor of Wassit Al Aan 
confirmed that his newspaper did not publish any article against the coalition 
forces, but they published pieces that criticised the provincial council of Wassit. 
Wassit Al Aan was printed in Baghdad, but the local reporters would write the 
material: “The newspaper material would be put onto a DVD then given to the 
Hamid Al Gailani office who would design the newspaper and print it in one of the 
presses for nearly USD 700 for each edition,” said Jamal Fayadh Al Jumaili (Al 
Jumaili, 2011). 
 
The revenue resources of the newspaper were limited and came mainly from the 
Americans. “We could not compete with the big newspapers of the political 
parties; sales represented 5% of our resources and adverts were difficult to get, so 
the rest of our financial support was coming from the Americans,” said Jamal 
Fayadh Al Jumaili (Al Jumaili, 2011). But the Americans stopped the financial 
support in August 2005: “I stopped the newspaper because I could not carry on 
publishing it after publishing 84 editions since it was launched in June 2004” (Al 
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Jumaili, 2011). The coalition forces directly supported three newspapers launched 
by Jamal Fayadh Al Jumaili: “In the beginning it was cash, but later the American 
coordinator put the money in a bank account. I was not able to make any 
payments unless the American coordinator would add his signature to mine on 
any cheque” (Al Jumaili, 2011). The editor of Wassit Al Aan presented a document 
that showed the amount of USD 29,500 being awarded to Wassit newspaper on 
19 June 2004, and the agreement between the CPA and Mr Fayadh Al Jumaili 
was active until 30 December 2004. Mr Jamal Fayadh Al Jumaili referred to 
another kind of support, which he received from the Americans: “I was provided 
with a car to use for the newspaper business and computers” (Al Jumaili, 2011). 
 
7-3-1-2 Baghdad Press Club  
In mid 2004, a few Iraqi journalists who supported the US military formed The 
Baghdad Press Club. Although the US army was cautious about paying money to 
reporters, it was revealed that many Iraqi journalists and members of Baghdad 
Press Club received financial “rewards”, for publishing material in local 
newspapers. Small amounts of money would be paid for each news piece 
published in a newspaper, or broadcast via radio or TV (Kadim, 2007). One of the 
club’s founders, Uday Lutfi, explained how he and his journalist colleagues started 
getting involved in the club: “The Americans decided to create a group for 
journalists to be contacted through the CPIC and I was nominated by the 
Americans, in particular General Martin Dempsey , to coordinate the process so I 
became the media consultant for the Baghdad area” (Lutfi, 2011). 
 
Ahmed Al Zubaidi, a co-founder of the club, confirmed Lutfi’s story saying that the 
club included a group of journalists who had established a friendship amongst 
themselves and with the American officers during meetings at various conferences 
held by the CPA and the US army spokesman, Mark Kimmitt. Some documents 
mentioned that the club was the idea of, or was supervised by, National Guard 
officer and civilian attorney, Major John Fuhrman, who wanted the members to be 
hand picked Iraqi reporters, but Al Zubaidi said this was not the case: “It was our 
idea, and we decided to call it Baghdad Press Club in a meeting with the US army 
officers in one of the palaces near Baghdad airport. I was there, as was Uday 
Lutfi, Abbas Al Salehi and Najem Al Rubayaee. From the American side there was 
General Hurtling who was the head of the first mechanic division which was in 
                                                 
 Martin Dempsey is the current chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, but before that he served in Iraq.  
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charge of Baghdad” (Al Zubaidi, 2011). The American officers were keen to send 
a specific message: “They wanted to use us to send positive signals. We were 
asked to report specific stories such as the help which the American troops 
provide to the locals or to the Iraqi army, etc” explains Ahmed Al Zubaidi (Al 
Zubaidi, 2011). According to Ahmed Al Zubaidi, the members chose Uday Lutfi to 
be the head of the club, and Uday suggested later to charge the US army money 
for the stories the club members were covering for them. But Uday Lutfi said this 
was not the case: “I asked the American generals to give the journalists who were 
members of the Baghdad Club rewards or gifts like cameras etc and sometimes 
money” (Lutfi, 2011). 
 
Members started organising their work so that there was a mission for each 
journalist to carry out, or a story to cover. The US army started making payments 
and reimbursing expenses or equipment to those they considered “pro-
democracy” journalists. “The journalist would bring the story after it had been 
published and would receive the money from Uday Lutfi who would get the agreed 
amount from the Americans,” Ahmed Al Zubaidi said (Al Zubaidi, 2011). The US 
army officers would pay Lutfi after seeing the piece in a newspaper, on TV, or 
being reported by a radio station (Kadim, 2007). Journalists who were members of 
the Baghdad Press Club said that they were given money, regardless of the 
content of the news they were reporting. However, more often these pieces dealt 
uncritically with the activities of US forces. “We were paid USD 50 for each news 
piece whether the stories were positive or negative,” Ahmed said (Al Zubaidi, 
2011). 
 
The activities of the Baghdad Press Club included covering other US military 
divisions who had asked the members to report their activities. The reporters 
would be granted identification cards as workers for these divisions, such as the 
101st Airborne. The club reporters would be invited to graduation ceremonies or 
other events, which would be covered by the media outlets they were working for: 
“Baghdad Club members would receive emails about media activities or 
conferences to be covered for your news outlet, our role was passing info to the 
club’s members,” said Uday Lutfi (Lutfi, 2011). The support provided was not only 
financial, but also included training or workshops. “The Americans were ready for 
anything, whatever we were asking for, in order to keep us happy to keep passing 
their message. I asked them to get Dan Rather to train us, and he came and gave 
us some training,” said Ahmed Al Zubaidi (Al Zubaidi, 2011). Some reporters tried 
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to conceal the nature of the pieces they were writing, whilst others were more 
brazen: “In my newspaper I was making the piece in a way which didn’t look like a 
propaganda piece, while other newspapers would make it pro-American in order 
to get financial support or to get adverts from the Americans,” Ahmed Al Zubaidi 
said (Al Zubaidi, 2011).  
 
On the American side Major Fuhrman was screening the club’s membership, and 
also prepared the day-to-day activities for the club’s members  - and managed to 
allocate the required funding for such activities. Major Fuhrman’s background was 
in the US army's “Information Operations” in the Baghdad metropolitan area 
(Source Watch, 2011). Fuhrman tried to influence these “Information Operations” 
with data collected by Iraqi focus groups formed or supervised by him. He wanted 
to gain insight into Iraqi opinions and the rumours circulating among the local 
populace, which were shaping Iraqi public perceptions in the Baghdad area. 
“Fuhrman was in charge of the Public Affairs Office of the US army, he was 
sending me the news about the activities which needed to be or could be covered, 
sometimes the generals contacted Major Fuhrman and he contacted us. He was 
friendly to everyone and he made a lot of friendships, he never asked for 
something in return,” said Uday Lutfi (Lutfi, 2011). 
 
The club included members from different Iraqi media outlets, but mostly of the 
“pro-democracy” print press. A military spokesperson who was commenting on 
news about the club said that, “members are neither required nor asked to write 
favourably” about the United States (Source Watch, 2011). The Baghdad Press 
Club did not continue for long, as the US media raised the issue of US army 
payments, but the head of the club said it was ended because he decided to leave 
Iraq: “I terminated the Club in September 2005, at that time the number of 
journalists was 168, representing different outlets,” said Uday Lutfi (Lutfi, 2011). 
 
7-3-2 The US Bribes Scandal  
One of the more prominent scandals concerning the Iraqi press involved the 
bribes that were paid to some Iraqi newspapers to publish specific stories, mostly 
translated from English to Arabic and designed to be planted in local Iraqi 
publications. The Los Angeles Times revealed on the 30 November 2005 that the 
US military had provided secret financial rewards to local Iraqi newspapers to 
publish articles written by US military personnel. The company that was assisting 
the army in this was a US public relations company called the Lincoln Group (Al 
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Dahan 2006). The Lincoln Group was one of the leading contractors in Iraq 
working in public relations and psychological operations. The group had four 
offices in Baghdad and Basra due to a five-year contract with the Pentagon for 
close to USD 100 million. According to the New York Times, the company was in 
charge of producing recorded video clips or written articles to be published within 
the Iraqi media by any means (Al Dahan 2006). These stories were denouncing 
insurgency and praising the efforts being made by the US to rebuild Iraq. The 
group started distributing articles among different Iraqi newspapers to be 
published as unbiased news accounts written or reported by independent 
freelance journalists (Middle-East Online, 2005). 
 
In a clear practice of “black” propaganda – that hid the true source of the 
information - the Lincoln Group was used to mask the connection between the 
propaganda articles and the US military. The Lincoln Group used Iraqi staff to 
claim that they were freelance reporters interested in publishing their stories 
(Mazzetti, and Daragahi, 2005). Their work was supervised by the “Information 
Operations Task Force” in Baghdad, which was part of the multinational corps 
headquarters under Lieutenant General John Vines, according to the Los Angeles 
Times (Mazzetti, and Daragahi, 2005). The company was responsible for nearly 
1,000 news articles published in 12 to 15 Iraqi newspapers. The cost would be 
between USD 40 to USD 2,000 depending on which newspaper published the 
story and its reputation (Isakhan, 2009). The Los Angeles Times based its report 
on interviews with American military officials who spoke on the condition of 
anonymity, and with Iraqi journalists, but documents were also obtained. The 
report also indicated that the Iraqi newspapers, which published the articles, did 
not reveal their official connections with the US army. Although some newspaper 
editors considered those articles to be “advertorial”, others denied knowledge of 
the source of the articles. The Government Accountability Office of the US 
Congress considered those efforts as a form of secret publicity (Al Dahan, 2006).  
The US army in Baghdad defended such practices saying it aimed to confront the 
lies spread by Al Qaeda (Al Dahan, 2006).  
 
7-3-2-1 How the Lincoln Group led the Propaganda Campaign for the US Army 
The Lincoln Group, which operated in Iraq as Iraqex, was awarded a USD 6 
million in September 2004. Although the company had “no previous background in 
public relations or media”, according to the contract it promised to lead “an 
aggressive advertising and PR campaign” (Battle, 2007). The company’s owners, 
 140 
Christian Bailey and ex-Marine Paige Craig, grabbed the opportunity to work for 
US government projects in Iraq. However, whilst their company offered public 
relations services, none of them had a public relations or journalism background 
(Cary, 2010). In regard to the USD 6 million contract, Iraqex had formed a 
partnership with the Rendon Group, which had led public relations activities on 
behalf of Republican Party causes (Battle, 2007). The partnership between 
Rendon and Iraqex ended when Rendon left. According to a Rendon spokesman, 
his company left because it did not agree with Iraqex on the subject of planting 
stories in the local Iraqi press. Iraqex changed its name to The Lincoln Group, 
which together with SAIC later won a five-year contract for close to USD 100 
million each to do psychological operations work for the United States Special 
Command of the army (Cary, 2010).  
 
One of the former interns at the Lincoln Group, William Marx, described how they 
operated in Iraq. Marx managed to go to Baghdad after applying for an internship 
from the Lincoln Group to gain some journalism experience, but he discovered 
that his job was to help in the propaganda effort of the US army: “An army team 
inside the Al Faw palace, another of Saddam's former residences, would send me 
news articles they had cobbled together from wire stories and their own reports 
from the field. It was my job to select the ones that seemed most like Iraqis had 
written them. I was then to pass these articles along to our Iraqi employees, who 
would translate the pieces into Arabic and place them in local newspapers” (Marx, 
2006). In many cases these stories would be written by US soldiers who belonged 
to the Psy-Ops division (Isakhan, 2009). Marx recalls some of these stories, which 
he read to approve for publication in Iraqi newspapers: “Unlike the terrorists, who 
offer nothing but pain and fear, the ISF bring the promise of a better Iraq. No 
foreign Al Qaeda mercenary would ever consider bringing gifts to Iraqi children. 
The Iraqi army, however, fights for a noble cause… together with the Iraqi people, 
they will bring peace and prosperity to the nation” (Marx, 2006). 
 
The US military writers at the Al Faw palace added an even more positive spin on 
Iraq’s prospects according to Marx. He referred to one of the articles, which ended 
up almost as a public service announcement: “Continue to report suspicious 
activities and make Iraq safe again” (Marx, 2006). The stories that Marx chose 
also needed to be approved by the army in Camp Victoria. Then the Iraqi staff 
would make a deal with a newspaper to publish these articles for a certain amount 
of money, telling them that it came from a wealthy businessman who was looking 
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for publicity (Isakhan, 2009). Marx mentioned that after the articles were 
published, the local staff of the Lincoln Group or their subcontractor would send 
them a scanned copy as proof of publishing the story (Marx, 2006). But evidence 
of these articles also needed to be supplied to the US army officers in charge of 
the operation. “I forwarded the scanned articles to the two majors in charge, Scott 
Rosen and John Muirhead, and received emails thanking me for my work” (Marx, 
2006).  
 
Some pro-American newspapers like Al Mutamar (“The Congress”), which 
represented Ahmed Al Chalabi’s party did not object to publishing these articles 
(Isakhan, 2009). “We publish anything,” said Al Mutamar’s editor at the time, Luay 
Al Baldawi. “The paper's policy is to publish everything, especially if it praises 
causes we believe in. We are pro-American. Everything that supports America we 
will publish” (Mazzetti, and Daragahi, 2005). Al Destor newspaper, which had 
published articles from the Lincoln Group, confirmed through its editor Basim Al 
Shaikh that the newspaper followed the ethics of journalism, but “these were 
clearly marked as paid ads,” said Al Shaikh (Beehner, 2006). 
 
The Lincoln Group was also assigning Iraqi journalists to write specific opinion 
pieces for payments of USD 400-500 per month (Cary, 2010). Lincoln’s Iraqi staff 
would never disclose the origins or the aims for which these articles were meant to 
be published or, more importantly, the party standing behind it (Isakhan, 2009). 
Although the Lincoln Group would try to remove anything from the translated 
articles that indicated they were coming from the Americans, such efforts were not 
effective. “Many Iraqis knew it was from the Americans,” according to one of the 
former employees of the Lincoln Group (Gerth, 2005). 
 
This policy sparked serious discussions amongst Iraqi media personnel. Some 
newspapers reacted with anger when they discovered that they had been trapped 
or targeted by this policy. Some of these newspapers published an apology to the 
readers for publishing Lincoln Group articles (Hama-Saeed, 2007). One editor in 
Azzaman said that such US actions were a humiliation to the independent national 
press (Isakhan, 2009). The company issued a statement saying: “Lincoln Group 
has consistently worked with the Iraqi media to promote truthful reporting across 
Iraq. We counter the lies, intimidation, and pure evil of terror with factual stories 
that highlight the heroism and sacrifice of the Iraqi people and their struggle for 
freedom and security” (Buncombe, 2005). 
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7-3-2-2 The US Government’s Reaction 
The first reaction of the US government came from the White House, which 
expressed concerns over the allegations (BBC, 2005). President Bush was “very 
troubled” about this revelation, while other official offices demanded an inquiry 
(Buncombe, 2005). American law prohibits such kinds of operations within its 
domestic media. 
 
The Pentagon conducted an internal review by the Defence Department 
Inspector, which found no violations of US guidelines for Psy-Ops on foreign soil 
(Isakhan, 2009). But the inspector referred to violations by the military officials of 
the guidelines for competitive bidding and for overseeing costs regarding the 
September 2004 Lincoln Group contract. The inspector did not ask for any further 
action because the contract had since expired (Battle, 2007). Some of the former 
employees of the Lincoln Group have confirmed that the Psy-Ops programme that 
they were involved in had no impact on Iraqis despite its big budget (Isakhan, 
2008, pp.17-18). “The Lincoln plan was just stupidity, people had lots of money 
who had to spend it before the end of the financial year, because if they didn’t 
spend it they wouldn’t get any more, so they just have to keep spending the 
money,” said Rohan Jayasekera of London-based “Index on Censorship” 
(Jayasekera, 2011). 
 
Observers considered the Pentagon’s use of this kind of tactic as a huge mistake. 
It had undermined US claims about promoting democracy in Iraq. The US should 
have supported and given help to truly free independent media outlets and helped 
them to get real stories rather than fabricating propaganda articles (Hama-Saeed, 
2007). “The Psy-Ops did not understand that there is a huge connection between 
credibility and believability. Everyone could hear something but if you don’t believe 
what you are hearing it is propaganda and it is a waste of time,” said Simon 
Haselock, head of the media advisory team for the CPA in 2003 (Haselock, 2011). 
 
In the spring of 2006, The US military's Special Operations Command decided to 
discontinue the USD 100 million contract with the Lincoln Group, but the military 
officials confirmed that the decision was not related to the revelations about the 
Group’s activities in Iraq. Lincoln Group spokesman Bill Dixon said in a statement 
responding to the news that the firm “continues to win contracts in the American 
effort to engage audiences in transitional areas of the world because of its unique 
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capabilities and proven record of accomplishing the objectives of its clients” (Witte, 
2006). 
 
The US government showed its willingness to continue its media propaganda 
campaign in Iraq (Isakhan, 2009). On 26 September 2006, the Lincoln Group was 
assigned a two-year contract for the amount of USD 6.2 million – USD 20 million 
to carry out monitoring of the services of the Iraqi and Arab media, in addition to 
providing training and advice to the Multi-National Forces in Iraq (Cary, 2010). In 
September 2006, the Lincoln Group offered the “Divide and Prosper” project to the 
United States Special Operations Command. It recommended targeting the Sunni 
religious leaders with US propaganda (Cloud and Gerth, 2006). According to 
Peter Cary (2010), the Lincoln Group had changed its name to Fulcra Worldwide. 
But after checking the name and the website provided, the current name of the 
company (as of August 2011) is Strategic Social.  Strategic Social describes itself 
as “A global technology, media and research company that provides our clients 
with ACCESS to CULTURES which have historically been DIFFICULT TO 
REACH through traditional Western communications. Our expertise lies in 
PROVIDING INSIGHT TO OUR CLIENTS in the markets they wish to reach and 
THE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THEIR TARGET AUDIENCE.” The company is 
advertising jobs now in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United States (Strategic Social, 
2010). 
 
“Psy-Ops were always there, you are trying to undermine the morale of the enemy 
by planting faked stories, the military mind-set is functioning to serve the military 
goals and it will be always like that and they have the money to do it,” said Jacky 
Sutton, IREX Baghdad office director (Sutton, 2011). General George W. Casey 
who was in charge of the US army in Iraq said in March 2006 that the US army 
would keep paying local publications for topics which promoted the image of the 
US. He confirmed that such actions would not violate any US laws or Pentagon 
guidelines. US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called for the US to confront 
the “campaign of disinformation” led by Iraqi militant groups (Mazzetti, 2006). 
 
The military went even further in the propaganda campaign as demonstrated by a 
military official who claimed that the task force had bought an Iraqi newspaper, 
and control of a radio station, and was using them to channel pro-American 
messages to the Iraqi public in 2004 (Mazzetti, and Daragahi, 2005). The official 
refused to disclose the name of the newspaper or the radio station fearing the 
 144 
possible danger which their employees might face of insurgent attacks (Mazzetti, 
and Daragahi, 2005). 
 
Some would defend such policy, like Charles A. Krohn, a retired army spokesman 
and journalism professor: “Psychological operations are an essential part of 
warfare, more so in the electronic age than ever. If you're going to invade a 
country and eject its government and occupy its territory, you ought to tell people 
who live there why you’ve done it. That requires a well-thought-out 
communications programme” (Gerth, 2005).  
 
7-4 Losing Credibility 
Many Iraqi newspapers lost their credibility with the public when they published 
certain stories or images. People became more suspicious about the motivation of 
any newspaper publishing positive stories about the United States or the US 
army. Questions started to be raised by the educated elite about the financial 
sources for such kinds of newspapers. The circulation of many newspapers 
started to decline. But among this press anarchy and the serious attempts by the 
US administration to control the situation in Iraq, two newspapers, Al Sabah and 
Azzaman, achieved a high rate of circulation.  The next chapter analyses the 
contents of these two newspapers and their coverage of different events in Iraq. 
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Chapter 8:  
Azzaman and Al Sabah Newspapers  
 
8-1 Introduction 
Despite the huge number of publications that flooded onto Iraqi streets, only a 
few publications hit a recognisable circulation figure. The only two newspapers to 
circulate over 40,000 copies per day were Azzaman and Al Sabah. This thesis 
characterises Azzaman as an independent profit-motivated newspaper 
representing the private sector, and Al Sabah as a politically-motivated 
newspaper representing the government. What kind of coverage did both 
newspapers present in their pages? What content did both publications have? 
How credible are they?  
 
Many Iraqi journalists hoped that the end of Saddam’s monopolisation of the 
press would lead to a free democratic press, but such freedom was not absolute, 
as it was affected by the security situation and by the interventions of the 
occupation authorities.  
 
8-1-1 Azzaman Newspaper 
Azzaman is an Iraqi international Arab-facing independent daily newspaper, 
published by the Azzaman Foundation for Press, Publishing and Information. It is 
one of the leading Arab newspapers in Europe, and was founded by the Iraqi 
journalist, Saad Al Bazaz, a former press secretary of Saddam, and former editor 
of Al Jumhuriya daily newspaper before he joined the formally opposed 
Saddam's regime and from 1995 lived in exile in London. The first pilot issue 
was published on 10 April 1997. Azzaman covered different kinds of global 
news, but news about Iraq and Saddam’s regime in particular. “We were 
covering the Arab countries in general and Iraqi issues in particular with 
professionalism and an unbiased attitude,” said Dr Fateh Abdul Salam, the editor 
of the newspaper since 2004 (Abdul Salam, 2011). Many stories were leaked to 
Azzaman newspaper from within Saddam’s tight circle. Some of these stories 
were not true, but the publication would publish an apology on the front page if 
the editorial team found out, as Azzaman’s editor Dr Fateh Abdul Salam  said: 
“It was difficult to get the news from Iraq, but we had some reporters who were 
                                                 
 Dr Fateh Abdul Salam is the editor of Azzaman , and the brother of Azzaman’s owner Saad Al Bazaz. 
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working for us secretly” (Abdul Salam, 2011). 
 
 8-1-2 Azzaman in Iraq 
The first edition distributed inside Iraq was on the 8 April 2003 in Basra by British 
troops. The title carried the words “Basra edition” which meant that the 
newspaper had more than one edition and might have even more in the future 
(Falhi, 2006). 
 
This was to come true for Azzaman newspaper, when the publisher launched 
another version on 29 April 2003 with the heading “Baghdad edition” (Falhi, 
2006). Azzaman was being distributed in Iraq earlier than April 2003, but it was 
limited to the provinces of Kurdistan in northern Iraq (Khudur, 2008). 
 
The reason for the existence of more than one Iraqi edition of Azzaman related 
to a contract between the Azzaman Foundation and the British Ministry of 
Defence, to publish a newspaper for the areas that would be occupied by the 
British troops.  Some websites - for example swissinfo.net (swissinfo.net, 2003) - 
show images of the British soldiers distributing copies of Azzaman newspaper to 
the citizens for free. The former editor of Azzaman at the time, Abdel-Munaim Al 
Aassam, confirmed this information: “During the war, maybe after a single day of 
the war, there was an agreement with the British Ministry of Defence to publish a 
special edition of Azzaman… I received the instructions from the editor-in-chief, 
Saad Al Bazaz, that we had an agreement with the British Ministry of Defence 
and the newspaper would be given to the British troops to be distributed in Iraq” 
(Al Aassam, 2010).  
 
The newspaper was printed in Bahrain, but additional copies of the Basra edition 
would be printed and then received by the British troops late at night and they 
would be distributed the next morning in Basra, according to Al Aassam.  
 
The Basra edition was fairly similar to Azzaman, but not identical. “I was the 
directing editor, but this edition of Azzaman would have its own editor. The first 
page would be different to ours, also the third page,” Abdul Munaim Al Aassam 
confirms (Al Aassam, 2010). The current editor, Dr Fatih Abdul Salam, has 
                                                 
 
 Azzaman was originally the name of a newspaper published in Baghdad in 1947 by Tawfiq Al Samaani, but it 
was stopped in 1963 (Khudur, 2008). 
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denied completely any ties with the British Ministry of Defence. He said that kind 
of cooperation with British troops happened only because of the lack of means to 
send the newspaper to Iraq and to distribute it there. “We used the troops 
because the army was controlling everything which crossed the southern border 
between Kuwait and Iraq, it was the only available mechanism to make our 
newspaper reach Iraqis,” he said (Abdul Salam, 2011). However, Dr Jassim Al 
Mljawi stated in his research paper “The Impact of Political Transition on Media 
Rebuilding the Media:  Lessons from the Iraqi Case”, that 10,000 copies of 
Azzaman newspaper were sponsored by the UK in areas where British troops 
were deployed in southern Iraq, Basra city in particular (Al Mljawi, 2009). The 
newspaper was printed in Bahrain and distributed in Iraq and the Gulf states, but 
from 28 April 2003 it was printed in Baghdad and distributed in Basra and 
Baghdad, and the international version was printed in London. Azzaman was 
printed in 20 large size pages, the first and last printed in colour (Falhi 2006). 
 
The Iraqi edition of Azzaman was focused on local issues. On the whole, there 
were no news pieces from around the world or other Arab countries, unless they 
related to Iraq.  Nada Shawqat, one of the editors of Azzaman in Baghdad, 
claimed that the circulation tolled up to 50,000 in Baghdad, while it was 15,000 in 
Basra (Fisk, 2003). But Dr Ahmed Abdul Majid, editor of Azzaman’s Baghdad 
edition, said they were aiming for more: “We started with 50,000 copies of 
Azzaman and we were aiming for 250,000” (Abdul Majid, 2010). 
 
Azzaman claimed to be an independent daily newspaper, but the independence 
of Azzaman was doubted by the Middle East correspondent of The Independent, 
Robert Fisk, who wrote: “Azzaman's London offices and the newspaper never 
refers to the ‘occupation’, only to the ‘Coalition’, America’s own favoured 
expression for the armies of the United States and its allies in Iraq” (Fisk, 2003). 
This is something confirmed by the editor of Baghdad edition of Azzaman, Dr 
Ahmed Abdul Majid: “We did not call the Americans ‘occupiers’, we called the 
American troops ‘the coalition forces,’” he said (Abdul Majid, 2010). 
 
8-1-3 Azzaman Sources and Editorial Policy 
The newspaper had a wide network of journalists and writers in different Iraqi 
provinces and other Arab capitals and even in foreign countries. In addition, 
Azzaman subscribed to the services of news wire agencies such as Reuters, AP, 
AFP and the German Press Agency. However, this newspaper like many other 
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local publications, deliberately “cleaned” the news received from these agencies, 
by reformulation of the news to make reports more accurate and clear them from 
any terms or descriptions which might be meant to stir up sectarian strife (Al 
Dahan, 2006). 
 
Editorially, an analysis of the distribution of news content throughout the 
newspaper shows us that 75% of the front page was taken up with Iraqi news 
and reports representing local affairs, while columns and images of other 
important international news appeared in the inside pages (Al Shimari, 2008). 
 
The editor-in-chief of Azzaman, Dr Fateh Abdul Salam, often referred to the 
great suffering endured by Iraqi reporters inside Iraq, so the reader was easily 
able to spot the differences between reports drafted in Azzaman’s Iraq edition 
and in its international sister. “Anyone checking the front page of each edition of 
Azzaman, International and Iraq, could tell the difference,” said Karam Neama, 
one of the Azzaman editors (Neama, 2010). He added, “I was the editor of the 
Azzaman website and two pages of Azzaman’s newspaper, both Iraqi and 
international, I was careful when I chose stories” (Neama, 2010). 
 
Azzaman’s editors often complained about the censorship that was practised by 
the American troops. The Americans visited Azzaman’s office in Baghdad from 
time to time, or in some instances they asked the office manager and Baghdad 
edition editor, Dr Ahmed Abdul Majid, to pay them a visit in the green zone. 
“Once they asked me to visit them in the green zone and the Americans were 
rude, they considered that publishing a picture of a female soldier searching an 
Iraqi woman in Faluja was an attempt to incite violence,” Dr Ahmed Abdul Majid 
recalls (Abdul Majid, 2010). But it was not the last time Dr Abdul Majid visited the 
green zone. “The Americans called us once again because we got some news 
about Al Qaeda from the Internet,” Dr Ahmed Abdul Majid said (Abdul Majid, 
2010). Azzaman later decided not to report similar stories in the Baghdad 
edition. 
 
Nidhal Al Laithi confirmed that he was called several times by American officers 
with regards to some stories published by Azzaman. Such censorship forced 
Azzaman editors to be extra cautious about the stories they were covering. “We 
stopped using eye witnesses to avoid troubles with the Americans in our 
Baghdad edition,” Dr Fateh Abdul Salam said (Abdul Salam, 2011). 
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Karam Neama from Azzaman’s London office referred to an event where he had 
an argument with the newspaper’s Baghdad office regarding “cleaning” his 
article: “At some point I referred to Ali Al Sistani  as the Iranian religious leader. 
There was a big row in Baghdad about this issue and then they removed this 
sentence from my article, although everyone knows that Ali Al Sistani is originally 
Iranian and nothing wrong with that, they removed this sentence, later on even 
the whole article was removed from our website,” Karam Neama said (Neama, 
2010). Like Neama, other Azzaman writers in London would be careful about 
what they wrote in order not to cause trouble for their colleagues in Baghdad. 
“We are free here [in London] to write what we like, but in Baghdad it is a 
different story. Not much of what we publish here could they publish in Baghdad. 
They stopped confronting the authorities, because it was a matter of life or 
death,” said Karam Neama (Neama, 2010). 
 
In mid April 2004 both Iraqi editions of Azzaman, Basra and Baghdad, merged in 
one edition called the Iraq edition (Kareem, 2007). The merger between the two 
editions after one year gave some validity to the claim that there was some formal 
contract between Azzaman and the British Ministry of Defence. The Basra edition 
of Azzaman appeared to stop after a certain period for no real reason.  This could 
have suggested it ceased as a contract had reached its end. In practical terms, 
there was no need to issue more than one edition of Azzaman newspaper inside 
Iraq, unless there was a prior agreement with another party, which appeared to be 
the British Ministry of Defence in this case. However, the editor-in-chief, Dr Fateh 
Abdul Salam claimed that having more than one edition of Azzaman was simply 
an attempt to avoid censorship. 
 
8-1-4 Azzaman Funding 
The newspaper was funded by sales of the newspaper and advertising only - it 
was not funded by any particular party (Falhi, 2006). “We had agreements with our 
distributors not to accept any returns, they had to take the whole set of copies,” 
said Dr Ahmed Abdul Majid, (2010) the editor of the Baghdad edition. But this did 
not mean that the newspaper was making profit, in fact it was losing money 
initially. “In the first two years, Azzaman losses were covered by the newspaper 
owner Saad Al Bazaz, but from early 2005 the newspaper revenue from sales and 
                                                 
 The Grand Maraja (Religious leader) for Shi’a Muslims in Iraq. 
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advertisements was enough to cover our expenses and even make profits,” said 
Dr Abdul Majid (Abdul Majid, 2010). 
 
The revenues from advertising - a major source of funding for Azzaman - came 
from government advertisements, which covered considerable space in the 
newspaper’s pages. There were low levels of commercial advertising in all 
newspapers as a result of the security situation, as many businesses closed 
because of the on-going violence. Government advertisements would have been 
as difficult to place with Azzaman, as with any other independent newspaper. The 
spread of corruption among employees meant that they would receive a portion of 
the payment for each advertisement the ministry commissioned. Furthermore, the 
publication would be subject to the pressure practised by some ministries, which 
were being run by partisan ministers. This usually happened if there was a 
crossover of interest between what the newspaper was publishing and the political 
party that ran that ministry. Any criticism of any ministry’s performance, or of any 
senior official in the ministry, or government official, could be the reason for losing 
all advertisement deals with a certain ministry.  Like other newspapers, Azzaman 
used private advertising bureaus, which shared the profits of the advertisements. 
The advertising would take up two to four pages a day in the Azzaman newspaper 
(Al Shimari, 2008). 
 
8-1-5 Accusations against Azzaman 
Azzaman was sometimes accused of being a pro-Sunni newspaper and of taking 
a stance which went against the country’s Shi’a population - indicative of Mr Al 
Bazaz’s good relations with other Arab countries (Isakhan, 2009).  Other 
accusations came from one of the better known Iraqi journalists, Abdul Munaim Al 
Aassam, who was the former directing editor of Azzaman: “I felt that the head of 
the newspaper, Saad Al Bazaz, was using Azzaman to fulfil his political ambition 
and the newspaper moved away from being a media project” (Al Aassam, 2010). 
In an interview with the New York Times, Al Bazaz said that he made the 
newspaper investment to fulfil his political ambitions (Baltic Media Centre, Index 
on Censorship, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, and International Media 
Support, 2003). Al Baydha’a newspaper reported a meeting between Al Bazaz 
and the tribal Sheikhs of Mosel on its main page.  It reported that at the meeting, 
he discussed different political issues in Iraq (Al Taiee, 2003). The situation in Iraq 
did not allow the former director of Saddam’s press office to play any political role, 
so it seems that Al Bazaz dealt with Azzaman as an investment.  
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The former editor of Al Sabah newspaper, Ismael Zayeer, accused Azzaman of 
being sponsored by the coalition forces, mainly the British and the Americans: 
“The Americans told me that 40,000 copies of Azzaman newspaper were 
sponsored by them (the coalition forces), they were taking the copies from Bahrain 
and sending it to Baghdad by planes,” Zayeer said. “I attended a meeting with 
Bremer and another British general. I asked them to stop supporting Azzaman 
because we can not compete, I said there must be one newspaper you are 
backing, Bremer said we support Al Sabah,” Zayeer added (Zayeer, 2011). 
 
Al Bazaz faced serious accusations of running a covert propaganda campaign 
funded by the Saudi intelligence to attack the wife of the Amir of Qatar, Sheikha 
Mouza. In the public hearing in October 2005, a bank statement was presented in 
the high court of London showed £2.5 million was transferred from Saudi Arabia to 
Azzaman’s National Westminster Bank account in Ealing (Barker, 2008). Mr Saad 
Al Bazaz did not want be interviewed nor to answer my questions I had sent to his 
office.  
 
8-2 Al Sabah Newspaper 
Al Sabah (“The Morning”) newspaper was launched as part of the American media 
project in Iraq and then became part of the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), which was 
formed in the early days of the US occupation of Iraq in April 2003. The first issue 
of Al Sabah newspaper was published on 17 May 2003 edition number zero. The 
newspaper, at the time, was accused of speaking on behalf of the coalition forces 
in Iraq (Al Dahan, 2006). Theoretically Al Sabah was formed to be “independent” 
as many articles confirmed in the establishment codes of the IMN, but the 
publication was effectively a mouthpiece for any party representing the authority 
(Mukhlif, 2008). 
 
8-2-1 Launching Al Sabah 
The CPA launched the newspaper, which later became part of the Iraqi Media 
Network. The IMN replaced the Ministry of Information by CPA order number 7. 
The concessionaire and first chief editor was the Iraqi journalist, Ismael Zayeer, a 
former journalist at Radio Free Europe (Kareem, 2007). Zayeer said that Al Sabah 
was the idea of one of the American advisors, Mike Furlong, who suggested this 
name as well to Paul Bremer and Jay Garner. “I contacted my old friends, 
journalists and writers, we were nearly 15 journalists and we agreed that we 
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needed two weeks to launch a newspaper,” said Zayeer (Zayeer, 2011). The Al 
Sabah team led by Zayeer selected the size of the newspaper to be the same as 
the French newspaper Lomond Diplomatic.  The content was similar to that of Al 
Hayat newspaper, where Zayeer was working before. “We showed the first demo 
to the American administration on the 14 May 2003,” Zayeer said (Zayeer, 2011). 
 
On the 17 May 2003 Al Sabah was launched to be Iraq’s national newspaper. 
Zayeer confirmed that in the beginning Al Sabah was basic. They lacked the 
required equipment, journalists were writing reports by hand, and the contents 
would be gathered at the printing house. The first edition contained an interview 
with Jay Garner conducted by the chief editor, Ismael Zayeer. This front page 
interview was criticised by some journalists: “When I saw the first edition of Al 
Sabah and Garner’s picture on the front page, I felt disgusted and I said, did we 
replace Saddam with Garner?” said Ahmed Mehana, an Iraqi journalist (Mehana, 
2010). 
 
The newspaper was published in tabloid size twice a week, Monday and 
Wednesday from 17 May 2003 until 2 July 2003. This progressed to three times a 
week, Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday from 3 July 2003 until 1 August 2003. 
Finally from the 3 August 2003, the newspaper became a daily publication, printed 
every day of the week except Friday, Friday being a public holiday in Iraq (Falhi, 
2006). The newspaper started to use the same printing factory as had previously 
printed Babil newspaper (Jasim, 2009). “In June we found the printing house 
number 3, but it was occupied by Al Kazanazanies group (a religious political 
group), where they were printing their newspaper. I negotiated with them and they 
left, then we re-organised the whole place and we moved in,” said Zayeer (Zayeer, 
2011). 
 
The newspaper benefited from the printing house’s professional staff of 
technicians and qualified workers who joined Al Sabah (Mukhlif, 2008). As 
mentioned before, Al Sabah newspaper was founded as a project, supervised by 
SAIC under a contract to the US Defence Department.  
 
8-2-2 Al Sabah Editorial and Management Policies 
Ismael Zayeer was the editor who drew up the editorial policies of the newspaper 
from the beginning, based on his understanding and experience in working for 
Radio Free Europe and the London-based Arabic newspaper Al Hayat. The editor 
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had daily editorial meetings where he divided the coverage among his reporters.  
This mainly covered the activities of the CPA and the coalition forces, but also 
included other local issues. “Our coverage was mainly the local issues which were 
related to Iraqis, they were our audience, and the country was full of events that 
would easily cover the whole space of our newspaper,” said Zayeer (Zayeer, 
2011). Zayeer claimed that the CPA officials were pleased to have Al Sabah in the 
beginning. Malath Amin, one of Al Sabah journalists confirmed: “Bremer said to us 
that you were the channel which put us in touch with the Iraqi people” (Amin, 
2010). Amin and his colleagues were frequently asked to escort Paul Bremer to 
his public events. Other, mostly positive “news” and developments were covered 
by Al Sabah reporters. “We were covering news like the forming of the first Iraqi 
army battalion; the re-establishment of the Ministry of Interior; the beginning of the 
new academic year in September 2003,” Malath Amin added (Amin, 2010). 
 
The newspaper had direct channels of contact with the US army or the CPA. “I 
was attending weekly meetings with Paul Bremer and Jay Garner,” said Ismael 
Zayeer (Zayeer, 2011). On other occasions the US army would pass information 
to the editors, but the newspaper would usually verify the information with 
witnesses from the scene. 
 
The newspaper introduced new terminology for dead people to gain the sympathy 
of the public, by calling the victims who died because of the violence, “martyrs”. 
Certain terms were used to refer to certain groups - such as “terrorists” for Al 
Qaeda or “militant groups” for other armed organisations or “militia” to refer to 
Shi’a armed groups. Although the newspaper was the state’s newspaper, some 
reporters claimed to have an amount of freedom where they could criticise any 
ministry or even Bremer, but still they had some taboos. “We had red lines we 
should not cross, for example not to talk about National symbols such as the 
religious leaders, Ali Al Sistani (Shi’a leader), Al Sadr (Shi’a leader), Barzani 
(Kurdish leader), Talbani (Kurdish leader) and Ahmed Al Kubaisi (Sunni religious 
leader),” said Malath Amin (Amin, 2010).  
 
These red lines which Malath Amin mentioned affected the coverage of Al Sabah 
as demonstrated in a particular story: “I was covering the Sadrists’ demonstration 
and I said there were 150,000 individuals who demonstrated in Baghdad. The day 
after, I was called by the editor, Ismael Zayeer saying that the number was 
incorrect and it was a million, but this was not what I had seen. I believe that he 
 154 
was called by the Sadrists and he published a correction the day after,” Malath 
Amin said (Amin, 2010). The editor was careful about publishing the names of his 
reporters, fearing that the reportage would endanger them and/or  get them into 
trouble. “I wrote a reportage about missing Iraqi air-force planes, but my editor 
refused to put my name, fearing attacks by the people who were making money 
out of that trade,” Malath Amin said (Amin, 2010). Zayeer said that he followed 
such policies to protect his staff.  
 
In January 2004, Harris Corporation won a USD 96 million contract to rebuild, 
operate and equip the Iraqi Media Network (IMN). Harris handed over the 
supervision of Al Sabah to a Kuwaiti-based, Iraqi-owned public relations company 
called Al Fawares (Haner, 2004) which was supposed to help the newspaper to 
expand its reach (Online NewsHour, 2004). Harris was criticised by the chief 
editor of Al Sabah, Ismael Zayeer, who resigned because of what he described as 
“editorial intervention” from Harris employees (Goodman, and Goodman, 2008). 
“Harris (Al Fawares) started intervening in everything, for example the 
representative of Al Fawares, Firas Arory, was questioning Al Sabah journalists 
about their reports! They were questioning our advertising contracts, they told me I 
should not sign any advert contracts. I thought they were willing to take our 
resources but instead of helping us, they gave us nothing,” said Zayeer (Zayeer, 
2011). Harris denied Zayeer’s allegations of editorial intervention at the time, but 
Zayeer left along with another 20 journalists, which in turn threatened the 
newspaper with closure (Goodman, and Goodman, 2008). The Associated Press 
reported that the reason for this disagreement was because Harris rejected 
Zayeer’s plan to turn the newspaper into a private venture. “We informed [Zayeer] 
that the paper would remain part of the IMN,” said Tom Hausman of Harris's 
corporate communications, who confirmed that Al Sabah would continue 
publishing with a new staff (Associated Press, 2004). “Al Sabah was not part of 
the IMN and the Americans told me it is not part of the IMN, but there was a 
handwritten addition to order number 65 and 66 which stated that Al Sabah was 
part of the IMN,” said Zayeer (Zayeer, 2011). The first editor-in-chief of Al Sabah 
did not deny that it was his wish to gain independence from any government 
institute: “I told Bremer in one of the meetings that we hoped that Al Sabah in a 
year’s time would be an independent newspaper which was self-run and we could 
put the legal framework for publication in this form,” said Zayeer (Zayeer, 2011). 
Media experts like Jacky Sutton from IREX encouraged such plans saying, “For Al 
Sabah to be within the IMN was a short-sighted decision, but the people who were 
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surrounding Paul Bremer were not media development experts, so they did not 
direct him in the right way” (Sutton, 2011). 
 
Ismael Zayeer worked in Al Sabah until he resigned on 4 May 2004, when he was 
succeeded by Mohammed Abdul Jabbar Al Shaboot who was working for a 
Kuwaiti newspaper called Al Watan, part of Al Fawres. But he was replaced by his 
deputy Jumaah Al Hilfi in early July 2004 until early October 2005 (Kareem, 2007). 
The interim Iraqi government, headed by Ayad Alawi, who was appointed by Paul 
Bremer as prime minister in June 2004, decided to extend the contract for Harris 
Corporation, which included Al Fawares, for another three months at a cost of 
USD 22 million (Rohde, 2005). 
 
In the middle of 2004 the contract with Harris ended, and the IMN including Al 
Sabah newspaper came under the supervision of the Iraqi Media and 
Communications Committee, founded by the civil governor of Iraq, Paul Bremer. 
The new board was founded according to laws  number 65 and 66 issued by the 
CPA on 20 March 2004. Since that date Al Sabah has been fully managed by the 
Iraqi administration as being part of the IMN; however the editors protested that 
this was not the case. “We did not find any document referring to the managerial 
connection between Al Sabah and the IMN,” said Jumaah Al Hilfi, a former editor-
in-chief of Al Sabah (Al Hilfi, 2010). 
 
8-2-3 Funding and Advertisements 
The newspaper was being funded from public money, which meant through the 
CPA - then the interim Iraqi government - but in theory, it was not officially 
speaking on behalf of the Iraqi government.  However, Al Sabah was keen to be 
the first newspaper to publish the government’s points of view, news, decisions 
and laws (Al Dahan, 2006). But the first editor-in-chief had a different opinion: “I 
must say here that the Americans did not give us anything, not a single computer 
or a car, they were paying the salary of 75 employees a ridiculous amount such as 
USD 60 per month for drivers USD 120 for department managers, people were 
not happy but I told them that I would sort everything out later through our work,” 
said Zayeer (Zayeer, 2011). The newspaper did not publish any advertisements 
when it was first established, but after a few editions they began to appear in the 
newspaper’s pages, as it became clear that advertising revenue was essential for 
covering the expenses of the publication. The first advertisement appeared in 
edition number 50, and it took up a quarter of the fifth and sixth pages. Later the 
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area for advertisements was increased - in edition number 60 they took up half of 
the fifth and sixth pages (Mukhlif, 2008). “We got just commercial adverts in the 
beginning, it was not that much. We did not have people who were specialised in 
marketing or adverts, but we noticed that such revenue would grant us our 
independence, so we gave the advert department more attention,” said Zayeer 
(Zayeer, 2011). 
 
The increase of the space given over to advertising continued until it represented 
up to 25% of the volume of Al Sabah (Mukhlif, 2008). In many cases 50% of the 
front page was advertisements. “I decided to give the adverts such space on the 
main page, because we wanted to make revenues for the newspaper, we were in 
a race,” said Zayeer (Zayeer, 2011). The space given to advertisements was an 
“historical” new development in the editorial policy of the Iraqi official newspapers. 
The newspaper also began using spaces in the interior pages to complete news 
stories, with the headline and a short excerpt printed on the front page (Al Dahan, 
2006). 
 
Like other publications, Al Sabah was seeking to establish financial resources to 
continue publishing in case their financial support, granted by public money, was 
suspended. Although recent research says that the advertising provided financial 
revenues covering 50% of the expenditure (Al Dahan, 2006), the former chief 
editor confirmed that the newspaper started covering its expenses within less than 
a year of its establishment: “In the beginning, adverts revenue was covering 40% 
of the cost of the newspaper, but after seven to eight months we started making 
profits,” said Ismael Zayeer (Zayeer, 2011). Jumaah Al Hilfi, the editor-in-chief of 
Al Sabah from 2004-2005, said that initially, Al Sabah advertising rights were 
being sold to advertising companies. “The contract was giving Al Sabah only USD 
80,000. When the contract ended I refused to renew it, and we started dealing 
with the advertisers directly. We made USD 280,000 income in less than one 
year,” Al Hilfi said (Al Hilfi, 2010). 
 
Other reasons for the increase of space given to advertising was the dramatic 
increase in the number of advertisers through the new laws implemented in Iraq. 
The laws asked any advertiser, who commissioned a TV advertisement, to publish 
additional advertisements in the local newspaper.  This represented 20% of the 
value of television advertisement costs (Mukhlif, 2008). 
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8-2-4 Al Sabah Distribution 
Al Sabah was printing nearly 20,000 copies in the early stages, but the circulation 
rate of the newspaper later reached up to 45-55,000 copies per day. “The 
Americans wanted to give the newspaper away for free, but I refused because I 
know that Iraqis would not respect a newspaper given to them for free,” said the 
chief editor at the time Ismael Zayeer (Zayeer, 2011). The wholesale copies were 
being sold without retrieval as deals were made with distributors to buy all of a set 
quantity. Those distributors could ask for increases or decreases in the number of 
copies, if they had a sense of the market. The circulation numbers might increase 
dramatically if there was an exclusive piece of news which interested the public 
and that was published in the newspaper (Mukhlif, 2008). “Sometimes it was 
100,000 when there were certain events, such as the capture of Saddam,” Zayeer 
said (Zayeer, 2011). 
 
Al Sabah was not distributed in some areas for political reasons. “We had trouble 
in distributing the newspaper in Ramadi, Salah Al Din and Mosel because we 
were accused of representing the Americans. I decided to give out the newspaper 
for free for a month in those provinces and the circulation went up from 150 to 
2,000,” said Zayeer (Zayeer, 2011). The international distribution of Al Sabah was 
limited to the neighbouring countries and was usually late, but the publication 
would publish up-to-date news on its own website (Mukhlif, 2008). 
 
8-2-5 Al Sabah and Credibility 
The chief editor and concession owner, Ismael Zayeer, who ran Al Sabah, tried to 
emphasise the independence of the publication. He said in his first editorial that Al 
Sabah was a “journal of Iraqis first and foremost, committed to their interests and 
aspirations” (Sulaibi, 2007). While Mohamed Abdul-Jabbar Al Shaboot, who 
succeeded Zayeer, said: “Al Sabah is the first national newspaper in Iraq, but 
nevertheless it is not an official newspaper” (Sulaibi, 2007). Nevertheless the 
newspaper, which mostly published political articles and contained events and 
field reportages directly related to people’s everyday life, hardly ever published 
articles that criticised the authority. Nor did it print information which might reveal 
any crimes committed by high level officials or executive authorities such as the 
coalition forces, the Iraqi army, the police or even private security companies 
(Mukhlif, 2008). Many Iraqis considered Al Sabah to be a mouthpiece of the CPA. 
Although an Iraqi government was ruling the country, Al Sabah was still seen by 
many as a product of the occupation (Rousu, 2010). 
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However, the former chief editor, Ismael Zayeer, denied such accusations, saying 
that the newspaper was not representing the American occupation: “It was an 
Iraqi newspaper, not an American one. Al Sabah’s location helped us to be away 
from the American influence, it was not in the green zone, they hardly came to see 
us, even when they came it would be an unpleasant visit for me because of the 
security preparations” (Zayeer, 2011). Despite the accusations about Al Sabah’s 
one-sided coverage, it stands as one of the widest circulated publications in Iraq. 
“Iraqis are used to buying the official newspaper since the former regime,” said 
Malath Amin (Amin, 2010). I believe Malath was right about that. As an Iraqi 
citizen myself I remember buying the official newspapers under Saddam’s regime, 
but I did not have any other option at the time, as they were the only newspapers 
available. After the launch of a huge number of newspapers, I started choosing 
the most credible one that provided the information I was after. I used to buy many 
newspapers to get information about stories coming from different places in Iraq. 
That helped me a lot when I was working as a journalist in Iraq as well as when I 
moved to work in the UK. In the next chapter I present my personal experience 
through two years of covering the conflict in Iraq when I was working as a fixer 
and then Baghdad bureau manager for the UK based newspaper, The 
Independent.    
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Chapter 9: 
Working as a Journalist in Iraq and in the UK, 2003-2008  
 
9-1 Introduction 
This chapter is intended to counterbalance the analytical study of the Iraqi press, 
conducted in the main body of the thesis, through a discussion of my personal 
experiences as a working journalist in Iraq and the UK, reporting on Iraq and the 
Middle East between 2003 and the present. This chapter will present specific 
experiences gained through my work in the UK as a freelance journalist, 
specialising in Iraq and Middle Eastern issues, from 2005 to the present. In this 
capacity I have worked with newspapers, television, Internet broadcasting, and 
news agencies, gaining experience with many Anglophone media organisations, 
such as the BBC, Channel 4, APTN, and Al Jazeera International. But beyond any 
doubt, my experience in Iraq, working as stringer, fixer, and journalist for the 
British newspaper The Independent from 2003-2005, has had the biggest impact 
on my career and understanding of journalism.  
 
In March of 2003, the United States of America led the coalition to occupy Iraq, 
promising to demilitarise Iraq and democratise the country, but for me it was the 
beginning of a unique and sometimes frightening experience. 
 
9-2 Important Events 
My work for The Independent newspaper in Iraq required me to travel around the 
country reporting different events and stories relating to the American occupation. 
Like many other journalists at the time, I was often faced with very difficult times 
and terrible situations. In particular, there is one situation that stands out clearly in 
my mind, reminding me how important it is to be a journalist.  
 
In May 2003 I was stopped at an American checkpoint on my way back to 
Baghdad, coming from Dyala province, 50km to the east. The soldiers began to 
search my car; they opened the doors, and they looked under the car's engine. 
More than four soldiers were involved in checking the car, and it seemed to me 
they were looking for something hidden. When the soldiers finished the search, 
their sergeant came to me and asked me if I spoke any English, to which I 
responded, yes. The sergeant said: “We had information about a car similar to 
yours carrying weapons.” I smiled warily and responded by saying that I was 
holding no weapon, I was holding only this, and I showed him my pen and 
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reporter’s notebook. The American sergeant moved one step back and said in a 
serious way, “This is the worst kind of weapon, but I can't arrest you because of it. 
You can go now.” I continued to carry my only weapon through my work covering 
different violent events for the next 27 months.  
 
9-2-1 From Najaf to Faluja: Being a Journalist is Dangerous  
During my work in Iraq in April 2004 I was covering an event in Najaf with my 
other colleagues from The Independent newspaper. We were captured by a 
militant group belonging to the young Shi’a cleric, Muqtada Al Sadr, and were 
taken as hostages. I was asked by my abductor, “Why are you not fighting with 
your ‘cousin’ Muqtada, especially since you both share the same tribal origin?” I 
was not expecting his question, but I decided to share, with someone who might 
be my killer, a dream that I thought I was making come true, which was, telling the 
truth, or getting as near to it as I could. I believed - and still believe - that this is a 
privilege; to find out about things. I said to him, “You told me earlier that you came 
here to Najaf to fight with Muqtada, but who is going to write about that? I have 
chosen to play my role, while you decided to fight.” My abductor seemed to be 
satisfied by this answer. We were lucky to escape from Najaf, and to avoid being 
the story ourselves. 
 
In the spring of 2004 in Iraq, there was fighting everywhere. With my colleague 
Patrick Cockburn, we tried to go to Faluja. There was fighting in the city, and we 
decided to escort an aid convoy of Red Crescent ambulances as a means of 
getting into the city. But on our way in, the convoy was caught in crossfire 
between Iraqi militants and a US army patrol that was passing through the main 
road. We were forced to stop the car and to jump out and lay on the ground, 
creeping to the closest hiding place through the heavy exchange of fire. During 
these few minutes, as I was counting the American vehicles, one of them caught 
fire. The shooting stopped and we jumped back into our car to go back to our 
office. On our way back we were stopped by militants who appeared to be from 
the same group as those who were shooting at the American vehicles. They 
asked our driver, “How many cars were burned?” I replied quickly, “Four,” 
gesturing to the driver to move before they noticed the “blond” foreigner, Patrick 
Cockburn, sitting in the back seat. They started shouting “Allah Akbar, Allah 
Akbar.” We drove off and returned to our base to write about what we had 
witnessed on that sunny day.  
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9-2-2 Faluja is the “Insurgents” Safe Haven, but Why? 
I covered the story of Faluja from the moment Saddam’s regime fell on 9 April, 
until it became impossible to cover from the field. I was also lucky enough to be 
with the first group of reporters to cover a particularly memorable event.  
 
I met some friends from my university days living in the same street where the first 
incident happened - where American soldiers killed a minimum of 16 Iraqi 
demonstrators.  The demonstrators wanted the American soldiers to leave a 
school they were occupying, so that their kids could return to study. The report in 
The Independent about this incident was the closest to the truth of any in the 
western media. However, although we tried hard enough to get the story, there 
were certain issues that I noted, had been “lost in translation”. These were the 
cultural issues, which seemed to be difficult for the Americans to understand. The 
story as reported by most journalists was that: “The people demonstrated, asking 
the American soldiers to leave the school, then there were two bullets fired close 
to the crowd, then the soldiers followed ‘the rules of engagement’ and shot at the 
crowd.” After asking many eyewitnesses, and because some of them were my 
friends whom I knew and who trusted me, I was told the more accurate story. Dr 
Noaman Al Hadithi said to me that the reason for the demonstration was not the 
school itself, nor that the people wanted their kids to go back to school; it was 
something totally different. He said that residents in the houses neighbouring that 
school were complaining about the American soldiers: “They were watching our 
women, and they have ‘laser glasses’ through which they could see people 
naked.” The use of binoculars by some soldiers was another reason that seemed 
to confirm the rumour and it developed into a story, according to Mr Al Hadithi.  
 
Although it started with a rumour, later it developed into a solid fact: the killing of 
many people. People in the city of Faluja believed that this meant an agreement 
would be reached between the families of the victims and their killers. I recall here 
what I heard from someone whose brother was killed in that incident.  When I 
asked, “What are you going to do?” he told me, as we were sitting in the funeral 
tent, that he and his tribe would wait for a few days for the Americans to come and 
apologise, and then make a deal about the “lost blood”, in other words - negotiate 
compensation. “In the agreement, the soldiers of that unit must leave Faluja,” he 
added. I thought that this person must come from a tribal background, like the 
majority of Faluja residents - this was the way he and others would see things. It is 
tribal law, that the killer must leave the area and his tribe should pay 
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compensation, “blood money”. I asked him, “If they don’t?” Without hesitation, he 
replied, “I will fight until I get my revenge, it is a stigma to live while the killer of 
your brother is walking free and enjoying life.” In this one incident, the Americans 
created a group of nearly a hundred enemies ready to die fighting them. It was a 
lack of cultural understanding of the special quality of the society in Faluja.  From 
then on, Faluja became a regular destination for me, where I covered many 
stories.    
 
9-2-3 Mysterious Newspapers  
One of the main resources for my stories were the new Iraqi newspapers. These 
newspapers, an important element of the rapid expansion of the Iraqi press, were 
covering many issues all over the country; news you would not otherwise know. 
However, these newspapers sometimes carried materials either badly translated 
from English or based on eyewitness stories that could not be proven. I recall an 
event where an Iraqi local newspaper, Al Yom Al Akhar, published a translation of 
an article by The Independent’s Middle East correspondent, Robert Fisk. I was 
stopped by the angry receptionist of the hotel where The Independent office was 
based, and he asked me, “If you think our hotel is dirty, why are you staying here 
then? Tell Mr Fisk that we do not want him here anymore, he is the dirty one, not 
our hotel.” I thought there had been a fight between this normally nice receptionist 
and our senior reporter. But then a copy of the translated article from Al Yom Al 
Akhar newspaper was presented to me, in which the hotel was described as a 
filthy place. Apparently the translation was wrong, because the original words 
were “dingy hotel”. I persuaded the receptionist that “dingy” means dark, and that 
it was a metaphorical use of the word, but I did not tell him that dingy in truth has a 
similar meaning to dirty. I took the newspaper, and we decided to make it our story 
of the day by paying a visit to the newspaper’s offices. There was an address 
mentioned in the heading of the newspaper, but when we went there, we could 
not find it. There was no newspaper, office or printing house. We realised that this 
newspaper was trying to hide its identity, for fear of attack from the different 
militant groups. 
 
9-2-4 Cultural Differences Cause More Damage   
The Independent was one of the first newspapers to cover the death of Baha 
Mousa in British custody in September 2003. I went with the other members of 
The Independent team to Basra, where we visited Mousa’s family. They were 
cautious about new visitors. They were very sad about the death of their family 
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member, and at the same time angry about it, insulted by the way the British army 
had dealt with them. “Do you know that our lives are worth USD 2,500?” Mousa’s 
angry brother told me. He presented a document, which offered this amount to the 
family as compensation for their loss.  
 
The Baha Mousa case was no exception. I started visiting Basra on a regular 
basis, since we covered British army stories (“The Independent” is a British 
newspaper). I went many times to a Basra slum called “Al Hayaniya”. “You must 
be crazy, they will eat you alive. Those people kill for no reason. I will leave you 
here, may Allah be with you.” That was the last warning from the local taxi driver 
whom I hired in Basra, when we started to investigate the deaths of three people 
who, according to a local paper, had been killed by British soldiers. Obviously I 
was a stranger, and I attracted attention.  
 
“Salam Alyakum, do you know these names?” I asked passers-by or people sitting 
on narrow street corners. Different faces and ages, all shared the same answer: 
“No, we do not.” Finally someone called over: “Hey brother, why do you expect us 
to help you in finding those people? You are a stranger and Allah only knows what 
you want from those people”. I explained that I was a journalist, and that my 
concern was to report the deaths of three civilians. Suddenly he called others, and 
I was received like an honoured guest at a big party. “They forced my brother to 
swim, and he did not know how to swim, so he drowned. His friends told me that 
the British soldiers were laughing at him while he was dying,” a young lady told 
me, through tears. In the same slum I was directed to another family who had lost 
their main breadwinner, a former headmaster, who was arrested and returned 
dead in a plastic bag. There were many signs of torture all over his body, 
according to his angry young son. He told me that the British army arrested his 
father because of accusations that he was an active Ba’athist before 9 April 2003. 
This simple accusation could be levelled against five million Iraqis, especially in 
the education system, after 25 years of the Saddam regime. I asked if he was 
going to follow the steps of Baha Mousa’s family. “I was contacted by the British 
army attorney. He told me they needed to dig up my dad’s grave and do an 
autopsy. But I refused because this is against Islam and our tribal law,” his son 
said. I tried my best to convince him to allow it, saying, “I am not acting as a 
reporter here, but for the sake of the truth, let them do so,” but he shook his head 
and said, “No, I believe in seizing my rights with my own hands.” That was his final 
answer. Again, there was a cultural ignorance between the two sides that could 
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prove fatal.  
 
9-2-5 Don’t be Misled by What the Majority are Saying 
Another event where cultural differences led to the death of six British soldiers 
took place in Amara, 400km south of Baghdad. The soldiers were killed in the 
local police station, but the loss of life could have been avoided if there had been 
greater knowledge about the local culture of the area’s residents amongst the 
British military. In Amara we met officials first, then we talked to the locals, who 
accused British soldiers of stealing their gold. This was hardly credible. After 
winning the trust of two of the hotel guards, they whispered the reason the local 
people had risen up in numbers. “They [British soldiers] were searching our 
women. They even searched their wardrobes and they were presenting their 
underwear and laughing,” one guard said. This exaggerated rumour was, for the 
locals, the spark to make them “punish” any British soldiers, even those not 
involved in such patrols, like those killed. 
 
Such stories are a reminder of a general indifference about Iraq and the 
relationship between its different communities. I recall a discussion with an 
American soldier standing at the gate of the green zone, when he asked me in 
late April 2003 if I was Shi’a, Sunni or Kurd. I was surprised that an American 
soldier from Alabama would care about the main Iraqi communities. I took it as 
well intentioned, asking, “What is the difference?” He replied: “If you are Shi’a you 
are a friend. If you are Kurd you are a very good friend. If you are Sunni you are 
not a friend and may be an enemy, because Saddam was Sunni.” He seemed not 
to know that the only Al Qaeda camp was in Kurdistan, that Saddam had large 
numbers of Shi’a supporters, and that he executed many Sunni officers after 
accusations of a coup attempt. His simplistic idea about Iraq’s communities 
seemed to be shared by many highly-placed American planners of the invasion, 
as their “white paper” tells us about designing different programmes for the 
Sunnis, and others for the Shi’a and Kurds, in the media project for Iraq.  
 
9-2-6 Censorship could Lead to Brutal Fighting  
One of the important events that I witnessed was the closure of the Sadrist 
newspaper Al Hawaza Al Natiqa (“The Spoken Hawza”). It was the mouthpiece of 
the young Shi’a cleric Muqtada Al Sadr, and was less than a mile from my office in 
Baghdad. I had visited it a few times. I met many of its eager young journalists 
and also the editor, who told me they were aiming to distribute more than 5,000 
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copies, twice weekly. Its closure was surprising, since what Al Hawza was 
accused of was something done by many other newspapers - that of reporting 
stories based on only a single eye witnesses or for comparing certain political 
figures to the former Iraqi dictator. The closure warrant was difficult to translate 
because it didn’t make much sense in Arabic. It was obviously an order that had 
been translated into Arabic from another language. When I went to the 
newspaper’s offices, I saw many American soldiers surrounding the place with 
their guns, vehicles, and personnel carriers, while the journalists were standing 
aside among the public. I recognised one of them: “What are you going to do?” I 
asked. “We will start another publication, we could use one of our houses as the 
newsroom. They cannot stop us,” he replied. But the leader of the Sadrist Current, 
Muqtada Al Sadr, used the newspaper’s closure to mobilise his followers to 
demonstrate in Baghdad’s main square. The demonstration led to serious fighting, 
in the course of which I ended up being held hostage, when we were covering a 
press conference in Najaf, as mentioned earlier. 
 
9-2-7 Investigative Journalism Does Better Than the Intelligence Service 
One of the stories which I worked on after the conflict, was an investigative 
journalism piece. I worked for The Atlantic Publishing Group, researching a very 
difficult story. I was contacted by a writer, Dominic Streatfield, with regards to 
leading an investigation into 400 missing barrels of HMX and RMX - heavy 
explosives. They were sealed by UN weapons inspectors sometime before the 
war, but went missing shortly after the invasion of Iraq. The explosives were last 
seen a few days before the fall of the Saddam regime by a small group of 
American soldiers and two reporters, in Al Yousoffia military compound. When the 
disappearance first came to light, the Americans said that the Russian Intelligence 
Service was responsible. Months later, the Americans accused the Iranian 
Intelligence Service of stealing the barrels. 
 
My plan was to go to Baghdad and conduct the relevant interviews, but at the 
same time I commissioned three researchers, whom I knew, but who did not know 
one another. I chose them based on many factors, starting with their capability to 
access the village where the barrels were stored, and also considering the tribal, 
ethnic, and sectarian background of each of them. It was not long before I 
received reports from my colleagues that gave me some initial idea about what 
had happened to the barrels. Each one of the researchers sent findings that would 
not stand up by themselves, if not confirmed by the other two. The first started 
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talking to the locals, who told him that farmers looted the barrels in the post-
invasion anarchy. They stored the material in potato sacks. Then the farmers 
started selling them to different militant groups. But after gaining control of the 
area, the militant groups began murdering the farmers and confiscating the 
explosives. The remaining farmers looked further afield and started selling to 
dealers from the neighbouring province of Babil. I asked the second researcher to 
look for a weapons and explosive dealers in the black market. He found one, and 
conducted an interview with him on condition of anonymity, but I was able to listen 
to the interview and ask the questions using the researcher’s mobile phone.  
 
The third reporter came from Baghdad, and managed to track down and interview 
a US ally who had formerly been a militant organising bombing campaigns. Again 
he agreed to be interviewed under the condition of anonymity. He told us how his 
former comrades had bought their heavy explosives from farmers in Al Yousoffia, 
and how they were using them. He also explained that they had had problems, 
since the farmers had stored the explosives badly. Finally I interviewed the head 
of the Department for Defusing Explosives at the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. He 
explained to me the nature of the car bombs his teams had dealt with during the 
first two years after the 2003 invasion. They mostly used RMX and HMX 
explosives.  
 
9-2-8 A Dead Journalist Cannot Write a Story 
One of the options I did not choose in reporting the above story was to conduct an 
interview with a militant. The militant had wanted me to meet him without knowing 
where I was going and possibly blindfolded. Despite the assurance of the 
cameraman about our safety, I refused, because there were no sponsors for the 
interview. There was no third party trusted both by me and the militant, to arrange 
the interview and to handle the situation if something went wrong. Going without a 
sponsor is a big risk, and no story is worth gambling between life and death – a 
dead journalist cannot write the story. I recall here one of the occasions when I 
went to Faluja with Robert Fisk, to report the death of an Iraqi detainee. The 
houses of the victim’s family and of the witness were both in the most dangerous 
area of Faluja, and we needed to get there. I was responsible not only for my 
safety, but also Fisk’s. I went to my source and asked him to get us a guarantor 
such as a tribal leader or a well-known Imam, who would be dealt with by my 
news organisation, family or tribe if something went wrong. He refused to get 
involved: “Are you mad, giving you guarantees? You, I may manage, but what 
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about the foreigner you are with? In Faluja? Forget it.” Those were his words.  
 
Another method had to be found. I knew an army general living in Baghdad, but 
originally from Faluja, who was a cousin of a tribal Sheikh from the same area. I 
asked him to be the sponsor, to which he agreed, and he helped us with the 
interviews. We went to Faluja where we found someone waiting for us; they took 
us first in one car, then another. Then we reached the house of the victim’s family 
where we did the interviews with them and a witness, who was also there. 
Afterwards we were driven to our car and two cars escorted us to the outskirts of 
Baghdad, which was 30 km from Faluja. 
 
9-3 Trauma of War Reporting  
Security was a big issue during my work in Iraq. I witnessed the killing of many 
colleagues. I was careful about who I told that I was working for a British 
newspaper.  Britain was one of the leading countries in the coalition.  My family 
knew about the nature of my job, as did the few friends whom I really trusted and 
whom I asked not to talk about my work to others. I changed my route to The 
Independent office every day, both on my way to the office and on my way back, 
to make sure I was not followed. Although I was heavily involved in covering 
events in Iraq and the work was interesting, I witnessed a great many car bombs 
and saw too many dead bodies. In one of my last visits to the green zone before I 
came to the UK, I missed a suicide bombing by just a few minutes. I was standing 
at the middle checkpoint, while the bomb exploded at the first one. I decided to 
wait for 15 minutes, fearing a second attack, which was a common militant 
technique. But then I decided to go back to find out what had happened and pass 
it on to my newspaper. As I walked there, I saw many dead bodies, flesh, and 
pools of blood. People were crying hysterically, asking for help. I saw the police 
carry a man, and then throw him down and run away. I went to look, and then I 
noticed that there were wires coming from his shirt. This was the second suicide 
bomber, who had not managed to detonate himself, because he was killed by the 
first suicide bomber. I went home that night and thought, “Have I lost my sense of 
humanity, after reporting for so long about the violence in Iraq? Have I crossed the 
point where I have become like a machine which does the job?” My take on this is 
that every war reporter needs to take a break from the war zone. The 
Independent, like many other organisations, provides these breaks for their UK 
staff, but not for their permanent local staff.  
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Chapter 10: 
The Conclusion 
 
After exploring the dramatic changes in the nature of the print media in Iraq pre- and 
post- the 2003 invasion, I am able to share many findings. From being a heavily 
controlled, state propaganda tool, the Iraqi press became a plethora of political, 
ethnic, tribal and sectarian mouthpieces.  
 
The Iraqi press has always been proud of titling itself as an “opinionated press”; this 
term referred to the way the Iraqi press would take one side or the other, and goes 
against the nature of modern professional journalism.  Journalistic standards state 
there should be a differentiation that draws serious lines between news pieces, and 
columns where writers are allowed to present their own opinions. 
 
During the Ba’ath Party era 1968-1979 and before the rise of Saddam Hussein, the 
ground was prepared for a new dictatorship as the previous regime “nationalised” all 
private press in 1968. However, there was a chance to build a free press and even 
democracy when the first National Advancing Front, established by the Kurdish 
Democratic Party, the Communist Party, and the Ba’ath Party rose to rule Iraq in 
1972. There were some internal discussions covered in the pages of these parties’ 
“mouthpieces”, but the Ba’ath Party’s desire to monopolise authority and the media 
put a stop to such progress. 
 
Another factor that helped the Ba’ath Party to achieve its goal was the withdrawal of 
the Kurdish leaders from the front, and their move towards armed struggle instead of 
leading political campaigns in their press. The communists were left alone to confront 
the Ba’ath Party press, who would easily accuse any other party of following foreign 
agents in any disagreement about a case.  When Saddam assumed power on 17 
July 1979, the Iraqi press was mostly government-owned and the few privately 
owned newspapers were more pro-government than the government press. The role 
of the Iraqi media has fluctuated according to the political changes in the country. 
When the government suffered from hardship, it promised to make changes, but in 
the end, the situation remained as it was.  
 
A remarkable point in this period of time was the role of Uday Saddam Hussein - well 
known for the atrocities he committed. Uday’s interest in the role of the press in Iraqi 
society came through his sports publication, Al Ba’ath Al Riyadi. Many journalists 
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whom I have interviewed confirmed that in some way he played a “positive” role. He 
gave them the power to criticise many ministers and government officials, which they 
would not dare to have done before. Although some said they were used by Uday to 
attack someone he did not like, they also used him to attack others. Although not all 
journalists could cross certain “red lines” like Saddam, the ruling family, and the 
Ba’ath Party, in the end it was a small step forward, where journalists were able to 
practise some real journalism.  
 
Another factor which affected the development of the Iraqi press, was the United 
Nations sanctions and the shortages in printing paper and other materials. Circulation 
of many publications declined by up to 90% during this time. This affected 
readership; many Iraqis were not able to buy newspapers because vendors would 
sell them for 5-10 times the “official” price due to limited supply from the publishing 
houses. Also many prominent writers left the country to work for Arabic newspapers 
and publications abroad because of the low wages paid by the Ministry of 
Information. The 13 years of sanctions did not affect Saddam’s authority, but it 
weakened the Iraqi press, which lost both people and printing capacity.  
 
During the sanctions, the Iraqi press led many campaigns against the United States 
following government orders and responding to many attacks by the successive US 
administrations against Iraq. At the same time the Americans were financing one of 
the leading Iraqi opposition newspapers, Al Mutamar. However, the effects of this 
newspaper were limited to the Iraqi expatriate community. Despite the generous 
American support to this publication, it had no influence inside Iraq since the regime 
was powerful enough to prevent its circulation by any means.  
 
When the war started, the propaganda campaigns of both sides concentrated on 
presenting each as the righteous one. Iraqi propaganda was extremely successful 
inside Iraq to the extent that people working in the press actually believed its content. 
Many journalists said that they were going to work for their publications right up until 
8 April 2003. 
 
The collapse of the regime was surprising not only for journalists in Iraq; it was also 
unexpected for many journalists working outside Iraq and others in the Kurdish Iraqi 
area, who were not under the control of Saddam’s regime. This could be seen 
through the hesitation of many editors to move to Baghdad. In many interviews I 
conducted, editors mentioned that they had continued printing outside the country or 
 170 
outside Baghdad for a few weeks until they managed to establish a foothold in the 
Iraqi capital. Meanwhile journalists inside Baghdad and in other provinces took the 
initiative and started launching their own publications. There were many 
businessmen, tribal Sheikhs and clerics trying to gain influence to achieve their 
political aims. At the same time there were many journalists starting to enjoy the new 
“freedom” to present different points of view, which was achieved only after the end 
of Saddam’s regime. Many of those journalists received support from the occupation 
forces or the CPA. The absence of any organising body, due to the collapse of the 
government institutions, led to a plethora of publication titles. Many of the newly 
launched publications used the same titles as had previously been in circulation, 
which confused both readers and distributors.   
 
The post-Saddam Iraqi press was motivated by two factors. One sector was 
politically motivated, while the other’s motivation was financial profit. The first 
category of press was aiming for political achievement for a government, authority, or 
political party. This represented a large proportion of Iraqi newspapers that were 
launched post-war. Many of these new publications appeared all over Iraq, but some 
were short-lived as they were not able to make any profit due to competition with 
other newspapers, provided by different political factions or the government.  
 
The political motivation of different parties could be considered as the reason for the 
dramatic reduction in the number of newspapers in Iraq on two counts: 
- Many politicians who were backing different publications either lost the political 
interest or decided it was hard to achieve anything, thus they decided to close 
many newspapers.  
- The high quality of many publications launched by the political parties did not 
leave much room for the profit-motivated publications to achieve any financial 
gain, especially as the political parties’ newspapers were sold at cheap prices. 
This forced many newspapers to close down, because they were losing their 
business.   
 
Like the press all over the world, the Iraqi press had a problem with sustainability. 
This problem was on a larger scale in Iraq, because of the ongoing violence. So, Iraqi 
press support came from political parties and the Americans, which in turn meant that 
news coverage could not be entirely free from the effects of the backers’ agenda. 
Many newspapers failed to make money because the system of distribution was 
based on the newly formed “newspaper stock” daily auction, rather than a fixed cover 
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price. This allowed the distributers to control the failure or success of any publication.  
 
Two examples, taken to represent the two motivations, were Azzaman and Al Sabah 
newspapers. The first one represented the financial profit motivation whilst Al Sabah 
was totally driven by the authority’s political attempts to inspire the public. Some may 
argue that even Azzaman was originally driven by the owner’s political ambitions, but 
I would exclude such a motivation, as this kind of ambition vanished a few weeks 
after the fall of the Ba’ath regime, because of Mr Al Bazaz’s former relationship with 
the Ba’ath regime, especially having previously been Saddam’s press secretary.  
 
Although both publications were covering ongoing events inside the country, both 
had connections with the occupation authority, whether it was the American or the 
British occupation.  Both allies were keen on presenting their own ideas and political 
opinions on the first pages of these two publications. 
 
The British played a minor role at the beginning of the war through making a deal 
with Azzaman’s owner, but the Americans had a much larger role as the area which 
they occupied was larger in size and more populous than the oil rich southern 
provinces of Basra and Amara controlled by the British army.  
 
In the first year of the American occupation there was no legal framework for the Iraqi 
media to follow in general. Most of the new publications had no guidelines. Although 
the Americans did not impose any restrictions on launching new publications, there 
were not many reforms made to the Iraqi laws which guaranteed freedom of 
expression. Even with the two orders 65 and 66, which represented the new 
framework, there were not many changes implemented in the laws. The penal code 
was left unamended, leaving journalists and the local publications to face 
prosecution, heavy fines, and imprisonment. The American authority in Iraq froze or 
stopped a few articles in the Iraqi penal code, but left many to be used by the 
subsequent Iraqi governments to prosecute and punish critical journalists and 
publications.  
 
The American authorities were keen on creating new publications all over the 
country. The Americans appeared to prefer keeping disagreements with the Iraqi 
people down to the level of criticism within the pages of the press, in order to prevent 
or defuse any potential fighting with the locals. However, there were certain kinds of 
criticism, which the Americans would not tolerate, such as any article which might 
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encourage the public to fight or to attack their troops. The Americans should have 
maintained stronger control over the new press, as they did in Germany after World 
War II by not allowing political parties to have their own press. The CPA should have 
organised training and rehabilitation workshops for journalists in order to encourage 
journalistic standards, before being permitted to practise the profession. 
 
The CPA neglected any media violations except those made against the Americans, 
where in contrast the US army or the CPA would react strongly. The reaction of these 
authorities, whether it was the US army, or the CPA, varied between closing the 
publications, arresting journalists or prosecuting them using laws which were 
introduced after the occupation in 2003, such as order 14, which was used to close 
the Sadrists’ publication, Al Hawza Al Natiqa. Order 14 was vague and it allowed any 
authority to seize any freedom the press would enjoy. It could be related to many of 
the previous publishing laws during the Saddam regime. The Americans terminated 
certain laws introduced by the Ba’ath Party and Saddam, but these laws were not 
active in practice after the collapse of the regime.  
 
The American role had a negative impact on the Iraqi media as it was chiefly 
motivated by the desire to control the information that the public received. The first 
mistake of the US administration was to hand the Iraqi Media Project to the 
Pentagon. This wasted the previous experience that the State Department had 
gained through many years of direct involvement in supporting Saddam oppositions’ 
press. Also, while many NGOs were dealing with the State Department in the 
Balkans, the majority refused to deal with the Defence Department in Iraq because of 
their lack of experience in dealing with the military and fears of exposing themselves 
to security risks. The other mistake was the Defence Secretary’s new strategy of 
outsourcing and handing a no-bid contract to Science Applications International 
Corporation (SAIC), a company more experienced in information control and the 
technical side of building broadcasting systems, than in building a free media 
organisation. It was clear that this corporation enjoyed a good relationship with many 
US military figures, politicians and even former United Nations weapons inspectors.  
These figures were often the ones who had been confronting the former Iraqi regime 
during the weapons inspection period, when the United Nations was leading the 
process. In return, SAIC recruited many unqualified people to pay back favours to 
military generals and politicians, but this had a negative impact on the output of the 
Iraqi Media Network (IMN), the main American media project in Iraq. SAIC neglected 
the press outlet of the IMN, leaving the whole project to be run by one single editor, 
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Ismael Zayeer, from May 2003 to January 2004. The situation was the opposite with 
Al Fawares Company, which was subcontracted by Harris, the company that 
succeeded SAIC. Al Fawares started challenging Al Sabah newspaper for getting 
advertising contracts, instead of helping the newspaper to secure new advertisers to 
ensure sufficient revenues to achieve its independence.  
 
Another factor that undermined the development of the Iraqi press was the 
psychological operations (Psy-Ops) campaigns practised by American intelligence 
and the US army. In attempting to defuse violence against the American soldiers in 
Baghdad and other central areas of Iraq, they tried to buy many journalists and to 
control their coverage. There were many attempts to make journalists cover certain 
topics which could enhance the image of the occupation and demonise the militant 
groups. The Pentagon commissioned companies like The Lincoln Group to conduct 
large scale, secret psychological operations. But the positive stories, designed by 
The Lincoln Group, which the Iraqi newspapers carried, did not have much effect on 
general public opinion. If the Americans had been as generous in building a proper 
liberal Iraqi press as they were in financing the psy-ops campaigns, their money 
would have been better spent. 
 
There are some arguments made about the willingness of the US to use the press to 
increase the feeling of difference among the Iraqi people. This argument is based on 
a “white paper” - the Lincoln Group’s plan “Divide and prosper” - which was de-
classified in 2007. The paper included plans for many programmes and media 
coverage for the Iraqi media once the people were classified according to their sector 
and ethnicity. The “white paper” suggested creating a page for each major 
community in Iraq. It reveals the aim of the Americans to use the press as well as 
other media outlets to increase the divisions between different communities in Iraq 
following the common historically colonial policy of “divide and rule”. 
 
The Americans tried to create their own publication, “Baghdad Now”, but it was a 
poor newspaper, hardly followed by the public. 500,000 copies were printed 
fortnightly, but it did little good for the occupation.  
 
The Iraqi press industry remained in its infancy a few years after the fall of Saddam’s 
regime, and the American motivation to control information prevented the Iraqi press 
from developing to play the role of the Fourth Estate. 
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Future research 
There are many areas to be covered around this topic by researchers in the future. 
One of them is the American propaganda effort to confront the “insurgency” in Iraq 
after the deterioration of the security situation in Iraq between 2007-2010, using 
private “advertising” companies. These companies used different Iraqi media to 
classify different factions as either “good” or “bad” in the conflict in Iraq. Some 
newspapers, TV, and radio stations would give the audience warnings that those 
were “paid advertisements”. Future research can explore the effectiveness of such 
efforts to ease the conflict in Iraq. 
 
The development of the press in Afghanistan is a similar area of research to the 
situation in Iraq, especially since both countries are/were occupied. The American 
effort in Afghanistan has many similar aspects to their effort in Iraq. Future 
researchers could investigate how influential the American role was in shaping the 
Afghan media. 
 
The dramatic changes that are taking place in many Arab countries after the Arab 
Spring is a new area which researchers could explore in the future. Many media 
entities have passed through a transition period from being propaganda tools to 
acting freely after the collapse of a number of the totalitarian regimes in the region. 
This transition period could be studied and analysed in different countries considering 
the many factors that played an important role in shaping the final picture of the 
media landscape in those countries. 
 
A particular case is that of the Libyan press, where researchers could study the rebel 
press in the areas that were under their control. The support which this press 
received, and the sources of this support, could be disclosed by future academic 
study.  
 
This thesis did not cover the effect of social media on the population of Iraq because 
of the marginal access to the Internet before the fall of Saddam’s regime on 9 April 
2003 and thereafter.  
 
Saddam Hussein banned ownership of satellite dishes, and Internet access, which 
was introduced late in 1999, and was then only available to a limited number of 
people. Ordinary Iraqi people could only access the Internet through the 
government’s server. In the whole country there were only 30 or so Internet centres 
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licensed to operate legitimately. These Internet cafés were censored by government 
agents, and were subject to censorship checking of any information that users might 
wish to send abroad. Those who attempted to access outlawed sites, such as 
"Hotmail", could be punished with substantial fines. The technical difficulties and the 
government monitoring system together made it almost impossible, and certainly 
very unfavorable, for Iraqis to access the Internet from home (Cazes, 2003).  
 
The Arab Human Development Report for 2003 stated: “The mass media are the 
most important agents for the public diffusion of knowledge, yet Arab countries have 
lower information media to population ratios... these are just 18 computers per 1000 
persons and only 1.6 percent of the population has Internet access. These indicators 
scarcely reflect a sufficient level of preparedness for applying information technology 
for knowledge diffusion” (UNDP, 2003, p.3). The report named various different 
factors that led to this situation, but mainly concentrated on “computer and Internet 
illiteracy, the high cost of the lines used and high personal computer prices and 
access fees” (UNDP, 2003, p.64). 
 
After the US invasion in 2003, the number of Internet subscribers dramatically 
increased, from around 4,500 pre-war to 59,000 (out of the total population of 
27,139,200). The number continued to grow strongly, reaching 160,000 by the end of 
the same year (Rohde, 2005, p.14). Iraq had witnessed an increase in the launch of 
many local websites, but few websites were registered in the .iq domain administered 
by the Communication and Media Commission. On 17 January 2006, a Google 
search reported zero results when searched for any website registered in this 
domain. The CMC itself is registered as an .org domain according to Article 19 and 
UNESCO report “A Media policy in Iraq”. This reflects the ignorance concerning the 
use of the Internet as a source of information or for business purposes even among 
those who were responsible for administering Internet development in Iraq after 2003 
invasion (Article 19 and UNESCO, 2003, p.36). When analysing a newly media-
literate population, we also need to discuss the availability of the tools required: firstly 
to have access to the new technology, and then to learn how to use it. In Iraq there 
was no infrastructure for the Internet. Most of the Internet cafés, which spread quickly 
all over the country, relied on foreign providers. The Ministry of Communications and 
the CMC were not able to provide high-speed dial-up Internet connections. Such 
issues made it nearly impossible for many Iraqis to have access the Internet from 
home.  
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The situation in Iraq differs in comparison with other Arab countries. In Tunisia, for 
example, when people seized the moment and used social media to claim power in 
autumn of 2010, nearly four out of ten Tunisians were connected to the Internet; 
almost 20% of the Tunisian population are on Facebook. By contrast, the percentage 
of Internet users in Iraq was scarcely 2% between 2003-2006, and fewer than 3% of 
households are online. 
 
The rise in power of social media has started to be seen only recently. YouTube, 
which has become an enormously important source of footage for broadcasters 
around the world, was introduced in 2006; Facebook, which has similarly become 
one of the main sources of news for many press agencies, was launched in 2005; 
Twitter then followed in March 2006. None of these years were the subject of this 
thesis, which focuses on the period 2003-2006. It could be argued that there were 
other social media websites already in use before 2005-06, but they were not nearly 
as popular among users in the region. Also, other social media websites did not allow 
users to have the same power as Facebook, Youtube and Twitter have allowed their 
users to assert, because of the dramatic increase in user numbers in the region and 
world-wide.  
 
The new social media culture was also spreading among the Arabic language 
satellite channels such as Al Jazeera, which became a major disseminating tool for 
user-generated content. BBC Arabic has also started to make extensive use of 
material provided through user-generated content (Harb, 2011). 
 
This kind of culture did not exist among media organisations around the world prior to 
the Arab Spring (from the end of 2010 to early 2011) or the social media revolution, 
which has only been a powerful force since around 2006. While media organisations 
in the recent past were reluctant to use material provided by citzen journalists, today 
the rise of social media has made these contribuations one of the main sources of 
news from areas that otherwise could hardly be covered without such means of 
communication. These kinds of new media sources of information are well on the 
way to becoming an important source for print media in Iraq, and future research will 
undoubtedly find much of interest to follow in this regard. 
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